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Abstract: 
The central claim of the dissertation is that lesser known and somewhat neglected, 
yet influential thinkers, within classical religious traditions have something 
worthwhile to contribute to the kind of ethos we should adopt in the face of the 
world‘s various environmental crises. Moreover an exploration of such perspectives 
is best done in dialogue, particularly between Eastern and Western thought.  
I examine this claim primarily through a dialogue between the Christian philosopher 
John Scottus Eriugena and the Japanese Buddhist philosopher Kūkai (Kōbō Daishi). 
This dialogue, framed by the triad of divine-human-earth relations, primarily 
emphasises the oneness of all reality, and it finds expression in Eriugena‘s concept of 
natura or phusis and Kūkai‘s central teaching that the phenomenal world is the 
cosmic Buddha Dainichi. By highlighting this focus, I contribute to the existing 
academic field of ecology and religion on the subject of holism.  
However, I go beyond the materialist focus that generally marks such ecological 
holism within that field, offering instead a more metaphysical approach. This is 
indicated through my use of the concept of ‗immanental transcendence‘ to describe 
Eriugena‘s and Kūkai‘s dynamic, numinous and mysterious notion of reality, as well 
as my exploration of Eriugena‘s concept of theophany and Kūkai‘s notion of kaji. I 
further explore how both philosophers highlight the human role in the process of 
reaching enlightenment—understood as attaining union with the whole. In that 
regard, I note significant differences in their positions: in particular, I note that 
Kūkai‘s emphasis on bodily practices contrasts with Eriugena‘s more conceptual 
approach.   
Finally to bolster my claim, I examine some ecologically oriented understandings of 
contemporary phenomenological approaches found particularly in the work of Jean-
Luc Marion and to a lesser extent Merleau-Ponty, arguing that these reflect notions 
of reality and of the human role similar to those of the medieval philosophers.  
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Introduction  
 
I. The Context  
It can be argued that an understanding of the human person as being radically 
separate from all other life-forms and the earth itself, what Anna Peterson calls 
human exceptionalism, is deeply rooted in Western culture. She traces the idea 
within what might be considered mainstream tradition, claiming that it reflects an 
ongoing effort to establish an almost complete separation between humans and the 
rest of the natural world.
1
 This sense of separation has been a feature of classical 
religious and philosophical thinking, particularly classical Christianity, as well as 
modern science. It reflects what J. Baird Callicott (quoting Francis Cook) refers to as 
‗the discontinuous and object centred ontology of externally related entities 
traditional to western thought‘.  Such a worldview has been marked by an 
understanding of the world as created, teleological, hierarchical and 
anthropocentric.
2
 Moreover, the focus on scientific and technological advancement 
has resulted in a tendency to ignore aspects of reality that cannot be measured and 
quantified. According to Philipp Rosemann, Heidegger saw this as an effort by 
Western metaphysics to eliminate the mysterious element in reality.
3
 
 
Many argue that these understandings have facilitated a largely derogatory attitude 
towards the natural world, resulting in environmentally destructive behaviour that 
has left the planet in crises not witnessed previously by humankind.
4
 This is often 
                                                          
1
 Anna L. Peterson, Being Human: Ethics, Environment & Our place in the world, Berkeley & Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2001, p. 28. There are many traditions within Western 
thought which we can refer to as minor ones. Not all such traditions take the view of human 
exceptionalism—in fact the core of this dissertation is the need to explore and highlight such lesser 
known approaches to understanding humanity in the face of the natural world.  
2
 J. Baird Callicott, Earth Insights: Multicultural Survey of Ecological Ethics from the Mediterranean 
Basin to the Australian Outback, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994, 
paperback edition 1997, p. 88 
3
 Philipp W. Rosemann, ‗Causality as Concealing revelation in Eriugena: A Heideggerian 
Interpretation‘ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 79, no. 4, 2005, p. 653 
4
 Roger S. Gottlieb outlines eight major dimensions to the crisis: Global climate change, an 
accumulation of waste, loss of topsoil, loss of biodiversity, loss of wilderness, devastation of 
indigenous peoples, unsustainable lifestyles, and genetic engineering. See Roger S. Gottlieb, 
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described as the ecological crisis, and it is the expression I mostly use in this 
dissertation. Such a crisis is manifesting itself today in a critical manner in human 
induced global warming and climate change, the effects of which have been 
devastatingly obvious in many of the poorer parts of the world for some time, and 
now increasingly in more ‗developed‘ parts.5 In many ways global climate change 
can be understood as an umbrella term for the various dimensions of the ecological 
crisis.  
 
The American author and activist Thomas Berry has over the course of his lifetime 
demonstrated concern for this crisis. Yet, in line with many other cultural theorists 
he claims it to be a symptom of a much larger cultural problem. For instance, John 
                                                                                                                                                                    
‗Introduction‘, in Roger S. Gottlieb, (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Ecology, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 4—5 
5
 One of the most comprehensive sources of information on human induced climate change and global 
warming is the Intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC). Online. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/ > (Accessed 29 August 2013). Established in 1988 to assess available 
information on the science as well as the impacts of climate change, it has since produced a series of 
Assessment reports as well as technical papers that are widely used by policy makers and other 
experts.  It received the Nobel Peace Prize for its fourth Assessment report released in 2007. Its fifth 
report is currently being worked on and is due to be released at the end of 2014. There exists a whole 
host of other material on climate change but here I wish simply to make reference to three. The 
climate scientist Dr. James Hansen, while providing detail on different facets of climate science, 
points out that ‗there is a social matter that contributes equally to the crisis: government greenwash.‘ 
There is considerable disparity between what governments such as the US say and what they actually 
do. Hansen recounts his experience as a scientist interacting with policy makers.  Politicians have not 
been able to connect policy with what the science has been saying, particularly with regard to 
acceptable levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. We have gone from 280 parts per million 
(ppm) in 1750 to 387 ppm in 2009—a dangerously high level. Hansen points out the need to reduce to 
and maintain a 350 parts per million so that most life forms (including humans) will be able to live 
comfortably on the planet. See James Hansen, Storms of my Grandchildren: The truth about the 
coming climate catastrophe and our last chance to save humanity, London: Bloomsbury, 2009. Based 
on research provided primarily by the 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report as well as the 2006 Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change but written more like a scary novel is Gwynne Dyer‘s 
Climate Wars. This is concerned with the political and economic consequences of climate change. 
Dyer offers a number of scenarios about how countries will possibly respond to the pressures and 
effects of global warming as the twenty first century progresses. See Gwynne Dyer, Climate Wars: 
The fight for survival as the world overheats, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008, (this edition 
2010). Finally, a recent article by David Barker and David Bearce on public attitudes in the US 
regarding global climate change claims that believers in ‗Christian end-times theology‘ seem less 
likely than others to support policy that would curb global warming. See David. C. Barker and David 
H. Bearce, ‗End-Times Theology, the Shadow of the Future, and Public Resistance to Addressing 
Global Climate Change‘, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 66:2, 2013, pp. 267-279, Online, 
Available HTTP: <http://prq.sagepub.com/cont/66/2/267> 
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Livingston notes that disasters are often portrayed as a series of separate incidents. 
Yet such incidents are ‗analogous to the tip of an iceberg, [in that] they are simply 
the visible portion of a much larger entity, most of which lies beneath the surface, 
beyond our daily inspection.‘6 In summary then, we could describe the crisis that is 
manifesting itself in the natural world as a cultural crisis: a crisis in human self-
perception vis-à-vis the other than human world, as well as a crisis in understanding 
the nature of that world. This dissertation is concerned with perceptions of ourselves 
and perceptions of the nature of reality itself. 
 
Instead of using these more derogatory attitudes (with roots deep in Christian 
thought and in the Western philosophical and religious mainstream traditions) as a 
reason for dismissing the entire Christian tradition when it comes to dealing with the 
ecological crisis, this project argues instead for probing more deeply into the 
tradition and for recognising within it a variety of attitudes and shades of opinion, 
since Christianity like all the major world religions is not a monolithic reality. 
Moreover, as Rosemann further points out in contrast to what he terms Heidegger‘s 
one-sided critique of Western metaphysics: within the history of the ‗metaphysics of 
presence‘ are counter currents that take account of the nature of reality as being 
mysterious—hidden as well as revealed.7 Thus we can say with regard to 
understandings of the natural world there exists a certain level of ambiguity towards 
it. Such ambiguity is expressed in many of the world‘s religious traditions.  Yet such 
ambiguity has not led to the abandonment of religion as a party in dealing with 
environmental concerns. Rather there has been recognition of the validity and value 
of religion in the search for adequate responses. Moreover this recognition has been 
made not just from within the various traditions but also from outside.  
 
In making such claims about the value of religious responses religions are conscious 
of the need to retrieve their own sources of wisdom. This has been one of the key 
                                                          
6
 John Livingston,  Arctic Oil, CBC Merchandising for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1981, 
p. 24 
7
 Rosemann ‗Causality as Concealing revelation in Eriugena‘ p. 654 
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reactions to Lynn White Junior‘s famous 1967 publication.8 In fact the article itself 
pointed to the teachings of Francis of Assisi within the Christian tradition as having 
valuable insights for an ethic of care towards the natural world.  Mary-Evelyn 
Tucker suggests the need for careful retrieval of selected scriptures and 
commentaries, symbols and myths, rituals and prayers as well as a ‗re-evaluation of 
particular beliefs and practices.‘9 Others, particularly those coming from a feminist 
context, claim that fundamental change in foundational theological understandings is 
required.
10
 Since the publication of White‘s article a considerable body of literature 
has emerged on this work of deconstructing and retrieving material and 
methodologies in religious traditions, in the light of the environmental crisis. Such 
work belongs in the broad academic field of ecology and religion, the field of 
research to which this dissertation belongs.
11
  
 
This area, which began informally in the late 1960s by endeavouring to offer 
scholarly responses to issues and concerns emerging from the ecological crisis, 
became more formalised in the early 1990s through its association with the American 
Academy of Religions. While it has focused almost exclusively on concerns about 
Christianity‘s relationship with the natural world, the last few decades have seen 
increasing interest in how the other world religions relate to nature. These decades 
have also been marked by interest from other disciplines concerned with the role of 
religion in human earth relations. In spite of this wide interest resulting in a 
                                                          
8
  Lynn White Jr., ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis‘, Science, Vol. 155:3767, 1967, pp. 
1203—07 
9
 Mary-Evelyn Tucker, Worldly Wonder: Religions Enter Their Ecological Phase, Chicago & La 
Salle: Open Court, 2003, p. 36. This is the second Master Hsüan Hua Memorial Lecture given by her 
in Berkeley California in 2002. 
 
10
 The Brazilian ecofeminist theologian Ivone Gebara speaks of the need to ‗rethink Christian 
theology not on the basis of preset dogma but of the concrete lived experience of group that find their 
inspiration in the very same fountainhead of wisdom that inspired Jesus of Nazareth‘. Moreover, 
instead of speaking about non-Christian religions, Christian thinkers need to talk more about dialogue 
among religious traditions, so that there is a labouring together ‗in exploring new ways of sharing life 
among humans in the context of our earth systems.‘ Ivone Gebara, Longing for Running Water: 
Ecofeminism and Liberation, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999, p. 54. 
11
 Bron Taylor more recently refers to this area of study as the field of religion, nature and culture—a 
title that is associated with the publication of Bron Taylor (ed.) Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, 
London and New York: Thoemmes, Continuum, 2005, (this edition, 2008). 
11 
 
burgeoning field of research, one can point to a common theme across all the 
literature: how we understand the relationships between human cultures, religious 
expressions and the natural world itself.
12
 While some of the earlier material tended 
to denigrate Christianity and praise the ecological credentials of religious traditions 
such as Buddhism, closer inspection reveals that much of the material highlights the 
complex nature of attitudes towards the natural world within world religions 
generally.  
 
As well as noting the complexity and variety within the area of research efforts have 
also been made to critically reflect on the field itself. Bron Taylor has been 
particularly vocal in this regard, highlighting how certain assumptions underlying 
much of the field of research themselves require critical appraisal. For Taylor the 
concept of religion itself needs to be analysed rather than engaged with as such. 
Also, in order to understand better the issues and concerns being explored in the 
material, a number of review essays, such as the work of Willis Jenkins, have tried to 
organise and classify the literature. Jenkins recognises the necessary criticism of 
Taylor while pointing out more nuanced positions in other contemporary 
anthologies.   
 
II. Probing the traditions  
All of this points to the fact that religious discourse cannot remain aloof from 
environmental concerns. This is so because the very nature of the crisis in which we 
are immersed raises issues that revolve around the question of divine-human-earth 
relations, such as the nature of nature and of human nature, the issue of belonging to 
the natural world, the nature of being itself. These are precisely the kinds of issues 
that concern religious discourse, particularly religious discourse of a philosophical 
nature—the type of discourse that is explored in this dissertation.  
 
                                                          
12
 I shall refer to this triadic structure for short as the divine-human-earth relations 
12 
 
Essentially, my claim is that there are neglected but important streams within 
Christian thought that reflect more positive attitudes towards the natural world, and 
these need to be reinterpreted within the context of the ecological crisis. Moreover, 
the global and unprecedented nature of ecological concerns requires responses not 
just from individual traditions but also on a global scale from conversations among 
the various traditions. In particular, such conversations regarding the natural world 
and our place in it need to take place between western and eastern traditions as the 
contrasts here offer rich possibilities for new insights.
 
 In that regard this dissertation 
is concerned with what a comparative study of the apophatic tradition in Christianity 
and Japanese esoteric Buddhism might contribute to an understanding of humanity in 
the context of the natural world and in the light of current planetary devastation.  My 
choice of these traditions reflects my claim that it is worthwhile engaging lesser 
known but influential streams within the mainstream in responding to the ecological 
crisis.  
 
The apophatic or meontological tradition in the West can be understood as holding 
back on the more dominant ontological tradition. Jaroslav Pelikan has described it as 
placing a check, ‗one that was often necessary, on the pretensions of theologians.‘13 
It arose as a critique of what might be termed theological presumption—that there 
must always be a reaching beyond the language used to describe the divine.
14
  This 
effort to recognise the inadequacy of divine imagery was first formalised by Pseudo-
Dionysius with his apophatic/kataphatic distinction. The apophatic ensured that the 
kataphatic, with its generous use of imagery, was held up for scrutiny. Yet often 
those associated with the movement were seen in a less than favourable light, in part 
because the Christian theological tradition, wherever possible, sought certainty. Thus 
the apophatic tradition has held a marginal position in Western thought.  
 
                                                          
13
 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Melodies of Theology, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 
7 
14
 Apophasis means beyond (apo) the image (phasis) and kataphatic means according to (kata) the 
image (phasis).  See Belden C. Lane, The Solace of Fierce Landscapes: exploring desert and 
mountain spirituality, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 62—5, for a concise but 
informative exposition on the emergence and development of the tradition. 
13 
 
The Greek Orthodox theologian Christos Yannaras claims that the understanding of 
apophaticism as a check on, or correction of, kataphatic theology is the Western 
understanding (as distinct from the Eastern orthodox), at least from the scholastic 
period, and is too limited an understanding. Rather, apophaticism is a way of 
acknowledging the experience of the God beyond all human concepts. The 
‗scholastic apophaticism‘ Yannaras argues ‗does not oppose another kind of 
knowledge to the rationalist assumption‘ of the notion of God.  It simply ‗underlines 
the limited character of rational definitions‘ of God. This apophaticism of essence he 
contrasts with what he terms the Greek apophaticism of the person: where 
knowledge is understood as ‗the experienced immediacy of relatedness, of the 
identity of truthfulness and participation.‘ The apophaticism resides in the fact that 
this kind of knowledge can never be exhausted in formulation.  What we are about 
then is an acknowledgement of the experience of the God beyond any human 
conceptual grasp—either positive or negative—since this God is beyond being.15  
 
There has been a resurgence of interest in the apophatic tradition in recent decades. 
Much of this late twentieth century interest draws its inspiration from the 
hermeneutical approach of postmodernist deconstruction such as the work of Jacques 
Derrida or from the fundamental ontology of Martin Heidegger. While it can be 
framed in the narrow sense pointed out by Yannaras, it also reflects the tendency of 
                                                          
15
 C. Yannaras, On the Absence and Unavailability of God: Heidegger and the Areopagite, edited and 
with Introduction Andrew Louth, Trans. Haralambos Ventis, London & New York: T and T Clark 
International, 2005, pp. 28—9. In his writings Yannaras displays a sharp antipathy towards the West, 
and tends to endorse Heidegger‘s comprehensive condemnation of the entire western philosophical 
tradition since Plato. However there is more than an anti-western bias at work. In fact his overarching 
aim has been to preserve the insights and culture of the Greek East, which he saw as being choked by 
the West particularly since the Renaissance. Along with distinguishing the notions of the apophatic in 
the Latin and Greek, he also highlights the distinction between person and individual, and between 
essence and activity or energy. See Andrew Louth‘s Introduction, pp. 1—14, for an insightful and 
concise exposition of Yannaras‘ thought. Louth further points out that some of Yannaras‘ 
interpretation of Western theology sounds outdated, since such theology has broadened considerably 
from the scholastic theology in vogue when Yannaras first wrote this book.  In fact many 
contemporary western theologians would find themselves in agreement with his thought and would 
find his insights are highly relevant.   
14 
 
the West‘s ‗post-Enlightenment stripping away of fixed, rational structures by which 
meaning can be measured‘.16   
 
Buddhism had existed in Japan for 300 years by the time the esoteric tradition 
arrived in the ninth century. Over the course of that time several schools came from 
China.  Like Confucianism, Buddhism had been accommodated by, and had 
accommodated, the existing indigenous tradition of Japan: Shinto. It helped preserve 
Shinto values and practices.   The esoteric tradition itself had behind it a thousand 
years of development in terms of philosophical understanding and ritual expression, 
and the brand to be developed in Japan, Shingon, would also be influenced by 
Shinto. This form of Buddhism is generally known as mikkyo which can be 
translated as ‗secret teaching.‘ Briefly this suggests that phenomena that may or may 
not have a religious value ‗are revealed to contain a dimension that reflects a more 
profound, a more ―true‖ reality.‘ All elements of existence have ‗both a mundane, 
exoteric meaning...and a religious, esoteric meaning.‘ The latter may need ‗esoteric 
decoding formulas‘ but these are available only to initiates.17  Parallels between 
western apophatic thought and Mahayana Buddhism in particular have been the 
subject of academic study for the past few decades.
18
 
 
In order to attain a manageable focus for a conversation between these traditions, and 
in endeavouring to engage a philosophical religious discourse, I develop a dialogue 
between two thinkers from the ninth century: John Scottus Eriugena, the Irish 
philosopher credited with introducing the first comprehensive apophatic tradition in 
                                                          
16
 Lane, Solace of Fierce Landscapes, p. 66. See also Martin Laird, 2001, '‗Whereof We Speak‘: 
Gregory of Nyssa, Jean-Luc Marion and the Current Apophatic Rage', Heythrop Journal, 42:1, p. 1-
12, Online, Available HTTP: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2265.00151> 
(accessed 20 May 2013). Laird claims that the debate is too narrowly focused, framed in the 
apophatic-kataphatic dialectic, resulting in an impoverished sense of the concept. 
17
James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis, John C. Maraldo (eds.) Japanese Philosophy : a sourcebook, 
Honolulu : University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2011, p. 47 
18
 The publications of Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist by Daisetz T. Suzuki in 1957, and Die 
Gottesgeburt in der Seele, by Shizuteru Ueda in 1965 highlighted these parallels. In particular, 
Suzuki, in his efforts to link Meister Eckhart with Zen Buddhism, explores Eckhart‘s teachings on 
detachment and the ―pure Nothing,‖ pointing out the parallels with the concept of emptiness or 
śūnyatā in Buddhism. 
15 
 
the West, and Kūkai (or Kōbō Daishi), the founder of the Shingon school of esoteric 
Buddhism in Japan.
19
 In fact, Kūkai is the beginning of a long history in Japan of 
fascination with the ‗esoteric perspective.‘   
 
Although I have been speaking of a mainly religious discourse, this dissertation is 
primarily a philosophical enterprise. I highlight this distinction because the 
separation of philosophical and religious discourse is and has been a matter of course 
in academia. However this is not the whole picture, and in fact it is only a reality 
since the birth of modernity. Older pre-modern traditions in the West always kept 
religious and philosophical speculation together. Moreover, eastern traditions have 
never made such definitive distinctions.  For instance, in Buddhist philosophy this is 
seen in the reflection of modern thinkers on the tradition. Hans Waldenfels says of 
Nagarjuna: ‗Whatever he has to say philosophically all has to do with clearing the 
way for enlightenment and with the radical liberation of man from all false 
attachments that obstruct that way.‘20 With regard to Zen, Heinrich Dumoulin holds 
that ‗metaphysical speculation, religious practice, and mystical experience come 
very near each other and form a unity.‘21  
 
 
While I highlight the fact that pre-modern traditions in the west hold together 
philosophy and religion, there are differences between east and west. Both developed 
speculative philosophical traditions, yet the east developed more fully in unison with 
religious objectives and practices: what is referred to as ―intrinsically religious.‖ In 
speaking of Buddhist philosophy we need to understand it as 'a mode of speculation 
that takes as its radical point of departure the Buddhist religious experience of reality 
as expressed in the Four Holy Truths', and 'provides a systematic explanation of that 
                                                          
19
 Such a possible comparison was suggested by Graham Parkes. See Graham Parkes, ‗Mountain 
Brushes, Ink of Ocean: Nature as Sacred in Japanese Buddhism‘, in Herausgegeben von Hannelore 
Eisenhofer-Halim, (ed.) Wandel zwischen den Welten: Festschrift fur Johannes Laube, Berlin: Peter 
Lang, 2003, p. 562  
20
 Cited in Jan Van Bragt, ‗Translator‘s Introduction‘ in Keiji Nishitani,  Religion and Nothingness, 
Trans. Jan Van Bragt, Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1983, p. xxvii 
21
 Cited in Van Bragt, ‗Translator‘s Introduction‘, p. xxvii 
16 
 
religious doctrine and its attitude, and constructs for it an appropriate logic.'
22
 
However in the West, by holding onto the Greek heritage with the emergence of 
Christianity, the development of both philosophy and religion is in a context ‗laden 
with tensions.‘ For instance the individual tends to assume one world view when 
reading spiritual material and another in moments of rational analysis. It is different 
with Buddhist philosophy, where the unity of the religious and the speculative had 
never been severed. Having said this, such tension does not mean that comparisons 
are impossible; rather they serve merely to highlight the unique contributions of 
both. With regard specifically to Eriugena (and perhaps again as expression of his 
unique contribution), he is very emphatic in stating that true religion is true 
philosophy and vice versa. Furthermore, he claims that the pursuit of truth is more 
than purely academic - it is intellectual contemplation for the ultimate purpose of 
union with the divine.
23
  
 
A brief biographical note as well as overview of the cultural and historical context of 
Eriugena and Kūkai reveals how part of their strengths is that they stand out as being 
innovative and creative for their time. Yet they remain undeniably within their 
respective traditions. These criteria make them candidates for the focus of this 
dissertation. In a comparison of Aquinas and Kūkai, Brinkman highlights how both 
thinkers, belonged in traditions ‗that emphatically held to a wholly transcendent and 
absolutely other sense of God and of the Dharmakāya vís-a-vís this realm of our 
experience and knowledge.‘ As counter to such traditions both offered new ways ‗of 
perceiving the intimacy of the infinite and absolute to our finite and relative realm of 
experience‘, claiming that what was considered to be ‗beyond all discursive thought 
and description per se is known by its effects.‘ The power to make known the sacred 
is best understood as the numinous in all elements of reality. Thus both philosophers 
represent a certain ‗threshold in and transformation of their respective traditions.‘ 
Moreover Brinkman claims these novel insights and ‗the new integration with which 
they informed their respective traditions‘ have given us a ‗basis for reflection on 
themes relevant to Buddhist-Christian studies and central to contemporary 
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concerns.‘24 While Aquinas may be groundbreaking in this regard, my contention is 
that a similar contribution from the Christian side was made by Eriugena some three 
centuries prior to the more widely known Aquinas. Furthermore, Kūkai‘s writings 
have been described as a ‗rich source of philosophical inquiry‘ yet they always 
remain within the context of ‗Mahayana‘ Buddhist doctrine.‘25  
 
 
Eriugena‘s philosophical thought validates Phillip Rosemann‘s claim that he 
(Eriugena) stands out in Western metaphysics as being an example of the kind of 
countercurrent that exists within Heidegger‘s ‗metaphysics of presence.‘ Eriugena 
formulated a philosophy where ‗the interplay of revelation and concealment stands at 
the very core of reality.‘26 Dermot Moran suggests that Eriugena‘s aim was to 
achieve salvation by gnostica scientia—secret, hidden knowledge. Reality is 
understood to be a ‗dynamic process of self-manifestation, at once manifesting itself 
as Creator and created, and in the same dialectical process withdrawing into its 
nameless origin.‘27 Likewise Kūkai‘s focus is to make known the esoteric wisdom—
that which is more truly real but at some level mysterious—in order to achieve 
enlightenment, while also recognising the exoteric aspect of reality. Moreover, 
Eriugena‘s strongly positive attitude towards human beings stands out against the 
overwhelming focus on humankind‘s sinful nature, which characterised the age. 
Similarly, Kūkai‘s understanding of the Buddha Dainichi ‗communicating‘ as the 
cosmos itself (Dainichi is understood by Kūkai to both express itself and to do so as 
the phenomenal world), as well as his focus on the possibility of attaining 
enlightenment in this very existence, marked a departure within Buddhist 
understandings of his time. His insistence on the possibility of attaining 
enlightenment in this very body emphasises his affirmative attitude towards the 
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 John Brinkman, ‗Harmony, Attribute of the Sacred and Phenomenal in Aquinas and Kūkai‘ in 
 Buddhist-Christian Studies, Vol. 15, 1995, p. 107 
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 Heisig et al, Japanese Philosophy: a sourcebook, p.  47 
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 Rosemann ‗Causality as Concealing revelation in Eriugena, p. 654 
27
 Dermot Moran, Time, Space and Matter in the Periphyseon: an Examination of Eriugena‘s 
understanding of the physical world‘ in F. O‘Rourke (ed.) At the Heart of the Real, Dublin: Irish 
Academic Press, 1992, p. 67—8. 
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phenomenal world as the realm where the highest enlightenment is attained, as well 
as emphasising his belief in the human potential to achieve that enlightenment.  
 
A cursory glance at Eriugena‘s life and context reveals that his knowledge of Greek 
was unusual for a time when the links between the Latin West and Greek East were 
weak. Moreover, his ability in this regard gave him intellectual status particularly 
through his translations of the works of pseudo-Dionysius—the originator of the 
apophatic tradition. His almost total pursuit of a rational explanation for the nature of 
things, through the use of a dialectical method of reasoning, expresses his courage in 
an age where submission to authority and tradition was uppermost. His desire to 
bring together the two intellectual worlds of Greek and Latin into a coherent schema 
is what we find expressed throughout his writings. This reflects the influence of a 
range of Church fathers on his thought as well as his ability to be a great synthesiser. 
In this regard Eriugena is not afraid to contradict accepted tradition. His Irish 
background is seen in his awareness of the need to balance the notion of immanence 
with the hidden mystery of God, a dynamic understanding that differed markedly 
from Augustine. Having said this, Eriugena is anxious to reflect received wisdom, 
frequently citing Augustine in a manner that portrays great deference. Moreover his 
speculative schema, which can be described as Neoplatonic, can equally be 
described in terms of the traditional Creation-Fall-Redemption framework. Eriugena 
in many respects epitomises the tension between pagan Neoplatonic philosophy and 
Christian religious beliefs spoken of earlier.  
 
Kūkai also balanced between a life of seclusion in his remote centre Mt. Kōya and a 
life of participation in the busy world of administration and study in Kyoto. In that 
regard he leaves us with a philosophical system that is both encyclopaedic and 
critical. Yet he needs to be understood as someone immersed in the indigenous 
culture of Shinto, and who managed to achieve an acceptable synthesis of the 
traditions of Shinto and esoteric Buddhism through identifying elements of overlap. 
Key among them, through the notion of kami and the principle of hosshin seppō, is 
the idea that all phenomena express the sacred. Kūkai‘s efforts at balance are seen in 
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his overriding wish to hold together theory and practice and, in that regard, he 
emphasises the sanmitsu—the three mysteries of mudra, mantra, and mandala.  
 
While standard approaches to understanding Kūkai suggest that he was only 
interested in demonstrating the superiority of esoteric teaching—emphasising his 
creation of a new school of thought, a new form of Buddhism—more recent research 
indicates that his overwhelming emphasis was on a different approach to Buddhist 
thought. He saw the possibility of esoteric readings of exoteric as well as esoteric 
texts. Thus Kūkai‘s originality is not so much associated with his introduction of a 
new form of Buddhism, but with a new and refreshing approach to the traditions of 
Buddhist thought.  
 
Eriugena‘s concept of natura, which is presented in the opening sentence of his main 
work the Periphyseon, provides the metaphysical framework for his entire 
philosophical enterprise, using it as his term for describing the whole of reality. 
Within that context Eriugena explores the various aspects of reality in terms of a 
two-fold and a four-fold division. Such divisions are not real or fixed: rather they are 
a way of expressing the view that reality is the continuous restless unfolding of what 
is hidden—the eternal manifesting of the unmanifest. For Eriugena the human mind 
is the leading principle of this process, but at the same time humanity is to be 
understood as embedded in the larger reality of natura.  
 
Kūkai‘s conception of the Buddha underpins his entire philosophical enterprise and 
gives rise to his two central doctrines that the Buddha‘s reality embodiment 
expounds the true teachings, and that the achievement of Buddha nature is in, 
through, and with one‘s body. At the heart of Kūkai‘s teaching is the concept of 
embodiment. Moreover this notion highlights the very close connection in Kūkai‘s 
philosophy between theory and practice. It is very evident in Kūkai that 
enlightenment is achieved only through engagement in esoteric practices. 
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III. The Dialogue 
The central question that I pursue in the dissertation is how a dialogue between these 
two medieval philosophers can contribute to the task of thinking and acting 
ecologically—of thinking and acting in a more sensitive manner towards the 
phenomenal world as a whole. In responding to such a question I firstly focus on 
ecologically oriented themes that connect the insights of both Eriugena and Kūkai, 
and secondly I explore some ecologically oriented understandings of more 
contemporary thought that reflect notions of reality similar to the two thinkers. The 
triadic structure of the nature of divine-human-earth relationships provides the 
ecological themes. This is an appropriate framework to use firstly because it frames 
the field of ecology and religion. More pertinently it offers a comprehensive 
approach to human earth relationships, and the place of religion within them. Thus I 
explore concepts of ultimate reality, the phenomenal world, and the human in 
relation to these. 
 
In exploring a concept like the divine we are immediately in difficulty since such a 
concept tends to be associated with the monotheistic religions of the west. In 
contrast, East-Asian traditions tend not to have the idea of God. At the same time 
notions of an ultimate principle do exist, and in order to convey what both Eriugena 
and Kūkai mean by such a principle some kind of common ground or commonly 
acceptable terminology needs to be established.  Therefore I mostly use the more 
neutral term ultimate reality, particularly in referring to what might be considered 
Kūkai‘s notion of ‗divinity.‘28  
 
Neither philosopher focuses on a reality elsewhere in the sense of a separate 
ontological realm that suggests a kind of dualism.  Overwhelmingly they wish to 
maintain a sense of one reality. At the same time this reality has a depth-
dimension—a hidden numinous aspect to it—that ‗prevents‘ its exploitation because 
                                                          
28
In a related sense it is important to note that the tradition of negative theology highlights the 
difficulty of notions of divinity in the west also. See the prologue in Gordan D. Kaufman, In the 
beginning...Creativity, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004, pp. 1—32. Kaufman argues that the term 
God is one of the most complex in the English language, with ‗layers and dimensions of meaning‘, 
one that is ‗full of problems and difficulties.‘ 
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it is more than a simple resource. Thus both Eriugena and Kūkai offer what we might 
term transcendent and immanent senses of ultimate reality but to varying degrees. 
While immanence is a central feature of their thought, an emphasis on a notion of 
absolute transcendence, which is a central feature of Eriugena, is not to be found in 
Kūkai. I argue that the concept of immanent transcendence can be applied to both. 
Because of the paradox inherent in such a concept it is possible to use it to talk about 
the kind of equivocation found in Kūkai‘s position. Moreover this concept would 
more accurately describe Eriugena‘s position than would an over emphasis on 
absolute transcendence. In grappling to communicate their notions of ultimate reality 
the question of language is raised. For Kūkai, this concerns the fact that the usual 
forms of expression need to be supplemented by others such as ritual practices. More 
discursive forms of expression need the symbolic language associated with the 
sanmitsu, which are in all phenomena, and together they convey in different ways 
the Dharma—Dainichi‘s self-expression. Eriugena highlights the need to resort to 
the two branches of theology—the kataphatic and apophatic—to express the divine 
most accurately. He relates his apophatic language for the divine mystery to the 
notion of theophany: there is a movement from the ‗nothingness‘ of God (understood 
in the sense of ‗more-than‘ or ‗excess‘) to creation understood as theophanic 
expression.   
 
Both philosophers express a dynamic sense of the phenomenal world and view it in a 
positive light. Kūkai‘s background and the influence of Shinto meant that he was 
influenced by an environment where human and natural were intimately related. 
Moreover the influence of his constant returning to his mountain retreat to meditate 
is reflected in his writings, giving expression to a sense of nature taming the human 
mind rather than culture controlling nature. This contrasted with court writings of the 
time where poetry was used to capture and transform natural beauty. Eriugena‘s 
dynamic sense of the phenomenal world can be attributed to his Irish-Celtic 
background and his Neoplatonism. This dynamic understanding is a departure from 
the more static standard version of creation associated with Augustine, and it gives to 
creation a more active role as the manifestation of the divine mystery. In spite of the 
dynamism inherent in both accounts of the phenomenal world, Eriugena maintains 
the traditional Christian concepts of creator and creation, but more as a kind of 
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‗dualistic‘ oneness. Kūkai‘s account, on the other hand, suggests a type of ‗monistic‘ 
oneness. The six Great Elements are both creating and created. Unlike Eriugena 
where God is ultimate cause of all things, there is no true cause to reality other than 
the causeless cause, which in effect is the absence of cause. Yet, Eriugena‘s divine 
mystery, being the nothingness beyond being (seen only in its effects), means that 
ultimate causality is also a nothingness, best understood via Umberto Eco‘s image of 
an onion.  
 
Eriugena and Kūkai in different ways suggest that the phenomenal world both points 
to the numinous and is that numinous or ultimate truth expressing itself. The use of 
the interaction of concepts like text and world helps us understand this. Esoteric texts 
and esoteric readings of texts reflect the world not in the sense of representing but in 
a more material sense, leading to the understanding of the text as the world and the 
world as the text. As manifestation of God, the world can be seen as the text or word 
of God in Eriugena. God, as the meaning expressed by the text, not only grounds the 
text but can only be found in it. 
 
In a sense the grappling with such understandings is not just an intellectual exercise 
for either philosopher; rather it is in the service of reaching enlightenment, which is 
the true identity of the human. A transformed vision is being sought. Enlightenment 
consists of seeing the world differently—seeing it as sacred—and it is achieved for 
Eriugena through the notion of theophany. While theophany is God‘s initiative, 
human cooperation is required in order to reach enlightenment. Kūkai offers a 
similar notion in the term kaji —the grace of the three mysteries—to indicate how 
the human reaches enlightenment, and is best expressed in the idea of the 
interpenetration of the Buddha and the one seeking enlightenment: I am in the 
Buddha and the Buddha is in me.  
 
Engaging in the practices associated with the sanmitsu is central to reaching true 
reality for Kūkai, making the body (rather than mind) central to the process. The 
notion of a body and mind duality, as in the west, is not a part of Eastern thinking. 
However the concept of bodymind has been coined to indicate the lack of duality. 
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Kūkai gives priority to the body aspect. The mudra, mantra and mandala practices 
enable the practitioner to align his or her behaviour with that of the Buddha‘s self-
expression. Ultimately it concerns a coming to an awareness of what already is true 
reality: the phenomenal world is Dainichi expressing himself.  For Eriugena, the soul 
creates the body to express itself just as the divine creates the world as its self-
expression. The mind creates the body and the entire sensible universe is what is 
suggested. Overall there is much greater ambiguity towards the body in Eriugena, 
which reflects the general western attitude toward corporeality. This is most clearly 
seen in his reflections on sin: while sin is related to human existence rather than 
human nature, the consequence of turning in on oneself (what sin effectively is for 
Eriugena) is the creation of the body. At the same time the body is also an aspect of 
coming to enlightenment. So the body (material reality) on the one hand offers 
possibility and on the other is seen as a source of danger. While Eriugena does not 
develop an understanding of praxis, like Kūkai, it can be argued that his notion of the 
Latin contemplatio or the Greek theoria is concerned less with thinking about reality: 
rather it refers directly to perceiving reality. This meant a kind of mental perception 
that was concerned with self-observation in relation to how one engaged with 
reality.
29
 It was aided by a process of experiential mindfulness akin to Nishitani‘s 
notion of ‗the real self-awareness of reality‘.30 
 
While human nature contains elements from the corporeal and intelligible worlds, 
Eriugena tends to emphasise its exalted role as mediator for all things. This mediator 
role can be contrasted with the notion found in Kūkai of the human as microcosmic 
expression of the macrocosmos.  The emphasis here in Kūkai is on unity and on 
expressing what is, while in Eriugena it is about all things coming back to the One 
via the human, giving the human a very central role in his schema. 
 
 
                                                          
29
 There are here intimations of contemporary phenomenological approaches, which are concerned 
not just with the direct perceiving of reality but also with how that is done. 
30
 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, p. 5 
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IV. The contemporary scene  
In turning to more contemporary ecologically oriented understandings with which to 
link the dialogue I focus firstly on the overall nature of reality as posited in Eriugena 
and Kūkai, in order to ascertain how it might contribute to an ecological ethic 
relevant for today. A common point emerging in their thinking is the notion of 
alterity or the sense of the numinous in all things, which gives to reality a depth-
dimension. However, this needs to be understood in the context of their strong 
emphasis on one ontological realm. I argue that the depth-dimension finds parallels 
today in Maurice Merleau-Ponty‘s interpretation of the il y a and also in Jean-Luc 
Marion‘s espousal of givenness being the essence of reality. The interest in such 
ideas emerged from the turn in French phenomenology that began to, more seriously, 
take account of phenomena that lay outside of direct sensory experience. These 
understandings provide a basis for an ecological response appropriate to religious 
traditions.  
 
Secondly, in exploring the nature and role of the human person I argue that human 
identity is found in responding to, or engaging with, the reality as it expresses itself 
in a variety of forms. This reality is most truly characterised as sacred, and humans 
are called out into it. It is interesting to note that this sense of reality—the really 
real—is what Nishitani refers to as true religion. This invitation or call outwards can 
also be understood as a response to the giving of the other. In that regard Marion‘s 
efforts to make the subject entirely passive are shown to be in need of critical 
appraisal. Moreover, the claim is that such an appraisal emerges from within 
Marion‘s work itself. On the one hand, in his efforts to remain faithful to the 
phenomenological tradition of Husserl he wishes to transmute the autonomous 
constituting subject of modernity into a passive receptor of givenness. On the other 
hand, he wishes to maintain an active role for such a subject.   
 
In line with the work of Shane Mackinlay I argue for a ‗middle-voiced‘ description 
of the role for the subject—that of active receptor.  Rather than phenomena being 
understood as pure givens, they are understood within a hermeneutical space opened 
by the subject‘s active reception of the phenomena in the first place.  Such a role, 
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which suggests a kind of passive-active dialectic, reflects the sense of the human 
subject found in Eriugena and Kūkai, as demonstrated by the ideas of theophany in 
Eriugena and kaji linked with the praxis of the three mysteries in Kūkai. 
 
Finally, in fleshing out what an understanding of the human as active receptor might 
mean in terms of practical ecological living, I engage the work of Mark 
Manolopoulos. In exploring how one might comport oneself towards the 
phenomenal world, Manolopoulos talks of creating an ethos built on the idea of 
oscillational thinking on the gift—in particular a reworked notion of Marion‘s. There 
is recognition, on the one hand, of the sheer givenness of reality and, on the other, of 
a subject that could be described as an active receptor. In that context I explore a 
number of elements of such comportment towards the world. Firstly, the idea of 
silence as a response can be seen as exemplary since it recognises the primordial 
silence that marks the reception of phenomena. It honours a version of reality that is 
not about having all the answers or about seeing the world as resource. Moreover it 
is reflected in the apophatic emphasis of Eriugena and in the experience of emptiness 
that characterises the Buddhist tradition.  As Kūkai points out true perception can 
only happen when we let go of the ordinary language of the everyday. Then we are 
able to recognise the silent boiling up of this primordial reality. A second element 
explored concerns our way of knowing. We engage in a kind of knowing that 
involves its opposite not-knowing. This is the recognition that engaging with reality 
as it really is means accepting that it can never be fully grasped and as such be in 
danger of being exploited. More interventionist type responses are then explored 
through the notion of violence and finally, our comportment also needs to be marked 
by elements such as playfulness and enjoyment. Here again is a form of oscillation: 
there is the danger of using nature for our own enjoyment, yet when done with an 
attitude of letting be, it gives rise to a gentler kind of recreation. Such elements of 
how one might engage as an active receptor reflect the more primordial notion of 
unity inherent in the positions of Eriugena and Kūkai. Thus we are part of a larger 
whole on which we depend and within which we play a particular role.   
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V. Chapter outlines 
This study recognises the ambiguity and at the same time value of religious 
responses to the ecological crisis. Such recognition is explored at the beginning of 
Chapter One. Moreover, because it is concerned with a philosophical exploration of 
questions about human self-understandings vis-à-vis the natural world, as well as an 
exploration of philosophical religious approaches concerned with a more immanental 
understanding of ultimate reality, it contributes to the broad field of religion and 
ecology. Thus it is helpful to offer a cursory overview of the literature in the field. 
This is the subject matter of the remainder of Chapter One, making this chapter the 
first of two contextual chapters. Since both Eriugena and Kūkai predate 
contemporary reality by more than a thousand years, and in order to create as rich a 
dialogue as possible, a second contextual chapter (Chapter Two) is necessary to give 
us a sense of their worlds. This consists of a brief outline of the historical and 
cultural contexts of these philosophers. In the case of Eriugena I offer a brief sketch 
of his Irish background, of Carolingian life and culture, and of the Latin and Greek 
Patristic influences on his thought. Exploring Kūkai‘s context also entails a brief 
sketch of his life, as well as brief comment on the origin and arrival in Japan of 
esoteric Buddhism, and reference to the Shinto-Buddhist syncretism that forms the 
backdrop of his thought.  
 
I conclude Chapter Two by offering a brief note on some of the main portrayals of 
the respective philosophical positions of Eriugena and Kūkai and outline the central 
concepts in their thought: the notion of natura in Eriugena and the idea of the 
embodiment of all reality in Kūkai. This leads into a very long chapter Three, which 
concerns the first exploration of the central question of the dissertation, and involves 
a comparison of the thought of Eriugena and Kūkai. There are three main areas of 
dialogue and these mirror my initial concern regarding the value of exploring 
philosophical understandings of divine-human-earth relations, as responses to 
current ecological destruction, as well as the value of a focus on lesser known 
thinkers within mainstream religious traditions.  
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Firstly, I approach the sense of the divine or ultimate reality found in their respective 
philosophies using the concepts of transcendence and immanence, noting how 
strongly immanental is the idea of mystery in both; secondly, I look at how the 
actual universe is understood in both their cosmologies, noting how the phenomenal 
world is understood to be the expression of what might be termed mystery for both 
Eriugena and Kūkai;  and thirdly, I explore how the role of the human person vis-à-
vis the natural world is understood in their respective schemes. This is a pivotal yet 
non-exploitative role. In other words, I approach the overall visions of Eriugena and 
Kūkai from three perspectives, that of notions of the divine or ultimate reality, of the 
cosmos or the phenomenal world, and that of the human as having a particular role 
within their overall schemes.  
 
The second aspect of the central question is about linking the dialogue with 
contemporary ecological writings. This is the subject matter of Chapter Four. I take a 
two-fold approach here: firstly, I consider the overall nature of reality as it emerges 
in Eriugena and Kūkai and how that might contribute to an ecological ethic relevant 
for this time. Ultimately, what is at issue here is the notion of cultivating a way of 
life. Secondly, I focus on the kind of human subjectivity that such an ethic would 
suggest. This involves a notion of subjectivity different from the modern 
autonomous subject and more reflective of the human as part of a larger reality, 
found in both Eriugena and Kūkai. This understanding sees the human as neither 
completely passive nor absolutely autonomous. I finish by briefly exploring aspects 
of how such a human subject might engage with the phenomenal world.  The 
conclusion offers brief comment on possible future study. 
 
VI. Methodology 
While the methodology underpinning this project can be described as an exercise in 
comparative philosophy, I focus primarily on the use of dialogue rather than simple 
comparison. I do so firstly because dialogue is generally richer and more engaging 
than comparison, which can often involve a kind of rigidity. In that regard dialogue 
makes possible a broader kind of engagement between the philosophies being 
compared. It also allows for the engagement of difference to a much greater degree 
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than does comparison, which tends to focus on like-for-like. Furthermore, where 
quite different traditions are in dialogue a conversational approach reduces the 
possibility of favouring the insights of one tradition over another. At the same time 
conversation makes real the possibility of seeing either tradition in a new light 
because it aims at a ‗value-free‘ non-judgmental engagement. This is because at the 
heart of a conversational or dialogical approach is the desire to understand the other 
rather than simply to compare different points of view.  
 
The conversational approach also reflects the physicist David Bohm‘s notion that 
dialogue should not be confused with discussion or debate, both of which are 
concerned with reaching a decision. Instead, dialogue is aimed simply at exploring 
and learning, and so allows for the emergence of something new. Often, comparing 
East-West religious and philosophical traditions, particularly from the vantage point 
of Western Christian thought, has tended to be ‗thinking about‘ the other tradition 
rather than ‗thinking with‘ them on an equal footing. The former has tended to be 
little more than an exercise in allowing for religious or philosophical diversity, while 
the latter strongly suggests a grappling together for deeper insights into ultimate 
questions of concern. Moreover, the former approach has often tended to hold the 
Christian perspective as primary, against which the other has been measured.
31
 Thus 
my comparison of Eriugena and Kūkai with its emphasis on dialogue, in the context 
of a project that is primarily an exercise in applied philosophy, will promote the 
emergence of new insights that are more relevant to today‘s reality.   
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 Lewis Lancaster offers an interesting example of this scenario in terms of Christianity and 
Buddhism. The practice of giving to the poor has been held up as a good thing to do in the West. 
Various confraternities such as Lions and Masons, aid projects, and a whole host of other 
organisations have grown up over time. The call for Buddhism to do likewise can be seen as 
Christianity‘s approach being superior and Buddhism needing to emulate the West. This becomes 
especially problematic when the full circumstances of such practices are taken into account. While 
such aid is laudable it has its dark side. Studies suggest that such giving can sometimes be 
patronising, in that those without are in some sense inferior.  To project western practices, then, on 
another tradition carries with it the danger of also transferring the difficulties with them. See Lewis 
Lancaster,‘ Buddhism and Ecology: Collective Cultural Perceptions‘, in Mary-Evelyn Tucker & 
Duncan R. Williams (eds.) Buddhism & Ecology: The Interconnection of Dharma & Deeds, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni. Press, 1997, pp. 5—6 
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A second method touched on is that of phenomenology. I am not so much doing 
phenomenology in this dissertation as engaging with and highlighting the value of 
the approach. This I do primarily via the work of Jean Luc Marion and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. I also draw from a number of others who reflect on their work 
particularly from an ecological perspective. Contemporary phenomenologists such as 
Ted Toadvine and Charles Brown claim that phenomenology, as a method in 
philosophy, can play an important role in developing a new relationship with the 
natural world.
32
 They suggest that the contribution of philosophy will most likely be 
about the ‗steady and insightful clarification of our ethical and metaphysical 
assumptions about ourselves and the world around us.‘ Similarly, Simon James has 
pointed out that inattention to ‗nature-as-experienced‘ not only makes environmental 
philosophy as a discipline appear abstract, it also makes for ‗bad philosophy.‘33  
 
Many of our assumptions are no longer adequate in responding to the questions 
raised by climate change, loss of biodiversity, or global pollution. Brown and 
Toadvine argue for bringing a phenomenological approach to ecological issues in 
what is being termed ecophenomenology, while James suggests that taking a 
phenomenological approach consists in ‗attending to and reflecting on one‘s 
experience‘ of the natural world, a task that takes much ―time and effort.‖34  
Phenomenology‘s emphasis, through the work of Husserl on a return to the things 
themselves and on a critique of scientific naturalism, parallels contemporary 
environmental thinking.  In other words we begin with our experience of the world, 
something largely forgotten by the scientific method which has succeeded in 
providing us with a highly abstract and reductionist conception of nature. The value 
then of a phenomenological approach is that it keeps our experience of the natural 
world as the basis from which we begin to understand ourselves and the world in 
which we find ourselves.  
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Phenomenological approaches also parallel in some ways the ancient and early 
medieval understanding of philosophy as a way of life. Both focus on a practical 
approach to philosophy though in somewhat different ways. In understanding ancient 
philosophy as a way of life, Pierre Hadot highlights its very practical nature. It was 
not, as is often the case in philosophical discourse today, the ‗construction of a 
technical jargon reserved for specialists.‘ Rather philosophy was an ‗art of living‘ for 
humankind, ‗a mode-of-existing-in-the-world,‘ something had to be continually 
practiced, with the goal of transforming one‘s whole life.35 The activity of 
philosophy was ‗an all embracing activity requiring total engagement‘ by the 
philosopher.
36
 The name philosophy, originally meaning love of wisdom, 
encapsulates both the goal and approach of ancient philosophy, because ‗real 
wisdom does not merely cause us to know: it makes us ―be‖ in a different way.‘ 
Hadot further highlights that it is through the practice of spiritual exercises such as 
meditative practices and the contemplation of nature that this way of engaging 
philosophy happens. Kūkai very explicitly and Eriugena more implicitly not only 
advocates praxis but clearly show that theory and praxis are bound together in the 
efforts to reach enlightenment.
 37
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Chapter 1: The Context  
 
I. Ambiguity in the Traditions  
The ambiguity within religious traditions, particularly Christianity, towards nature 
exists at the level of popular cultural understanding, and is also highlighted in 
academic work in this area. In terms of everyday understandings, while there exists a 
general recognition of the goodness of creation (stemming from the Genesis 
proclamation that God saw all that he made as good), the tendency to emphasise the 
other-worldliness of humanity‘s true home (in some heavenly realm—often thought 
of in a spatial sense) is undoubtedly a more popular hallmark of the tradition‘s 
thinking. This is reinforced by ritual practices that largely focus on some future 
oriented afterlife as a better place, and on how one can get there.
38
 One can argue 
that this has contributed to the flourishing of a disregard for nature rather than an 
enhancement of it, in Western Christian culture. This disregard has not been 
deliberate, but the result is a failure in the general mindset to posit any obvious 
correlation between Christian belief and concern for the natural world.  Therefore, it 
has long been the practice to confine understandings of divine relations with the 
world to the human realm.  In the past this has not been overly problematic, now 
however in the context of the ecological crisis, such understandings prove to be 
lacking and less than helpful in terms of formulating appropriate human-earth 
relations. 
 
In more scholarly contexts the ambiguity is a point asserted by the theologian H. 
Paul Santmire with regard to Christianity in his aptly subtitled 1985 volume 
investigating Western Christianity‘s attitudes towards nature. Santmire attempted to 
show that the tradition is inherently ambiguous, being neither ‗ecologically 
bankrupt‘ nor obviously ecological in its outlook.  As such it contains possibilities 
for ‗a rich theology of nature‘. However, the process of unearthing these possibilities 
requires great care and caution so that positive elements can be separated from 
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numerous less positive and antithetical ones. Thus Santmire concludes we can talk of 
‗the ambiguous ecological promise of Christian theology.‘39 
 
An aspect of this ambiguity which is of relevance in the context of this dissertation 
concerns the body of literature known as Celtic Studies.
40
 Much recent literature on 
Celtic Christianity suggests that this branch of the tradition had a strong positive 
awareness of the natural world. Many writers, interested in nurturing a care for 
creation, cite early Celtic Christian society as being exemplary and somewhat unique 
in this regard. However, others argue that such writers ‗may be promoting an 
artificial construct, developed from a selective reading of the literature‘ and from ‗a 
romantic nostalgia and a wishful projection of how things were and ought to be 
today‘. While there is clear evidence that Celtic Christians had an affinity for nature, 
a more nuanced investigation of the literature reveals that this is not the entire 
picture. Nearer the truth is that Celtic Christianity displayed an ambivalent attitude 
towards the natural world, on the one hand, speaking about it in glowing terms 
while, on the other, describing it as ‗menacing, chaotic and hostile.‘ 41  
 
While Buddhism‘s track record in terms of its attitude towards the natural world is 
popularly understood as being considerably more sympathetic in its outlook, this 
view needs to be critically analysed as ambiguity is also found there. It is important 
to realise that there is not just one Buddhist perspective: nearer the truth is the 
recognition that Buddhist perspectives on the natural world are quite diverse. While 
some earlier schools of Buddhism emphasise withdrawal from the world, later 
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schools affirm the interconnection of all reality.
42
  And while questions can be raised 
regarding the limit and value of the ‗love of nature‘ in Japanese Buddhist traditions, 
they contain rich and imaginative understandings of how we might positively view 
the natural world. In fact the particular fusion of nature and culture in the Japanese 
mindset is one from which the western modern mindset of separation has much to 
learn.
43
  For instance, Graham Parkes argues that traditional East Asian 
understandings of the human nature relationship are ‗remarkably un-
anthropocentric‘, (in contrast to mainstream western traditions), even though it is the 
Western conceptions that now dominate in both China and Japan. He uses the 
examples of Kūkai and Dōgen to examine the human-nature relationship as found in 
ancient and medieval Japan, claiming that both thinkers firmly rooted their 
conceptions in somatic practice that was ‗designed to bring about a transformation of 
experience.‘ Moreover, these understandings are ‗experientially accessible to any 
contemporary person‘ regardless of their background or tradition.44 
 
Writing in the introduction to the multi-authored volume Buddhism and Ecology, 
Duncan R. Williams comments that there never has been just one perspective; rather 
perspectives vary according to place and time in history. Instead of a ‗core 
―Buddhistic‖ element‘ there is a variety of positions that can be identified as 
Buddhist.
45
 Alan Sponberg, in his article in the same volume, suggests the need to 
critically assess traditional Buddhist conceptions of nature. It is important, he 
maintains, to understand that traditional Buddhism tended to view humans and 
nature hierarchically, but that this notion of hierarchy need not necessarily be seen in 
a negative light. Rather Sponberg points out the value of what he terms a ‗hierarchy 
of compassion‘ in a specifically Buddhist approach to the environment. As one 
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moves vertically upwards the circle of interrelatedness increases.
46
 Elsewhere he 
undertakes an exploration of ‗key assumptions‘ that shape, at a fundamental level, 
Buddhist perceptions of nature and ecology. The role and impact of such 
assumptions is, he goes on to argue, easy to overlook because they are so different to 
attitudes taken for granted in the west. This is so particularly with regard to 
understandings of the self and its relation to reality, the framework within which 
Sponberg explores these topics.
 47
  
 
II. Value of religious approaches  
Over the course of the past few decades the scientific community has been calling on 
the global religious community to contribute more effectively to finding solutions to 
the crisis.  In 1990 a number of internationally renowned scientists led by Carl Sagan 
and Hans Bethe issued ‗An Open letter to the Religious Community‘, where they 
detailed the horror of environmental destruction and went on to appeal to the 
religious community ‗to commit, in word and deed, and as boldly as required, to 
preserve the environment of the Earth‘. They suggested that ‗efforts to safeguard and 
cherish the environment need to be infused with a vision of the sacred‘.48  Thus 
scientific discourse, in some quarters at least, is pointing out the need for more than 
scientific or technological responses to the issue of climate change and other 
environmental problems. They argue that we need more than knowing how best we 
might use technology to manage the problems created by climate change and so 
forth.
49
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Laurel Kearns, in a sociological study of the various types of ecological responses 
found within Christianity, makes a link with more general sociological 
understandings of the value and increased role of religion in secular societies.
50
 
Drawing on the work of James Beckford, who noted a ‗shift in the general 
perception of social problems toward "concerns about the fundamental purposes and 
direction of all human life"‘, she argues that ‗religious responses are more salient 
than would be predicted in secularized modern society because of their ability to link 
practical responses with holistic, ideological frameworks.‘51  
 
In his efforts to analyse the role of religion vís-a-vís the environment Tony Watling 
suggests that religion itself is a process. Religious traditions ‗can be and are used, re-
interpreted and re-empowered in response to the modern worldview (which is itself a 
process).‘ In a focus on language he highlights how, in the context of the ecological 
crisis, religious concepts, such as ―caring for creation‖, ―stewardship‖, ―the integrity 
of creation‖, and ―co-creation‖, are being used to articulate the relationship of 
humanity and the natural world. His claim is that the use of such terms shows that ‗a 
sense of an ecological and spiritual whole beyond reductionist and materialist 
concerns‘ is being sought. The emergence of such an ecological consciousness 
‗would temper hubristic human self-centredness and embrace the wider community 
of life.‘52  
 
Elsewhere and taking an ethnographic approach, Watling speaks of the need for 
‗new imaginations of nature‘, ones that are more ‗environmentally-friendly‘ and that 
see nature as ‗active, meaningful, subjective, and spiritual‘. These would counter the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
‗Introduction‘, in D. K. Swearer (ed.) Ecology and Environment: Perspectives from the Humanities, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 9. 
50
 Laurel Kearns, ‗Saving the Creation: Christian Environmentalism in the United States‘ in Sociology 
of Religion Vol. 57:1 (Special Issue: Sociology of Culture and Sociology of Religion), 1996, pp. 55—
70. 
51
 Kearns, ‗Saving the Creation,‘ p. 66. 
 
52
 Tony Watling ‗The Field of Religion and Ecology: Addressing the Environmental Crisis and 
Challenging Faiths‘, in H. de Vries (ed.) Religion: Beyond a Concept, New York: Fordham Press, 
2008, pp. 473—4. 
36 
 
dominant western mechanistic worldview. In response to the claim that religion can 
be seen as a source of such re-imaginations (because of its ability to link ‗humanity 
to a wider environmental (and divine) reality‘, and to provide a moral authority and 
institutional influence) he analyses what he terms ‗religious ―ecotopias‖‘: religious 
imaginations envisaging a more environmentally-oriented humanity in a balanced 
and mutually enhancing relationship with nature.‘53  
 
Laurence E. Sullivan has been critical of the general field of environmental studies 
for not adequately exploring the role of religion in ecology, a lack that is in stark 
contrast to the emphasis placed on the role of science and technology.
54
 This, he 
claims, is to the detriment of its own goals. It is detrimental because it leaves largely 
unexplored what is an essential source of human motivation and action in the world: 
‗No understanding of the environment is adequate without a grasp of the religious 
life that constitutes the human societies which saturate the natural environment.‘ 
Sullivan describes religious outlooks as ‗primordial, all-encompassing, and unique‘, 
and as such they propel us into the world with fundamental dispositions towards it, 
rather than simply being the cause of occasional traces which accumulate over time. 
Because they are primordial they focus human attention on such core realities as the 
source of life and death, destruction and renewal, creativity in its full sense. Their 
all-encompassing nature provides a view of the whole and so offers a framework 
within which all other ideas ‗commingle in a cosmology.‘ Finally, they offer a 
uniquely other perspective from which to evaluate nature, by setting it within a 
different kind of universe, appearing only in the religious imagination. While this 
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can lead to a disregard for the natural world, it can likewise reveal nature in a 
distinctively new light, one that mirrors the distinctively religious and imaginative 
human way of being in the world.
55
 
 
Roger Gottlieb espouses the value of what he terms religious environmentalism, not 
only for a broader environmental community, but also for religion and for the earth 
community as a whole. It provides the secular community with ‗a language in which 
to express the depth of our relationship with the rest of the natural world‘ as well as a 
way of speaking about the ‗gravity of the disastrous policies and misguided values‘ 
that mark much of our current behaviour towards nature. While religious language 
can be alienating for some, when spoken ‗with a self-reflective humility‘ it invokes a 
‗moral seriousness‘ that recognises the profundity and systematic nature of the 
ecological crisis. We are all to some extent complicit, and the language of sin and 
repentance, for example, seems to capture what is being felt as well as, if not better 
than, any other kind of language, as, for instance, the language of rights or of 
consumer preferences. Moreover, religion has the capacity to offer a more universal 
vision of community— the possibility of a sensibility which can be described in a 
broad way as spiritual—which is something necessary for environmentalism to 
succeed. Such sensitivity, Gottlieb argues, ‗must translate into a distinctive political 
style‘, found in figures such as Ghandi and Ang San Suu Kyi. They have garnered 
such support because they themselves embody the kind of virtues—emerging 
directly from their religious beliefs—that such a political style requires: commitment 
to nonviolence, a principled pursuit of one‘s goals, respect for the opponent, and ‗a 
rejection of desperation created by despair.‘56   
 
It is also the case that this kind of undertaking where religion is used in the 
environmental context raises some questions and concerns. For instance concerns are 
raised about exploring and adapting religions out of context, as well as a fear that 
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this may be based simply on a misguided belief that religion is a unified concept. As 
Tony Watling asks: is appropriating traditions merely based on ‗Western 
assumptions, of ―religion‖ as a unified concept and of an objective ―nature‖ needing 
protection,‘ and in this way are non-Western assumptions overridden with the 
imposition on them of ‗a universal ‗―religious‖ ―eco-ethic‖‘?57 Most of the traditions 
began somewhere else (primarily focused on human-centred issues) and this raises 
the challenge of traditions making the environmental issue a centre stage one. Judith 
Berling points out that effort may be put into transforming religious traditions, and 
yet the planet is dying around us.
58
 Related is the issue of an obvious disjunction 
between modernity and ancient times, as well as the challenge of reconciling 
different traditions. There are questions of power and authority regarding 
interpretation as well as the problem of more fundamentalist elements being taken as 
the position of a tradition. Moreover, can religious understandings be taken 
seriously, especially as they often move slowly and are often unwilling to embrace 
change? 
 
These challenges no doubt are very real. However, it is important to view them as 
challenges rather than insurmountable obstacles that would suggest dropping religion 
altogether in this context as the best course of action.  To begin with, the richness of 
the traditions outweighs any of the above challenges. Religions are never static: in 
fact they require constant adaptation and change for them to remain alive and 
relevant. In speaking of the Christian tradition and its necessary evolution Anne 
Primavesi comments: ‗where Christianity is alive its landscape changes. Where the 
landscape changes, so does Christianity. Else it finds itself...imprisoned in a 
linguistic contour which no longer matches the landscape of fact.‘59 The approach 
taken here of engaging lesser known elements of the traditions can be seen as further 
recognition of the diversity and variety within the world religions. Moreover the 
emphasis on dialogue allows for the differences across traditions, including where 
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such differences are irreconcilable. Finally, in the context of human induced climate 
change and its consequences, all sources of wisdom are necessary, particularly those 
whose ultimate aim, even if not always stated, is the wellbeing of the whole of 
reality.  
 
III. A brief overview of the field of ecology and religion 
The field of ecology and religion is an uncommonly wide field of study, with 
scholarly interest found, not only from scholars within religious studies and theology 
departments, but also among philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, scientists, 
indeed almost all areas of study.  This interest has given rise to a variety of other 
sub-disciplines, such as environmental ethics, environmental history, ecological 
anthropology, ecophenomenology, as well as the more obviously religious area of 
ecotheology.  According to Roger Gottlieb (writing in 2006) even a partial 
bibliography could amount to a thousand entries.
60
 Because of the Christian 
Buddhist orientation of this project in this chapter I offer an overview of studies 
relating to these traditions.   
  
The 1960s mark the beginning of serious reflection on the relationship between the 
ecological crisis and religion, though Bron Taylor dates the emergence of religion 
and ecology as a distinct area of study only to 1989.
61
 It was a reflection that began 
in the more affluent parts of the globe such as the United States, the United Kingdom 
and some European mainland places like Germany and Scandinavia, and most of the 
material still comes from these somewhat similar socio-political contexts.  However, 
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in relation to ecotheology, the South African theologian Ernst Conradie highlights 
the wealth of contributions that have come from other contexts especially in recent 
decades. In particular he notes the importance of contributions from ‗impoverished 
local communities‘ across the globe including the United States itself. Together these 
writings constitute ‗a rich mosaic of cultures, languages, local contexts, bioregions, 
gender perspectives, theological traditions etc‘62 
 
The catalyst for much of this work, particularly the earlier literature from within 
Christian circles, has been Lynn White Junior‘s 1967 article that unleashed an 
avalanche of studies.
63
 Some of this writing has emerged from scholars in the field 
who are also actively engaged with environmental issues while more of the literature 
comes from those within an established theology, religious studies or philosophy 
department.
64
 A number of well-known and influential eco-theological works 
emerged especially during the 1980s and 1990s, as did many key philosophical 
works.  
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For instance in 1985 Santmire‘s The Travail of Nature was published as part of the 
Theology and the Sciences series, which provided a historical study of attitudes 
towards nature within the Christian tradition. The same year saw the publication of 
Jürgen Moltmann‘s Gifford Lectures of 1984-1985, which was an early influential 
effort within German protestant theology that recognised the notion that new issues 
such as the exploitation of nature needed to be addressed.
65
 The philosopher of 
religion, Rosemary Radford Reuther published an often cited book in 1993 entitled 
Gaia & God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing, and in it she draws on the 
sacramental tradition within Catholic theology to highlight an immanent sense of the 
divine in the natural world.
66
 Grace Jantzen‘s God‘s World: God‘s Body, which was 
published in 1984, and Sallie McFague‘s The Body of God published in 1993, both 
express, as the titles suggest, the need for embodied notions of God.
67
  These last 
three theologians are also prominent ecofeminist theologians – an area of study that 
emerged alongside the broader field of ecofeminism in the early 1970s.
68
  
 
The liberation theologian Leonardo Boff‘s Ecologia: Grito da Terra, Grito dos 
Pobres, originally published in Brazil in 1995, was published in English as part of 
the Orbis Ecology and Justice Series in 1997. In this book Boff shows how the 
understandings of liberation theology, which have responded to the ‗cry of the poor‘ 
in Latin America, can aid in offering a theological response to the ‗cry of the 
earth‘.69 The same series published Women Healing Earth: Third World Women on 
Ecology, Feminism, and Religion initially in 1996, an edited volume of Latin 
American, Asian and African women activists and scholars writing about 
ecotheology from their own contexts, and creating, what the editor Rosemary 
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Radford Reuther calls, ‗South-South‘ dialogue.70  No exhaustive overview of 
Christian contributions to the field of religion and ecology exists. However Willis 
Jenkins‘ relatively recent publication, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and 
Christian Theology, offers one of the most comprehensive bibliographies to date.
71
 
And Roger Gottlieb‘s 2010 edited four volume publication on world religions 
contains entries on virtually every aspect of the area.
72
  
 
Environmental philosophy emerged over this period also, in a variety of guises. 
Roderick Nash highlights the emergence and development of arguments for ethical 
extension firstly to animals through the work of Peter Singer and Tom Regan, 
likening the impact of Regan‘s 1973 review essay to that of Lynn White‘s article on 
ecotheology. He further notes the emergence of a broader and deeper environmental 
ethic, which he claims was inspired by the women‘s liberation movement, and gave 
rise to philosophical sub disciplines such as ecofeminism and deep ecology.  The 
latter ethic tended to be a more holistic or organic type of moral philosophy.
73
  One 
of the foremost philosophers in this regard, also concerned with environmental 
issues and religion, is J Baird Callicott.
74
  While recognising the work done in a 
Western context, on developing a scholarly literature by applying various strains of 
western moral philosophy to the environmental agenda, Callicott highlights the need 
for a similar ethic in other parts of the world. However, such an ethic, he argues, 
needs to emerge from the indigenous traditions of these cultures, and not be imported 
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from the West. As a consequence, his monograph Earth‘s Insights was published in 
1994.  
 
A 1973 lecture by the distinguished Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess introduced 
the very influential and highly radical concept of deep ecology, and in his book, 
Ecology, Community, & Life-Style, he develops his philosophical understanding, 
which he terms Ecosophy T.  Naess‘ life and works were very influenced by 
Buddhist teachings.
75
 The edited volume, Worldviews and Ecology published in 
1993 also contains an article by George Sessions on deep ecology as a worldview in 
its section on contemporary ecological perspectives.
76
 Barnhill and Roger Gottlieb 
emphasise the relationship between deep ecology and world religions, arguing that 
contemporary ethical and religious valuing of nature stems from deep ecology.
77
   
 
There was strong institutional support from religious bodies for environmental 
activism and reflection during the 1970s and after a lull in the 1980s, it picked up 
again in the 1990s. The support came from institutions like the US National Council 
of Churches who assisted the work of the ‗Faith-Man-Nature Group‘, from 1960 to 
1974. Its aim was to understand the human nature relationship within the context of 
Christian faith.
78
  Also the World Council of Churches was another prominent 
supporter of such work, and at its 1983 assembly the concept of ‗integrity of 
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creation‘ was added to its justice and peace work.79 The WCC published a number of 
works relating to ecology and religion including the edited volume Ecotheology: 
Voices from South and North, in 1994.
80
 This collection of articles, many of which 
appeared elsewhere, focuses on ecotheology and ethics from both Southern and 
Northern perspectives. It deals with a central issue in North-South relations 
concerning the environment, namely how concern for the environment relates to 
answering the basic needs of the world‘s poor. 
 
While White‘s critique of Christianity raised the possibility of turning to eastern 
traditions as possible aids for western environmental writers in responding to the 
crisis, most writers, in the early decades, exhibited a reluctance to do so. According 
to Eugene Hargrove this reluctance displayed a certain fear of Eastern influence. 
Hargrove blames the Lynn White article and subsequent articles for the lack of focus 
on Eastern traditions as sources for environmental studies. He argues that these very 
influential writings created a fear of an eastern takeover, as they suggested that 
eastern philosophy was both ‗insidious and environmentally ineffectual‘. 
Consequently, environmental writers, during the two decades after Lynn White‘s 
article, mostly followed the agenda set by White, which was to find ways of 
reforming Christianity from within.  Hence there was no real exploration of eastern 
traditions, a step that effectively stifled comparative studies in environment and 
philosophy.
81
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Yet, Buddhist interest in the ecological crisis also stems from this period. This 
interest is found among three groups: academics, practicing Buddhists and 
environmental activists.
82
 Buddhist scholars focus on important Buddhist writings 
and Buddhist thinkers, while environmental philosophers have been trying to explore 
Buddhism as a conceptual resource for environmental ethics. For instance Roger T. 
Ames and J. Baird Callicott present their work, Nature in Asian Traditions of 
Thought published in 1989, as an example of this latter effort. In fact this volume is 
the first scholarly work on Asian traditions and environmental concern. Thus it is 
only in the closing decade of the twentieth century that any significant scholarly 
work relating religious traditions, other than Christianity, and the ecological crisis 
has begun in earnest.  
 
The first anthology on Buddhism and Ecology, Buddha Dharma, appeared in 1990 
on the twentieth anniversary of Earth Day.
83
 This somewhat poorly edited volume 
sees environmental concern as essentially rooted in a spiritual crisis.
84
 A more 
organised collection of writing entitled Buddhism and Ecology was published by the 
World Wide Fund for nature in 1992, as part of a series on world religions and 
ecology.
85
 The series also featured a collection entitled Christianity and Ecology 
edited by Elizabeth Breuilly & Martin Palmer. The Buddhist collection is very 
positive in its valuing of a Buddhist contribution towards alleviating the 
environmental crisis, while the Christian volume focuses on the perception of 
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Christianity as being responsible for the crisis. This contrast reflects the popular 
understanding of these traditions, the former being viewed as environmentally 
friendly while the latter tended to be seen as incompatible with a positive ecological 
stance.  
 
A number of other significant volumes appeared in the 1990s. For example the 
edited volume Worldviews and Ecology was published in 1993 as an issue of 
Bucknell Review, and it contains both Buddhist and Christian entries. Also David 
Kinsley published Ecology and Religion: Ecological Spirituality in a Cross-Cultural 
Perspective in 1995, which contains entries on traditional religions and 
contemporary movements like deep ecology and ecological spirituality. Roger 
Gottlieb edited This Sacred Earth: Religion, Nature, Environment, which was 
published in 1996, and which contains selections from sacred texts from different 
traditions. While weighted in favour of Judaism and Christianity, it does offer a 
range of entries from other traditions, including Buddhism.
86
   
 
However, one of the most ambitious scholarly projects appeared in the latter half of 
the 1990s, the Harvard Series on world religions and ecology.  Over a four year 
period, 1996-2000, a number of conferences were held and a series of ten volumes 
was published, nine of which related to a particular world religion, and the tenth to 
indigenous religions.
87
 In the series foreword the editors make reference to a 
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common viewpoint that underpins much of the literature in this field: the ecological 
crisis is moral and spiritual as well as being political, social and economic, which 
suggests the need for a broadening of the philosophical and religious understandings 
of humans as embedded in the natural world.
88
  Thus world religions have a role to 
play as moral and spiritual forces in helping alleviate the ecological crisis. In the 
process of undertaking this role the religions themselves are transformed, but also 
environmental studies would recognise that religions have helped shape attitudes 
towards the natural world.  The editors of the series saw these conferences and the 
subsequent publications as opportunities to expand the dialogue between ecology 
and religion, and they effectively framed a research arena, which not only gave 
religion ‗high ecological significance‘ but also saw the need for its ‗critical 
transformation in the light of ecology.‘89  They listed five aims for the actual work of 
the conferences, which included identifying and evaluating the distinctively 
ecological attitudes, values and practices in each tradition, identifying a minimum of 
common ground across very diverse understandings and highlighting useful 
resources within the various aspects of the traditions.
90
  
 
The editors of the Christian volume see the environmental crisis primarily as a 
cosmological crisis, and so the task of moving towards a more sustainable future 
fundamentally involves a cosmological transition, a change of worldview.
91
 Thus the 
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volume explores themes in the tradition that contribute to ecological abuse as well as 
highlighting positive elements in the tradition.  The contributors discuss where new 
emphases need to be placed in terms of theology and ethics, and identify some 
practical implications for both the Christian church and the wider society. For 
instance, Elizabeth Johnson‘s lead essay on the one hand explores how both Catholic 
and Protestant traditions lost interest in the natural world, setting humanity over 
against it, and on the other highlights how contemporary cosmological 
understandings are aiding in the discovery of the relational nature of the cosmos, 
which includes human beings.
92
 McFague‘s essay, meanwhile, offers some positive 
insights from the prophetic, sacramental and wisdom aspects of the tradition.
93
  In 
her response to McFague, Kwok Pui-lan, as an Asian Christian, brings another 
perceptive to the discussion. In her article she highlights the imperialist uses of terms 
like ‗Cosmic Christ‘.94   
 
Some themes from the Greek Orthodox tradition are offered in John Chryssavgis‘ 
article, including how all perceived dualisms, such as heaven and earth or spirit and 
body, interpenetrate in the icon. Other themes such as the apophatic or mystical 
elements in theology are also offered as serving an ecological theology.
95
 A number 
of essays at the end of the volume focus on the practical implications for the 
Christian churches in terms of ecological justice. Marthinus Daneel‘s contribution 
highlights the example of tree planting in Zimbabwe by the African Independent 
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Churches.
96
 Activities such as these can act as an inspiration to Christian churches 
everywhere to develop a practical consciousness.   
 
 
In the introduction to the Buddhism and ecology anthology, Duncan Ryūken 
Williams highlights the scholarly nature of this volume as distinct from previous 
publications, which were largely written by practitioners and environmentalists.
97
  A 
number of key concerns are explored here such as the problem of generalising about 
the Buddhist tradition. This tendency, alluded to also by Ames and Callicott, 
suggests the need to be aware of cultural and geographical diversity within the 
tradition, something highlighted in the opening essay by Lewis Lancaster. Explored 
also in this essay is the difficulty of utilising ideas from the past as aids in dealing 
with current concerns.
98
 As with the Christian volume the underlying premise of this 
volume is that attitudes to nature are largely affected by religious and cultural 
worldviews, and so we need to explore the tradition to help us make cosmological 
change. Cultural, thematic and denominational approaches are reflected in the first 
five sections, while the last two sections explore practical contributions that can be 
made from within Buddhism, as well as raising some methodological issues about 
the interface of Buddhism and ecology.  
 
 
It is interesting to note that three essays relating to aspects of Japanese Buddhism are 
offered, with two of them having a focus on Kūkai. Paul Ingram offers a change in 
worldview. He argues that a dialogue between Buddhism, illustrated by Kūkai, and 
contemporary Western understandings of reality as they are emerging in the natural 
sciences and in Christian process theology could ‗energize‘ an emerging global 
vision that would look at the ecological crisis in a different way.
99
 Graham Parkes 
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also speaks of the need for a ‗radical revisioning‘ of humanity‘s relation to the 
natural world, but focuses more clearly on the link between religious or 
philosophical worldviews and behaviour. His argument is that if someone were to 
‗realize experientially‘ a worldview where nature was considered to be sacred and a 
source of wisdom, it is more likely that such a person would be inclined to treat 
nature with care. He illustrates this in part through some features of Kūkai‘s 
teachings, most notably the sanmitsu. Ultimately for Kūkai, as Parkes points out, all 
beings both sentient and non-sentient possess Buddha-nature.
100
  
 
 
The essays regarding methodological issues point out again the somewhat facile 
suggestion that Buddhism as a whole is eco-friendly. Such a conception, it is argued, 
is very recent and in fact the concept of nature within Buddhism has a more complex 
history.
101
 Ian Harris argues that with few exceptions those wishing to support ‗an 
authentic Buddhist environmental ethic‘ often show ‗a positive indifference‘ to the 
complexity that is Buddhism, and ‗may be guilty of a sacrificum intellectus‘ that 
does not reflect the ‗critical spirit‘ inherent in the tradition.102 
 
As with the Christian volume this volume also contains contributions of a practical 
and policy level nature. The issue of nuclear waste and the possible contribution that 
could be made by the Buddhist scholar and activist are explored by Kenneth Kraft.
103
 
Rita Gross deals with questions about fertility control and resource utilization, 
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claiming that specific Buddhist teachings such as interdependence and the Middle 
Path, can be applied to the crisis of overpopulation and excessive consumption.
104
 
The third focus in this section by Stephen Rockefeller concerns a Buddhist 
contribution to a global ethic. In particular he focuses on (at the time) the upcoming 
Earth Charter, suggesting that what Buddhism should try to ensure from such a 
charter is that all sentient beings be provided with protection.
105
  
 
The main conferences and their publications were followed by two ‗culminating 
conferences‘ in September and October 1998, which contributed more clearly to 
significant trends in the field, namely the growth of spiritualities that considered the 
idea of the evolution of the universe and the Earth as a sacred story, extending the 
greening of mainstream religious expressions and ethics, and helping in effecting the 
‗greening‘ of other institutions, in particular the United Nations.106   
 
Since the beginning of the new millennium climate change has begun to be used as 
an umbrella term for global environmental concerns, and it is within that awareness 
that the contributors to the fall 2001 edition of the journal Daedalus again emphasise 
that religion must play a role in responding to the ecological crisis alongside other 
institutions and academic disciplines.
107
 While the editors Mary Evelyn Tucker and 
John Grim point out the positive contribution of religion they also highlight a 
number of qualifications in this regard, including the fact that often religious 
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traditions have been guilty of a tendency towards dogmatic rigidity and have all too 
frequently contributed to conflict in many parts of the globe.
108
  
 
This issue claims to be the first to bring together a range of perspectives from the 
world‘s religions with observations from the fields of science, public policy and 
ethics. Lead essays by scholars from these fields, which call for the involvement of 
the world religions, are then followed by one essay from each of the traditions. Sallie 
McFague suggests that Christianity has, on the one hand, supported an 
individualistic view of human life underpinning the consumerist attitudes, which is a 
root cause of the current devastation of the planet and the widening gap between rich 
and poor. On the other she argues that Christianity has within it the ability to 
‗support an ecological model built on an understanding of the planet and its life-
forms as interdependent and interrelated.
109
   
 
In the contribution from the Buddhist camp Swearer, recognising the contextual 
nature of religious traditions but also noting that more general principles and 
practices may be embodied in a particular tradition, sees the three stages of the 
Buddha‘s enlightenment as suggesting a moral reasoning model, suitable for 
environmental ethics that integrates general principles, collective action guides, and 
particular contexts.  He also draws on the work of current Buddhist 
environmentalists and scholars such as Gary Snyder as well as the teachings of key 
historical figures like Kūkai and Dōgen. As the title suggests he further highlights 
how metaphor, story, poetry and discursive logic have been used as hermeneutical 
tools in the dissemination of Buddhist teachings throughout Buddhist history. 
Finally, using the example of Doi Suthep, a sacred mountain in Northern Thailand, 
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he points out how narrative of place can make a crucial contribution to 
environmental ethics.
110
   
 
A strong (and somewhat harsh) criticism of much of the religion and ecology 
literature, in particular the Harvard book series, comes from the work of Bron 
Taylor.
111
 He suggests that the Harvard enterprise is not as inclusive as it may sound 
since the label ‗world religions‘ is in danger of limiting our understanding of the 
concept ‗religion‘.  While acknowledging the inclusions of indigenous religions as a 
category in the series he, nevertheless, stresses that the contemporary multi-religious 
scene rarely fits into neat and conventional categories, which the term ‗world 
religion‘ suggests. He makes a strong claim that the concept excludes individuals 
and groups, many of whom are environmentalists who engage in some form of 
‗nature related religiosity‘, as well as excluding religious groups such as Pagans, 
Wiccans and a range of New Age followers.
112
 
 
A further aspect of this criticism is that the focus seems to be on the mainstream of 
the traditions investigated, and by scholars who tend to remain loyal to what they 
take to be the original meaning of their tradition‘s texts. There is the possibility of 
missing out on the diverse experiences that are also found in conventional religions, 
when one thinks in terms of ideal worldviews. All of this undermines a stated desire 
of the world religions and ecology series, namely the ‗creative revisioning‘ of 
religious expression.  Little acknowledgement seems to be given to the role that 
hybridity and boundary transgression play in the evolution of religious thought.
113
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Taylor criticises the idealistic premise of the whole project: that environmental 
actions are deeply conditioned by religious attitudes towards the natural world. The 
Danish anthropologist Poul Pedersen refers to this approach as the ‗religious 
environmentalist paradigm‘.114 In the Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature entry, of 
the same name, Arne Kalland argues that this paradigm is inspired largely by East 
and South Asian cosmologies and indigenous traditions. He highlights how 
environmentalist writers, in clothing such core teachings as the interconnectedness of 
everything, which is easily found in these cosmologies and traditions, in ecological 
language, make the assumption that the discourse of locating human beings within 
the world of nature will automatically ‗foster a deep reverence for nature‘. On the 
other hand a worldview, such as Christianity, that does not hold this notion of 
interconnectedness in as clear a way, is often seen as the source of environmental 
ills. Thus there is the need for ecological reform of these latter worldviews.  
However, Taylor argues that this close relationship of worldview and environment is 
an assumption that the field should actually be debating.
115
 Willis Jenkins also 
highlights this assumption suggesting that much of the literature, as a consequence, 
is concerned with how the religious traditions can produce more ‗verdant, 
sustainable worldviews.‘ 116  
 
 
This approach reveals an underlying belief in a causal one-directional relationship 
from worldviews (that have been profoundly influenced by religious understandings) 
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Environment‘, Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 36, 2011, 441—63, Available, 
Online HTTP: <http://www.annualreviews.org/eprint/vDJcwJ5VmqQdkQhaFU2c 
/full/10.1146/annurev-environ-042610-103728> and 
<http://www.academia.edu/1158537/Annual_Review. Religion_and_Environment 
.Jenkins_and_Chapple>  (Accessed 26 August 2013). This latter article expands literature reviewed in 
the earlier one. 
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to our treatment of the environment.
 117
 Roger Gottlieb, in The Oxford Handbook to 
Religion & Ecology, published in 2006, posits two questions, in this regard, as 
forming the heart of the religion ecology study. Firstly, we need to investigate what 
the world religions believe about the relationship between humanity and the natural 
world, and secondly, how these beliefs must then change.
118
  Laurel Kearns points 
out that this causal link is the core of much of the material within the discipline of 
ecotheology.
119
 Moreover, some recent literature—for instance some entries in the 
Encyclopedia of Nature and Religion—actually suggests that the reverse is the case: 
the environment has profoundly shaped religious worldviews.
120
   
 
 
One certainly needs to take on board that a rigid one-directional influence of one‘s 
worldview, always dictating how one might act towards the environment, needs to be 
criticised. At the same time, as Parkes points out, it is a reasonable position to take 
that those whose lives are informed by a worldview that regards nature as ‗the locus 
of ultimate reality‘, are more likely to live in a caring relationship towards the 
environment, while those whose worldview would tend to denigrate the corporeal 
reality in favour of a spiritual other-worldly realm are less likely to have concerns 
about exploitation of the natural world.
121
 Moreover, efforts at caring (or not as the 
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(Critical Concepts in Religious Studies) Vols. 1-4, London: Routledge, 2010.  
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case may be) are in turn likely to deepen one‘s worldview whatever it may be. Thus, 
in exploring the cosmic visions of Eriugena and Kūkai in this dissertation, which is 
in some sense about taking a worldview approach, I recognise the potential influence 
of such visions of reality, while at the same time taking cognisance of the more fluid 
relationships between religious worldviews and the environment. For instance the 
influence of direct engagement in a positive sense with the natural world is quite 
explicit in Kūkai‘s writings. On the other hand Eriugena‘s more speculative writing 
and more obvious emphasis on a holistic worldview—a cosmic creation story—does 
not refer to any explicit engagement with the world of nature.  
 
 
A recent journal publication that has its roots in the past yet reflects a broadening 
perspective of the concept of religion and nature is the Journal for the Study of 
Religion, Nature, and Culture, first published in 2007.
122
 In his introductory article 
the editor Bron Taylor wants this new journal ‗to provide habitat for the widest 
possible range of scholarly approaches‘ for the terms religion, nature and culture and 
the relationships between them, and in the process make the journal a place for 
‗critical, interdisciplinary inquiry‘ on these concepts. Not only that but Taylor 
extends an invitation to all within the conventional disciplines of the humanities, 
natural and social sciences to contribute articles, essays, special issue proposals or 
scholarly perspective essays on these terms, which would make the journal a locus 
for blurring the boundaries between conventional disciplines and in the process 
allow new and creative insights to emerge. Most of the articles in the first volume 
explore ways of defining the core terms in as comprehensive a way as possible.
123
 
Also a number of the volumes to date are special issue volumes dealing with areas 
such as Indigenous Religions and Environments, Volume 2.1, 2008 and African 
Sacred Ecologies Volume 2.3, 2008. These reflect a broad nature based 
understanding of religion. 
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 This journal was previously named Ecotheology and before that Theology in Green. See Online 
HTTP: <www.religionandnature.com> for further information on both the Encyclopaedia of Religion 
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information on the International Society for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture 
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 See for instance Stephen R. Kellert, ‗Connecting with Creation: The Convergence of Nature, 
Religion, Science and Culture‘, Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture Vol. 1:1, 2007, 
25-37 and Adrian Ivakhiv ‗Religion, Nature and Culture: Theorizing the Field‘ 47-57.  
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A further concern regarding the field of ecology and religion is the issue of ‗engaged 
scholarship‘.124 Taylor suggests that two approaches to studying the field can be 
discerned. On the one hand is the activist scholar whose primary concern is to turn 
religions green and not, in the process, to offend religious mainstreams. Often this 
has resulted in a kind of apocalyptic reading of the ecological crisis. On the other 
hand the focus is on simply trying to understand how humans, their religions and 
environments interact. Those taking the latter approach argue that the former 
‗ultimately compromises the critical acumen associated with distanced scholarship‘. 
125
 In a recently published volume, Ecospirit: Religions and Philosophies for the 
Earth, the editors, Laurel Kearns and Catherine Keller, acknowledge this concern but 
demonstrate that the relationship between activist oriented material and scholarly 
analysis is perhaps more complex and nuanced than has been suggested by Taylor. 
The religion and ecology field‘s task should not be a simple choice of analysing 
religion over against defending or engaging in it. What is needed is a kind of 
theology. In an effort to move beyond what they describe as ‗ecoapocalyptic rhetoric 
of threat‘ Kearns and Keller try to facilitate an ‗ecosocial transition, transmuting 
simple emergency into complex emergence‘.  They hope to join ‗vigorous activism 
with rigorous thinking.‘ 126 In this Willis Jenkins describes their hope of ‗developing 
an apposite mode of scholarly relation to a vulnerable life-world‘127  The volume‘s 
aim is ecological and so wishes to go beyond academic fields, yet, it recognises the 
need for rigorous scholarly analysis. The contributors are not so much interested in 
defending any confessional position as such but are engaged in working with cultural 
inheritances.    
 
 
A number of relatively recent efforts have been made to organise the field of religion 
and ecology. Most of these have approached it from an ethical standpoint or using 
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 Taylor, ‗Critical Perspectives…‘ p. 1376.  
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New York: Fordham University Press, 2007. See ‗Preface‘ xiii, italics in the text 
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ethical categories, as for instance the work of Laurel Kearns. Drawing on Max 
Weber‘s notion of ideal types and based on her own field-work Kearns categorises 
Christian environmental writings under three types or ethics: Christian stewardship, 
eco-justice and creation spirituality.
 128
  This threefold typology is also used by 
Willis Jenkins‘ more in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the field.129 Both 
Jenkins and Kearns suggest that these types broadly correspond respectively to 
conservative, mainline and liberal understandings within Christianity. However not 
all of the material fits neatly into these categories and there is considerable 
overlap.
130
  
 
 
Jenkins links his three strategies to three categorisations of the secular field of 
environmental ethics because he claims that these secular strategies aid a better 
understanding of the specifically Christian field: the normative pluralism of the 
secular field can be a means of interpreting the theological pluralism of the Christian 
field.
 131
 His further reason for this paralleling is to support his claim that the 
Christian strategies not only take up, but expand on and transform, the secular 
strategies. Thus Jenkins parallels the strategy of ecojustice with the moral standing 
of nature, but its rationale is found in creation‘s theological status rather than nature 
as such. In other words it is nature‘s relationship with God that gives it value rather 
than its own moral standing. Loss or defilement of nature means now an offence 
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against the sacred.
132
 The strategy of stewardship turns the focus from creation‘s 
integrity to the human person as care-taker of that creation, just as the secular 
strategy of human agency is more focused on the human‘s role and responsibility 
vis-à-vis the natural world. The stewardship role in the Christian context is seen as 
being in response to the divine invitation and command. Thus the moral significance 
of nature is no longer based within God‘s presence in nature as such, but more on 
faithful human practices towards nature in line with God‘s command.133 The final 
paralleling is between ecological spirituality and ecological subjectivity, both of 
which reflect a more dialogical approach between nature and the human person. 
Within ecological spirituality, then, the starting point is not the valuing of nature 
because of the divine presence, nor is it an approach that sees humans as stewards.  
Instead it concerns a ‗primary spiritual communion of humanity and earth, assumed 
into personal experience with God‘.134  It is not biblical texts that are primary in 
experiencing the divine but the universe itself.
 135
   This strategy has a certain affinity 
with phenomenological approaches to understanding divine-human-nature 
relationships and is also, I suggest, reflected in the philosophical understandings of 
Eriugena and Kūkai.  
 
What both Jenkins and Kearns are trying to develop here is a rich Christian 
environmental ethic. Implicit in their approach then is the idea that the 
environmental crisis demands a response that is primarily ethical in nature and it is 
primarily that aspect of religions that they are focusing upon. Thus it is the moral 
aspect of our religious understanding that challenges us to respond. We are stewards 
and must begin to understand this in a new way or our sense of justice towards the 
other must begin to include justice towards the non-human other. Within the 
religious tradition we can find supports for this kind of expanding viewpoint. The 
third division does not fit as easily into this type of ethical framework, rather it offers 
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instead a focus on a more experiential engagement between humankind and nature 
out of which we act.
136
  
 
Donald Swearer suggests a five-fold taxonomy as a prolegomenon to a critical 
exploration and evaluation of the literature concerning Buddhism and ecology:  eco-
apologists, eco-critics, eco-constructivists, eco-ethicists, and eco-
contextualists.
137
The majority of writings fit under the first label including the 
previously mentioned anthologies Dharma Gaia: A Harvest of Essays in Buddhism 
and Ecology and Buddhism and Ecology, as well as the more recent Dharma Rain: 
Sources of Buddhist Environmentalism.
138
 This position has largely been identified 
with engaged Buddhism as many of the texts are contemporary rather than classical, 
and those who espouse the position generally understand Buddhist environmentalism 
as an extension of the Buddhist worldview.  There is a tendency to appeal to 
particular rules and to important Buddhist doctrines.
139
  
 
The main objection of eco-critics to the eco-apologetic position is that they ‗judge it 
to be a serious distortion of normative Buddhist teachings and historical traditions‘ 
and so proponents of this position argue that the ‗Buddhist worldview is 
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 It may however reflect a virtue ethic approach developed by David E. Cooper and Simon P. James. 
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incompatible with an environmental ethic‘.140 For instance Noriaka Hakamaya 
attacks the use of concepts such as Buddha-nature and ‗suchness‘ arguing that they 
are inherently not Buddhist.
141
 However, in response eco-apologists argue that such 
interpretations are too limited in focus since the way of the Buddha always 
concerned itself with more than ‗a narrowly construed quest for Nirvana without 
regard for other sentient beings and natural surroundings‘. 142 Swearer suggests that 
Ian Harris epitomises the eco-critic position most clearly. His basic argument is that 
Buddhist environmentalist ethic is primarily an American liberal effort to create a 
Buddhist response to the environmental crisis. He also suggests that the ethic 
expresses a kind of globalization that erodes culture-specific boundaries and so 
overrides important differences in doctrine and practice. Such an approach displays 
an indifference to the history and complexity of the Buddhist tradition.
143
  At the 
same time Harris recognises that all traditions need to grow and change, and as such 
Buddhist environmentalism needs to be seen as an expression of such work.  
 
Those whom Swearer labels eco-constructivists also try to uncover ecologically 
positive elements in Buddhism but try not to lose the essentials of the tradition. They 
see the possibility of an environmental ethic in Buddhism but it is not co-terminal 
with a Buddhist worldview.
144
 The fourth position advocates a Buddhist 
environmental ethic from Buddhist ethics rather than from the Buddhist 
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worldview
145
, while the final ethic emerges from particular contexts and situations, 
which is the eco-contextualists‘ position146.  
 
Other reviews frame the material somewhat differently. For instance Celia Deane-
Drummond, in an effort to highlight the global diversity of literature concerned with 
Christian ecotheology, offers an illustrative overview under chapter headings that 
use the cardinal points of north south east and west.
147
 It is however unclear how 
north and west are separated since the theological contributions examined in these 
chapters could belong to either location. Also the chapter entitled ‗ecotheology from 
the east‘ is a focus on eastern orthodox contributions rather than the geographical 
east, reflecting a traditional Christian understanding of East and West rather than a 
global understanding of these terms. Deane Drummond also offers chapters on a 
range of standard branches of study within Christianity from an ecological 
perspective, such as Christology, eschatology, and ecofeminist theology. 
 
Tony Watling‘s analysis of the field, points out the limited nature of Lynn White‘s 
interpretation of Judeo-Christianity and highlights that a more ‗explicit and overt 
ecological awareness‘ within the traditions reflecting a ‗non-anthropocentric re-
interpretation of humanity, nature and the sacred‘, has been growing over the last 
number of decades. This has involved extending a sense of the sacred, as well as 
ethics and identity, to nature as a whole.
148
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Chapter 2: Eriugena & Kūkai: An Overview 
 
I. Eriugena: A brief biographical sketch  
All sources on John Scottus Eriugena
149
 hold that he was born somewhere in Ireland 
around the beginning of the ninth century CE. Nothing further is known of his Irish 
background, but in all probability he was educated at one of the monastic 
establishments that were widespread in Ireland at the time.
150
 This education would 
have included the study of Greek, which seems to have given the Irish an advantage 
on the continent since knowledge of the language was more closely associated with 
Irish scholars than with any other group of scholars.
151
  While the Viking raids, 
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which were intensifying by the mid-ninth century, may have provided the motive for 
his leaving the country, one must also keep in mind the well developed pattern of 
Irish peregrinatio, the favours that Irish scholars seem to have received and the 
inducements offered to scholars and teachers generally at the Carolingian court in the 
reign of Charles the Bald, the grandson of Charlemagne.
152
  Whatever the reason it 
seems that by the time of the predestination controversy in 850-1 Eriugena was 
already attached to the royal court of Charles the Bald as a well known teacher of the 
liberal arts.
153
 Most sources agree that if Eriugena was a cleric at all, it was no more 
than a simple monk. It is perhaps more likely that he was a layperson and this 
probable fact makes his achievements all the greater, given the almost total control 
of theological and philosophical thinking by clergy at the time. 
 
Two of his early writings are the Annotationes in Martianum Capellam and the De 
divina praedestinatione, both of which exemplify Eriugena‘s wish to adopt a 
rationalistic approach.
154
  Thus from very early on in his writings we find that he 
considers appeal to authority on its own insufficient, and he advocates the pursuit of 
reason. The Annotationes is a commentary on Martianus Capella‘s De nuptiis 
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Philologiae et Mercurii, the most popular school textbook on the liberal arts for the 
most of a thousand years and also the source of Eriugena‘s greatest encounter with 
pagan tradition.
 155
 In this commentary we find Eriugena trying to do what is more 
fully developed in the Periphyseon, which is to merge his understanding of Christian 
doctrine (particularly on the soul and original sin) with a Neoplatonic understanding 
of the world.  Reflected here is his ultimate pursuit to seek a rational explanation for 
the nature of things.
 156
 Again in the De divina praedestinatione, which was 
completed in 851, while recognising the ‗privileged and responsible position‘ of 
Hincmar and Pardulus as bishops, Eriugena makes it quite clear that what he wishes 
to pursue is a rational approach. It was this issue—the use of the philosophical and 
secular method of dialectic in his argument against the double predestination 
position of Gottschalk—rather than his actual conclusions that so embarrassed the 
Church authorities who had ordered Eriugena to write on the subject, and led to their 
rejection of Eriugena and his work.
157
 Thus what we find in his first extant work are 
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These include ideas on the movement of the planets, the harmonisation of the cosmos 
through the power of love, how the four elements relate to each other, the notion of the world soul, 
and the nature of space. Finally the Annotationes also demonstrate Eriugena‘s precision and his 
breadth of learning at this early point, and its line-by-line method of commenting on texts rather than 
just producing manuals on texts that would be at the level of his students, had a profound influence on 
the method that became wide spread in the universities in the High Middle Ages. See Moran The 
Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena, p 39—45.  
157
 The particular predestination controversy of this period arose over the ideas of a Saxon monk 
Gottschalk who argued for a doctrine of double predestination and claimed to base his position on 
Augustine‘s teachings, the mainstay of authority in the Church. Church authority in the person of 
Hincmar, archbishop of Reims, and others saw Gottschalk‘s doctrine as dangerous, and eventually 
invited Eriugena to write on the subject. It is also to be noted that relations between Gottschalk and 
Hincmar were never good. Eriugena based his argument against predestination on his Neoplatonism. 
For Eriugena there can be nothing at all that is predestined since God is simple and unchangeable. His 
being is his knowledge, his will, his ‗predestination.‘ Predestination then is God‘s knowledge of the 
primordial causes. There is no other predestination. Humanity itself leads to its own hell through its 
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‗intellectual characteristics which he was to manifest for the rest of his life.‘158 While 
Gottschalk was condemned and reviled by Church authorities for the remainder of 
his life, Eriugena was not. In fact his career flourished after that, possibly because he 
was protected by Charles.
159
 
 
Deirdre Carabine raises a further point here that concerns the authority of Augustine. 
Since both Gottschalk and Eriugena appear to draw on Augustine in support of their 
respective positions, the implication is that Augustine‘s position was open to 
different interpretations. Thus the use of his authority in supporting positions (and 
indeed questioning that authority itself) is brought into question. Citing Jaroslav 
Pelikan, Carabine holds that the comfortable ‗Augustinian synthesis‘ of the previous 
centuries was now under threat.
160
Again this suggests the innovative nature of 
Eriugena‘s writings as well as his courage to express such bold ideas in a strongly 
polemical age. 
 
Moran describes Eriugena during these early decades of his time on the Continent as 
‗a grammaticus, well read in Augustine, Boethius, Martianus Capella, Pliny, Isidore, 
Macrobius, and other Latin writers.‘161 Moran warns against making too great a 
contrast between Eriugena as a Latin Arts master and Eriugena as the ‗follower of 
Greek Platonism,‘ since his knowledge of Greek is seen in his earlier glosses too. 162 
Nevertheless, almost all scholars agree that it was the translation of the works of the 
Greek Dionysius the Areopagite or pseudo-Dionysius into Latin that propelled 
                                                                                                                                                                    
own actions. Likewise heaven is open to all. In large measure Eriugena‘s position was not that 
different from Hincmar. See O‘Meara, Eriugena, 32—50. 
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 O‘Meara, Eriugena, p. 37—8. 
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 Carabine, John Scottus Eriugena, (Great Medieval Thinkers), Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, p. 11—2. 
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 Carabine, John Scottus Eriugena, p. 12. 
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 Moran, Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena, p. 46. 
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 This work began c 860. For instance his use of the term substitutio rather than substantia in 
relation to being, in De praedestinatione, before his translation of the Greeks is testimony to this. The 
former conveys a sense of coming into being not found in the latter that is central to understanding 
Eriugena as we shall see. See Moran, Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena, p.46—7. 
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Eriugena into the pages of intellectual history.  In all, he translated the Celestial 
Hierarchy, the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, the Mystical Theology, the Divine Names 
and ten Epistles by pseudo-Dionysius.
163
 This translation work was done at the 
invitation of Charles, whose enthusiasm for all things Greek shaped his patronage of 
Eriugena,
164
 and the work was possibly completed around 860 (or 862).
165
 
 
 
Other Irish scholars and contemporaries of Eriugena, such as Sedulius who worked 
in Liege and Martin the school master at Laon, also knew Greek.  However, 
Marenbon makes the point that in Eriugena‘s case his knowledge changed his 
intellectual horizons. The task of translating pseudo-Dionysius into Latin certainly 
made him improve his Greek, but more importantly it brought him into contact with 
the intellectual world of Greek Christian Neoplatonism.
166
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 While the Identity of the mysterious figure under the pseudonym pseudo-Dionysius remains a 
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the West, Variorum Collected Studies Series, (Hampshire & Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2000), 
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Eriugena‘s major contribution to western thought is undoubtedly the Periphyseon, 
which has been described as ‗one of the most radical redefinitions—and indeed 
expansions—of the concept of nature (Greek: physis, Latin: natura) ever found 
within Christian philosophy.
167
 Written in the first half of the 860s in the form of an 
extended dialogue between a master and his student, it is divided into five books and 
it runs to over two hundred thousand words.
168
  Book I outlines the main aspects of 
his metaphysical framework such as his concept of natura (introducing the four 
divisions), his notions of essence, of being and non-being, and the categories. Here 
also are to be found discussions on negative theology, theophany and the categories.   
Book II concentrates on the second division of nature—understood as that which 
both creates and is created. This is the idea that ‗procession through the primordial 
causes is the source of the diversity in the visible world.‘169 This discussion is 
concluded in Book III, which also introduces the third division: that which is created 
but does not create namely the phenomenal world or the created effects. Here also 
Eriugena begins his Hexaëmeron—his interpretation of the six days of creation—that 
continues through the final two books: in Book IV is a treatise on human nature, 
while Book V focuses on the last division of nature, the return of all to the source. 
Eriugena intimates a change in these two books. Using the image of a ship and the 
notion of a journey Eriugena likens the first three books to a smooth sea where 
‗readers could sail without fear of shipwreck, steering a safe course.‘ Books IV and 
V however, are like dangerous waters since they engage with conflicting doctrines 
and difficult issues. What is worthy of noting however, is that Eriugena is confident, 
not so much because of the aid of tradition but because he is guided by reason. 
 
The dialogue follows the pattern of unity-diversity-reunification as found in 
Neoplatonism, or Creation-Fall-Redemption as in the Christian tradition. While 
Neoplatonism is central to the text, scholars hold that his main theme is creation 
understood as the process by which the hidden divine mystery becomes manifest and 
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returns to its source. The work was probably revised continuously over this period, 
as is evidenced by the number of glosses that were gradually incorporated into the 
text.
170
 In this work, Eriugena displays a masterly knowledge of both Greek Eastern 
and Latin Western authorities of the time, setting out to associate himself with the 
great figures of Augustine and pseudo-Dionysius among others.
171
  
 
It is a work that displays an extraordinary level of erudition and (for his time) 
knowledge of the natural world—cosmology, number theory, astronomy, physics 
and so on.
172
 Moreover, he displays his knowledge of scripture, attempting a bold 
interpretation of the creation story of Genesis, and emphasising the refreshing notion 
that many interpretations are possible. In this regard he highlights the dangers of a 
literal interpretation of the scriptures. These cannot be studied in isolation and need 
more than the authority of the fathers: reason must be followed, ‗which investigates 
the truth of things.‘173 Moran, further points out that Eriugena‘s sole desire to have a 
proper insight into the words of Scripture, which he considered to be the ―secret 
dwelling-place of truth‖, must be tempered by the impression from the dialogue that 
Eriugena reads scripture in the wider context of his metaphysical framework.  
 
Overall through his use of dialogue as a method of genuine inquiry, Eriugena wants 
to ‗provide a vehicle for travelling on the road towards spiritual enlightenment.‘174 
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This more holistic focus means that his use of dialogue cannot be understood as a 
vehicle for conveying dogmatic propositions, as dialogue would become in the 
scholastic period. Thus difficulties are not glossed over but are faced up to, and in 
that way Eriugena displays a true speculative spirit and emphasises that the ultimate 
focus is union with Truth itself which for him is God.
 175
  
 
Cappuyns has described the philosophical works of Eriugena as forming a triptych, 
with the Periphyseon as the central panel and with the Expositions of the Celestial 
Hierarchy on one side and both his exegetical works on John‘s Gospel, the 
Commentary and the Homily on the Prologue, on the other. It is probable that the 
Commentary (which is quite fragmentary) was unfinished at the time of Eriugena‘s 
death, and while it did not have a wide circulation it did have strong influence 
throughout the Middle Ages and was used, for instance, by Aquinas. The latter work, 
the Homily on the Prologue, has been the most popular of his works to be found in 
medieval libraries. This may be because it was thought to have been a work of 
Origen, and also its eloquence and fervour made it popular especially in monastic 
establishments during the Middle Ages.
 176
  
 
Eriugena‘s ending like his beginnings is shrouded in obscurity. We hear nothing of 
him after 870. According to William of Malmesbury he went to Britain to become 
Abbot of Malmesbury and there his scholars are reputed to have ‗fatally stabbed him 
with their pens.‘  However, it is much more likely that he stayed in France and died 
around 877. Just as he himself faded into relative obscurity so also his influence 
waned after the thirteenth century. This is largely due to condemnations of the 
Periphyseon at church councils in 1210 and 1225.
177
  Apart from his influence on 
Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, and Giordano Bruno during the later Middle Ages, his 
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writings fade from history for the next number of centuries until his Periphyseon 
surfaced in Malmesbury in the seventeenth century whereupon it was duly placed on 
the index of forbidden books.
178
  Only in the nineteenth century did serious interest 
in his writings begin to grow, though one has to wait until the latter decades of the 
twentieth century to find more than a few monographs in English.
179
  
 
II. Sources of influence 
Eriugena‘s translations and subsequent original work resulted in ‗the meeting of 
Athens and Rome in Gaul.‘180 The Latin West and the Greek East – two worlds that 
were becoming increasingly alienated from each other—were being brought together 
into a coherent schema. For Dermot Moran this coherence reflects a range of 
Neoplatonisms received from his contact with the various authors both East and 
West, and was subsequently communicated by Eriugena ‗as the truth of Christianity 
and the meaning of nature itself‘.181 In fact most scholars agree that the primary 
philosophical influence on Eriugena from his various sources had to be Neoplatonic, 
since Aristotle‘s works were known only through the Categoriae decem at this 
time.
182
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It is also the case that Eriugena‘s access to Plato‘s and Aristotle‘s philosophies is via 
Christian sources, both Greek and Latin.
183
 His knowledge of Plotinus, Proclus, and 
Neoplatonism is largely from the same sources, relying most particularly on the 
versions found in pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus Confessor.
184
 
Stephen Gersh has outlined the close links with later Platonic writers such as 
Iamblichus and Porphyry.
185
  
 
A. Sources from the Latin West 
It is clear that a number of Boethius‘s works were known to Eriugena, though he 
does not make any reference to Boethius‘s most famous work, the Consolation of 
Philosophy.  Boethius may have been one of his sources for Aristotle, along with the 
Latin paraphrase by Marius Victorinus of Porphyry‘s Isagoge, and the Categoriae 
decem.
186
 Bede‘s De rerum natura has been cited as a source of Eriugena‘s fourfold 
division of nature and his concept of the primordial causes. There is also a 
suggestion that Victorinus may have been another source for the four-fold division. 
As previously mentioned, Capella‘s Marriage of Philology and Mercury was known 
to Eriugena, and from it he gleaned a number of Neoplatonic concepts as well as a 
summary of Aristotle‘s logical procedure.187 Haren suggests that the twin framework 
on which the Periphyseon is built, the dialectical method and a belief in the power of 
reason not necessarily connected with authority, may have already been developed 
through his contact with Capella and Macrobius, though Augustine and pseudo-
Dionysius are also sources. 
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Augustine is undoubtedly the most influential of his Latin sources, both in terms of 
his overall scheme and particular details. According to Moran Eriugena ‗seems 
thoroughly Augustinian in many of his ideas and attitudes.‘188 It is through 
Augustine that Eriugena would have come into contact with the Neoplatonism of 
Plotinus and Porphyry.
189
 His distinction between the two paths of wisdom—
authority and reason—is also to be found in Augustine. Many scholars claim that 
Eriugena sometimes seems to use this distinction to actually contradict that towering 
authority of the age. As Carabine puts it Eriugena is not held captive by Augustine. 
Rather his Periphyseon contains ideas that can be considered a ‗powerful alternative‘ 
to those of Augustine and later of Aquinas.
190
 Moran, while recognising that 
Eriugena differs from Augustine, suggests that this stems from his desire to show the 
‗underlying deep unity and agreement between the Christian systems of Greek East 
and Latin West‘ that leads him to remodel whatever he adopts from Augustine.191 
Whatever his reasons, the refreshingly dynamic understanding of reality posited by 
Eriugena—with its central idea of creation being the manifestation of the divine—is 
an expression of the type of ancient wisdom that can be retrieved and reinterpreted in 
the contemporary context of the ecological crisis.  
 
An interesting example of being influenced by Augustine but ultimately following 
the Greek Maximus‘ version concerns the doctrine of omnipresence—the notion of 
how a single metaphysical principle relates to the multiplicity of created things. This 
originally Neoplatonic notion took on a Christian focus, with Augustine being the 
principle channel of Plotinus. For Augustine the metaphysical principle, God, is 
understood to be both non-spatial and atemporal, while the human soul is temporal, 
but also non-spatial. Eriugena however follows Maximus who holds that the 
omnipresence of God as non-spatial and atemporal is understood as relating to a 
spatial and temporal creation that includes the human soul. In other words, God 
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encompasses created entities—all understood as spatial and temporal—within him, 
implying that he is simultaneously transcendent and immanent. Eriugena uses the 
notion of light and its diffusion, and the blending of light and air, to illustrate his 
understandings.
192
 
 
B. Sources from the Greek East 
Thus, Eriugena cannot be categorised as simply a follower of Augustine or any of 
the Latin writers. A number of the Greek writers also impacted on him, and from 
them he not only follows their general pattern of focusing on God as not known in 
himself but known in his effects or energies, but he also adopts new ideas such as the 
notions of theophany and theōsis, God as superessentialis, and the different forms of 
theology—positive, negative and mystical.193  Origen‘s ideas were known to 
Eriugena, a reason why he is sometimes referred to as the Origen of the West. Of 
particular relevance to him is Origen‘s idea that creation is an eternal not a temporal 
act of God. Both Origen and Eriugena argue that all spiritual beings or intellects are 
one with God in ουσíα.194  
 
We have seen that through his translation work his knowledge of Greek deepened 
and scholars agree on the overriding Greek Christian influence on his thought. In 
particular the formative influence of pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil of 
Caesarea, and Maximus the Confessor is acknowledged.
195
 From these writers, 
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whom he tended to read as confirming each other‘s viewpoints,196 he gleaned a new 
understanding of time, of the meaning of creation, and of the relation between the 
divine ideas and their effects. He also received a more radical concept of infinite 
nature, new ideas on anthropology, and an intricate method of philosophical and 
theological negative dialectics, all of which are key concepts in his Periphyseon.  
Corresponding to Augustine in the west, Gregory of Nyssa commands the lion‘s 
share of Eriugena‘s attention in the East, helping to form Eriugena‘s views of the 
human and of its relation to the divine.
197
 In particular he received from Gregory the 
doctrine that matter is the confluence of invisible realities—a doctrine we find 
expounded in his understanding of the body.
198
 Eriugena‘s claim concerning the 
existence and essence of God—that while we know that God is we do not know what 
he is—can be attributed to the influence of Maximus.199 Yet the more qualitative 
influence was possibly pseudo-Dionysius, and it is primarily in his reading of this 
author and of Augustine that we find his efforts to create a synthesis. While these 
authors are not always in agreement, Eriugena is at pains to show that they are 
proponents of the one true philosophy.   
 
C. Irish cultural influences 
While no hint of Irish origins emanates from Eriugena himself, scholars do suggest 
an Irish cultural influence.  For instance he has been associated with a number of old 
Irish words explaining difficult Latin terms for well over a century.
200
  Scholars have 
also suggested that he may have learnt his knowledge of Greek in Ireland, even 
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though recent research suggests otherwise, since the Irish did not possess such a 
level of Greek.
201
 Most likely he had some knowledge prior to travelling to the 
Continent but this was considerably enhanced there. 
 
Recent work by the literary critic Alfred Siewers highlights the influence of 
Eriugena‘s Irishness in his writings, by attributing the uniqueness of his work in part 
to ‗his cultural background in the archipelago‘. Siewers associates the Periphyseon 
with the corpus of Insular writings relating to the Irish sea provinces, suggesting that 
it culminates these early Irish Sea writings on nature from the standpoint of 
intellectual history.
202
 
 
Thomas O‘Loughlin, writing in the Traditions of Christian Spirituality Series, 
stresses Eriugena‘s emphasis on the notion of divine transcendence. He suggests that 
Eriugena‘s work is an indication of a wider awareness of the need for a balance 
between a sacramental view of creation and the more apophatic which focuses on the 
awesome mystery of God – or God as mysterious other. He notes comparisons with 
examples from early Irish Insular literature, and suggests that Eriugena may have 
first got his notions of divine transcendence from contact with less sophisticated 
versions found in these texts from his Celtic background.  Thus his philosophy may 
be considered grounded in a kind of Celtic apophatic theology as is found in the Irish 
hexaëmeronic tradition.
203
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The Celtic scholar John Carey also emphasises the importance of Eriugena‘s link 
with his Celtic roots. His approach is to argue for commonality between Eriugena‘s 
understanding of the resurrection and understandings found in a late ninth or early 
tenth century text composed by another Irish writer entitled In Tenga Bithnua (‗The 
Everlasting Tongue‘). This is an account of the mysteries of the universe following 
roughly the sequence of Genesis, a sequence also found in the Periphyseon. 
However it is written in a style that reveals an author with a vivid and restless 
imagination. Such a tone is as far away as one could imagine from the ‗quiet tone 
and rigorous reasoning‘ of the Periphyseon.  Yet Carey argues that these texts may 
have much more in common than has previously been thought. He does this by 
considering what each has to say about the Christian doctrine of the resurrection or 
the idea of the return of all things to God, concluding that Eriugena may have been 
exposed to a range of ideas about this topic prior to leaving Ireland. Eriugena sought 
in vain to find a counterpart to these ideas in the Latin Patristic tradition, but 
eventually found one in the Greek tradition in the writings of Maximus the 
Confessor. In fact this focus on Maximus was a divergence from drawing on Pseudo-
Dionysius who, as we have noted, seems to have been his primary Greek influence in 
every other respect. The reason for this may be due to the fact of some resonance in 
Maximus‘s ideas with Eriugena‘s own Irish background. 204  Carey‘s final point is 
that both these texts – Periphyseon and In Tenga Bithnua – assert that not only the 
human species but all things return to God, since both humans and the cosmos are 
‗portions and versions of one another.‘205 
 
III. Portrayals of Eriugenian thought 
The standard interpretation of Eriugenian philosophy in the late nineteenth century 
was that it reflected a Christian Neoplatonism with mystical and pantheistical 
tendencies.
206
 According to Dermot Moran this standard approach to Eriugena sees 
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him positing a ‗hierarchical metaphysical system under the guise of ―divisions‖ of 
nature‘ and going further than many others ‗in arguing for the final conflation of 
these divisions (which include God and nature, uncreated and created being) into one 
pantheistic concept of nature as both God and creation.‘207  According to Willemiem 
Otten, this was largely understood as a kind of ‗metaphysical monism‘.208  While 
Moran agrees that Eriugena provides a ‗metaphysical system‘, seeing it as unique for 
the time, he challenges the pantheistic aspect of this interpretation and argues that 
Eriugena‘s strong monistic statements about the identity of creator and creation are 
countered by his statements on the absolute distinction between them.
209
  In this also 
is reflected the tension in Eriugena between the Neoplatonism of his Greek 
inheritance and the strongly Augustinian-influenced Catholic faith that stresses the 
distinction between creator and creature. 
 
In offering a contemporary rendition of Eriugena‘s thought, Moran follows another 
nineteenth century trend that stressed Eriugena‘s rationalistic tendencies and 
suggests that while his system might appear to be ‗an objective hierarchical 
metaphysics of order‘ it is more clearly ‗a subjectivist and idealist philosophy‘. This 
is so firstly in terms of understanding all spatiotemporal reality as ‗immaterial, mind 
dependent, and lacking in independent existence.‘ Eriugena‘s idealist position is seen 
then from his belief in matter as a ‗combination of immaterial qualities‘ and from 
‗his identification of objects of knowledge with the mind which grasps them.‘ 
Secondly, Moran argues that this idealism is comparable to Hegel‘s system ‗whereby 
all finite reality is understood to require infinite reality for its full intelligibility and 
completion.‘ In fact, Moran argues, Eriugena‘s idealism is a more problematic 
formulation in that there is a struggle to retain the notion of difference while 
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reducing all to ‗infinite subjectivity.‘ In dealing with this difficulty, God is often 
spoken of as unum multiplex, a complex unity.
210
  Elsewhere, and highlighted by 
Darren Hibbs, Moran suggests a similarity to the radical idealism of Berkeley. 
However Hibbs argues that while Eriugena can be understood as prefiguring a form 
of idealism his position cannot be understood as indicating a belief in a wholly 
immaterialist view of reality.211 
 
Otten, while recognising the centrality of human reason, highlights a certain concern 
with overly emphasising the relevance of Eriugena‘s philosophy for a modern 
idealistic system, and shifts her perspective from viewing Eriugena‘s main work the 
Periphyseon as primarily of metaphysical importance to viewing it from an 
anthropological perspective. The human can be considered the central character 
within its literary structure, and this still allows the work to be regarded ‗as a 
coherent exposition of ideas.‘ Taking this stance counterbalances the over-emphasis 
on interpreting the work as a modern idealist system or indeed as a ‗statically 
layered, Neoplatonic universe of Proclean design.‘ Her main point is that the work 
needs to be considered primarily within its ninth-century context, and if there is to be 
a comparison with another era it would be best done with what has been described as 
‗medieval humanism‘ of the twelfth century. Thus Otten argues for an interpretation 
that recognises the reflective subject, but as incorporated within surrounding nature. 
The human ought not to be understood as an isolated entity, ‗a creature of 
independent status‘, but one who ‗functions as a vital and integrated part of the 
whole complex of natura.‘212 
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Marenbon challenges the view that Eriugena developed a philosophical system at all. 
He argues, for instance, that Eriugena displays a level of confusion in his usage of 
ουσíα, largely because he borrows from various traditions and tries to make the ideas 
fit into a coherent system of thought. Instead, Marenbon claims, Eriugena ends up 
giving expression to an inherent logical incoherence. Thus he cannot be regarded as 
producing a philosophical system.
213
 Marenbon therefore is more in favour of 
understanding Eriugena through a historical framework.
214
 In this regard Marenbon 
disputes the tendency to view Eriugena as some kind of isolated, lonely figure, not 
understood by his contemporaries, and posits instead an Eriugena who is more 
important but less outstanding (in the sense of being the only one) than previously 
imagined. For instance Bertrand Russell describes Eriugena as ‗the most astonishing 
person of the ninth century.‘215 Frederick Copleston describes him as the last of the 
Greek Neoplatonists, whose philosophical system ‗stands out like a lofty rock in the 
midst of a plain‘.216  
 
For Marenbon Eriugena was not an isolated figure standing above and beyond others 
and then soon forgotten by his contemporaries, but was read by them and by a circle 
after him.
217
  In this regard Moran agrees with him and those others who have 
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produced critical contextual understandings of Eriugena‘s work in terms of seeing 
him as part of the Carolingian renovatio. It is within that historical context that 
Marenbon places Eriugena‘s value as a philosopher, claiming that this value lies in 
his work on more general ninth-century philosophical concerns such as the question 
of universals and the nature of logical classification. He reads the Periphyseon as 
having at its core ‗a complex of questions concerned with essence, universals and 
categories.‘218 However Moran holds that while Eriugena does begin from within 
that historical framework (and does engage the issues of his day), he ‗totally 
transformed and transcended the limits of the Carolingian and Latin systems that he 
inherited, to such a degree that ‗he was no longer even comprehensible to the 
philosophers of the age in which he lived.‘219 
 
IV. Kūkai: A Biographical note 
Commonly known by his posthumous honorific title Kōbō Daishi, (Great teacher 
who widely spread the Buddha‘s teachings), Kūkai is remembered as one of the most 
prominent and respected Buddhist teachers and multi-talented cultural figures of 
ancient Japan.
220
 By contrast with the case of Eriugena, reliable sources exist 
regarding Kūkai‘s early life. While embellished with legendary accounts of his 
accomplishments, numerous biographies were produced in the course of the Middle 
Ages.
221
  Born in 774 into an aristocratic family, Kūkai‘s genius was recognised 
when he was fifteen by his uncle, the distinguished Confucian Scholar Atō Ōtari, and 
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he began his studies of the Chinese classics as was the custom.
222
  It seems that while 
he attended college in the capital he became dissatisfied with the standard Confucian 
curriculum; and while he showed interest in the Buddhist scriptures, according to 
Shinzei‘s biography, Kūkai ‗constantly told himself, however, that what he was 
learning was only dregs derived from the men of old,‘ and he ‗thought it essential to 
learn the ultimate Truth.‘223  In this we gather that he turned to Buddhism for 
answers. While the Twenty-Five Article Will seems to indicate that Kūkai left 
college, undertook a period of asceticism, wrote both the draft and body of the 
Indications of the Goals of the Three Teachings, (his first major writing described by 
Ryūichi Abé as a quasi-autobiographical fiction and Buddhist apologetic) and was 
initiated into Buddhism by the age of twenty, it seems that more reliable scholarship 
puts his writing of the Indications at age twenty-four and his initiation somewhere 
between the ages of twenty-four and thirty-one.
224
  
 
His early contact with the Natural Wisdom School, particularly their recitation of the 
mantra Kokūzō gumonji no hō, which related to esoteric Buddhism, seems to have 
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been a formative influence.
225
 From the beginning Kūkai‘s interest in Buddhism 
arose from his experience of meditation rather than from ideas gleaned from any of 
the books he had been studying at the college.
226
 A hint of this can be gleaned from 
‗Indications‘: 
I recited the mantra incessantly, as if I were rubbing one piece of wood 
against another to make fire, all the while earnestly hoping to achieve this 
result. I climbed up Mount Tairyu in Awa Province and meditated at Cape 
Muroto in Tosa. The valley reverberated to the sound of my voice as I 
recited, and the planet Venus appeared in the sky.
227
 
 
It seems that from early on Kūkai set a pattern of ‗altering between seclusion and 
participation in the world‘ mirroring the pattern that later emerged in his travels 
between his remote centre Mt. Kōya and the capital Kyoto. On the one hand he 
embraced the life of a wandering scholar and in all likelihood he encountered native 
ways of life, and gods or kami of Shinto. On the other hand he studied intensively, 
possibly at Nara or the capital where books would have been available, a whole 
variety of texts, as is obvious in ‗Indications‘.228 
 
Encountering, but being unable to understand, the Mahāvairocana Sutra led him to 
request permission to visit China, where he met his teacher Hui-Kuo the seventh 
Patriarch of Esoteric Buddhism.
229
 Within three years he had returned to Japan as the 
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eight Patriarch
230
, having accomplished many things, including a knowledge of 
Sanskrit, of Indian Buddhism, and laden with ‗voluminous sutras, huge mandalas, 
and books of poetry.‘231 
 
It would be another three years before Kūkai was favourably heard by the court as 
the new Emperor Saga promoted Kūkai, just as the previous Emperor Kammu had 
promoted Saichō, who had first introduced Esoteric Buddhism.232 Residing at the 
Takaosanji on the outskirts of Kyoto from 809 until 823, Kūkai‘s religious and 
cultural significance grew and during these years this place became the centre of 
Esoteric Buddhism. Though extremely busy as administrator, performing religious 
ceremonies, responding to requests for epitaphs and petitions, his true genius, 
‗nurtured by the practice of meditation‘, was expressed in his religious treatises. It 
was during this time that he wrote Benkenmitsu nikkyôron (‗The Difference between 
Esoteric and Exoteric Buddhism‘—hereafter ‗The Difference‘), as well as his trilogy 
his sambu no sho: Sokushinjōbutsugi (‗Attaining Enlightenment in this very 
Existence‘—hereafter ‗Attaining Enlightenment‘), Shōjijissōgi (‗The Meanings of 
Sound, Word, and Reality‘—hereafter ‗Sound, Word, Reality‘), and Unjigi (‗The 
Meanings of the Word Hūm—Meanings of Hūm‘).233  This led to ever greater 
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numbers wishing to join him, and the eventual establishment of his centre on Mt. 
Kōya.  
 
In requesting this centre on Mt. Kōya, Kūkai stresses the regrettable lack of 
meditation by priests ‗in high mountains, in deep forests, in wide canyons, and in 
secluded caves.‘ He goes on to suggest that this is because the ‗teaching of 
meditation has not been transmitted, nor has a suitable place been allocated for the 
practice of meditation.‘234 He claims Mt. Kōya as suitable due to it being a remote 
flat area surrounded by peaks on all sides, which resembled the lotus flower the 
symbol of the Matrix Realm. At the centre of the plateau he built his temple complex 
which he named the Kongōbūji, the Diamond Peak Temple, placing the Buddha 
Mahāvairocana at the centre. Thus the Diamond Realm was inscribed in the larger 
circle of the Matrix Realm. While work began on the site in 819 shortly after his 
request was granted, Kūkai did not live to see the various buildings completed.235 
The last ten to twelve years of his life before his final years of retirement to Mt. 
Kōya were extremely busy. For instance while supervising the construction of this 
temple complex he was also in charge of the completion of Tōji as well as the 
reconstruction of a reservoir in his native province of Sanuki.
236
   
                                                                                                                                                                    
unique works of a ―metaphysical linguistics.‖ They examine the interrelationship (which is ultimately 
non-dualistic) between the phenomenal world, its sounds (or ―voices‖) as ―signs‖ (or ―letters‖), and 
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During this period also he continued his writings. In 823 Kūkai received approval 
from the new Emperor Jun‘na for his ‗List of Texts, Consisting of the Three 
Divisions of Study‘ which effectively meant the recognition of Shingon as an 
independent Buddhist sect.
237
 And in 830 he completed ‗The Ten Stages of the 
Development of Mind‘, the culmination of his thought, which was followed by a 
simplified edition entitled ‗The Precious Key to the Secret Treasury‘.  Having 
stressed the incompatibility of Exoteric and Esoteric Buddhism, and the superiority 
of Esoteric over Exoteric teachings in earlier texts, Kūkai finally reached a new 
synthesis that allowed for the coexistence of a variety of different points of view in 
these latter texts.
238
 
 
He spent his final few years primarily on Mt. Kōya officially retired, though still 
making some requests for his centre which ensured that it became officially 
recognised as a state-supported Buddhist institution. Many believe that Kūkai is still 
living on Mt. Kōya sitting in a permanent state of meditation and ‗merged with the 
Buddha‘s hosshin,‘ as a saviour to all who suffer. A visit to this centre today is like 
‗a journey back to a radically different time and place,‘ where the Japanese people 
can ‗temporarily divest themselves of modernity‘s cloak and once again live among 
the naked magic of rocks, trees, and streams.‘ In this scene Kūkai resembles a 
Japanese Merlin and Mt. Kōya is like a ‗museum of the Druidic relics of Japan‘s 
ancient past.‘239 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
received numerous other requests he was unable to decline, such as participating in religious 
ceremonies by the great Nara clergy, being appointed monastic religious director, acting as tutor to 
the crown prince and opening the School of Arts and Sciences, the first school in Japan that provided 
universal education. The opening of this school reflected Kūkai‘s belief that everyone regardless of 
being rich or poor was entitled to an education. However his ideal did not last long as the school was 
closed ten years after his death by his successor. See Hakeda, ‗Life of Kūkai‘, p. 54—8 
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Yet just as during his lifetime, when his various activities gave witness to ‗the 
existence of certain polarities in a state of harmonious tension‘ reflecting the 
conjoining of the separate entities of sky and sea in his name,
240
  Kūkai is more than 
a mysterious figure depicted as a scholar-monk with three faces and six arms who 
can only be partially understood. Kūkai has left us a comprehensive philosophical 
system of thought in his corpus of writings that is both encyclopaedic and critical. In 
the final analysis, however, to understand Kūkai one cannot ignore the 
mysteriousness associated with him, since to do so would be to ‗dissociate him from 
the social and cultural ground in which his thought took root.‘ 241  
 
V. Mutual Influences: Shinto& Esoteric Buddhism  
To better understand that background we need to look briefly at the mutual influence 
of Shinto and esoteric Buddhism, since this synthesis highlights how esoteric 
Buddhism became such an accepted and influential movement in Japan. The later 
fusion of Shinto and Esoteric Buddhism as the indigenous mountain religion 
Shugendō had its roots in the activities of earlier Buddhist ascetics, who did not 
differentiate between Buddhist guardians and the kami spirits associated with Shinto. 
In the eight century Emperor Shōmu saw an overlap in the symbol systems of both 
traditions. He claimed to embody both in his person and through his practice ‗the 
common symbolic ground between Buddhism and Shinto,‘ making himself ‗a 
holographic entry point for the intersection of both traditions.‘242  
 
In terms of a philosophical justification for such a claim of compatibility, the decided 
advantage lay on the side of Buddhism, and at the beginning of the ninth century the 
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newly arrived esoteric form played a key role through both its Tendai and Shingon 
renditions.
243
 Kasulis considers three points of intersection between the esoteric 
Buddhism and the ancient Shinto worldviews that would justify this claim. First, 
Shinto‘s stress on the kami-filled nature of all things correlated with the Buddhist 
notion of the whole cosmos being the self-expressive activity of the Cosmic Buddha 
Dainichi, the Buddha‘s ‗thought, word, and deed.‘ Already the emperor Shōmu had 
formally associated this figure with that of Amaterasu.   
 
Second, the idea of developing a ‗purely mindful heart‘ in Buddhism correlated with 
the kotodama no kokoro of Shinto. Thus similarities in terms of ritual praxis existed 
in the repetitive body-mind performances of chanting and gestures to be found in 
both traditions. For instance, certain voiced sounds in both traditions are seen as 
having transformative power.  Kasulis makes the point that Esoteric Buddhism had 
developed a metapraxis, a philosophical underpinning to its practices that could be 
similarly used in Shinto. Using the example of how certain voiced sounds in both 
traditions contain transformative power, namely the kotodama or the spirit of words 
in Shinto and the gomitsu or ‗mysterious intimacy of speech‘ in Buddhism, Kasulis 
concludes that ‗in philosophically justifying its own practice (in developing a 
Buddhist metapraxis), esoteric Buddhism brought to Japan a philosophical 
understanding that could work equally well for Shinto praxis related to kotodama 
and norito.‘          
                      
A third point of overlap comes from the assumption common to both traditions that 
the sacred is found in the form of celestial deities allowing for correlations between 
these celestial personages. More importantly, however, for both Shinto and Esoteric 
Buddhism the sacred is found in every phenomenon. Here we find a correlation 
between Shinto indentifying all natural objects as kami and Kūkai‘s central principle 
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of hosshin seppō: every phenomenon is the activity of Dainichi and so preaches the 
truth.
244
 
 
VI. Portrayals of Kūkai’s teachings 
Kūkai‘s philosophical system has traditionally been understood to have a two-fold 
approach—a theoretical and practical aspect. His theoretical approach has generally 
been framed in terms of demonstrating the superiority of esoteric teaching over 
exoteric, and convincing his listeners/readers of the validity of his thought and the 
effectiveness of his approach. However, this traditional approach of framing Kūkai‘s 
work along sectarian lines, where Kūkai is primarily associated with the 
establishment of a new sect within Buddhism with the main aim of emphasising its 
superiority over all other forms of Buddhism, is disputed by Ryūichi Abé in what is 
the most comprehensive English study on Kūkai to date.245 Abé argues for a much 
more nuanced understanding of Kūkai‘s work, wanting to contextualise his writings 
in the political and social issues of his day. In that regard Abé suggests that Kūkai 
was more interested in engaging with the existing Buddhist Nara clergy and in 
indicating that esoteric readings of exoteric texts was possible. For Abé, Kūkai‘s 
value is not so much about the introduction of a new sect into medieval Japan but in 
introducing a new approach.  
 
Kasulis also wishes to approach Kūkai and his thought from a different perspective 
than simply locating Shingon within the array of Buddhist schools. His concern is 
with the type of knowledge emphasised by Kūkai. He draws a parallel between 
Bergson‘s two types of knowing and Kūkai‘s exoteric and esoteric teachings. 
According to Bergson the first or relative type of knowing is where one moves 
‗round the object‘ and the knower is ‗placed outside the object‘. The second type, he 
refers to as ‗absolute‘, and it is where one ‗enters into‘ the object and knows the 
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object ‗from within, as it is in itself‘.246  Kasulis parallels Kūkai‘s exoteric teachings 
with the first type and his esoteric with Bergson‘s second type of knowledge. Thus 
Kasulis concludes that Kūkai‘s ultimate emphasis on the esoteric as a more superior 
kind of knowledge meant that Kūkai ‗tipped Japanese philosophy in the direction of 
intimacy rather than integrity‘, and in this way he (Kūkai) makes an engagement 
model of knowledge primary.
247
  
 
VII. Outlining core philosophical ideas 
Having contextualised both Eriugena and Kūkai, I now begin to explore how these 
thinkers might converse with one another. To do this in an effective way some kind 
of basic scaffold is required; some kind of guiding principles. As noted previously, 
emerging out of the overview of current ecology and religion studies is the central 
issue of the nature of divine-human-earth relations. It is this triadic structure that will 
guide my exploration. Before engaging the dialogue proper (the subject matter of the 
next chapter) and keeping in mind this triad of relationships I outline the 
fundamental philosophical positions of Eriugena and Kūkai.   
 
A. Eriugena & the framing concept of natura  
The central aspect of Eriugena‘s cosmic framework—its organising principle—is the 
concept of phusis or natura, as the opening statement of the Periphyseon attests:  
 As I frequently ponder and, in so far as my talents allow, ever more carefully 
investigate the fact that the first and fundamental division of all things which 
either can be grasped by the mind or lie beyond its grasp is into those that are 
and those that are not, there comes to mind as a general term for them all 
what in Greek is called φύσις [phusis] and in Latin Natura. 248 
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For Eriugena everything, including his understanding of the divine, is incorporated 
within this overarching concept of natura. Because he includes divinity—that which 
is beyond definition— within this concept, he cannot logically define the concept in 
any absolute sense. Instead he approaches his exploration of natura by the use of 
division—first (as in the quote above) into a two-fold division of being and non-
being; that which is and that which is not (or is not accessible), and later into his 
four-fold division.  Alfred Siewers suggests that non-being can be understood as that 
which is not ‗readily apparent or instrumentally to hand yet is omnipresent both as 
mysterious essence and part of dynamic process.‘249 This opening statement of the 
Periphyseon offers a perspective on all the elements that constitute the triadic 
structure of the dialogue—the element of mystery (which in Christian terms can be 
understood as the divinity), the phenomenal world (the cosmic landscape), and the 
human as the one engaged in the act of pondering upon the mystery of everything, 
trying to understand it all in a coherent manner, and yet recognising human 
limitations. 
 
Behind this two-fold distinction (and central to his philosophy of nature) is the 
pseudo-Dionysian distinction of the kataphatic/apophatic theology, with its 
dialectical exchange of negative and affirmative statements about the divine. 
According to Otten the apophatic was a useful tool for Eriugena since it enabled him 
to expand the created scope of human reason and ‗consider God present inside rather 
than outside or above natura, even if full insight into the divine was not reached.‘250 
As previously indicated (see introduction) the more general understanding of the 
apophatic suggests that anything positive said of the divine needs to be countered by 
the opposite. God is understood to be beyond all affirmative statements, with denials 
being seen as more true than affirmative statements, leading to an understanding of 
the divine as a transcendent nothingness beyond being. In Book I of the Periphyseon 
God is said to be ‗nothingness and negation of essence.‘251   
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Eriugena however presents being and non-being in a dialectical tension throughout 
his work, which, as Carabine points out, is one of his great innovative themes. 
Essentially he is not content simply to deny all affirmations about God, and in that 
way fit Yannaras‘ depiction of the Western concept of the apophatic. Rather for 
Eriugena the ultimate ground of reality lies beyond both being and non-being, 
revealing an entirely deeper mode of conceiving God. Carabine describes this as the 
hyperphatic way of speaking about God—a method that goes beyond both the 
kataphatic and apophatic and uses the prefix super or plus quam. Eriugena uses the 
concept of superessentialis to express this sense of beyond.
252
  
 
Eriugena then offers his second method of dividing natura—a four-fold division. 
Thus we have that which creates and is not created, which refers to God or the divine 
as first cause. The second division—that which creates and is created—concerns the 
primordial or hidden causes which Eriugena sees as the secret folds in the cosmos. 
His third division—that which is created but does not create—essentially refers to 
the rest of creation: the effects of the primordial causes. The fourth division—that 
which neither creates nor is created—again refers to God, but this time as final end.  
Essentially Eriugena is describing creation as a kind of divine self-expression, where 
the divine nature eternally self-expresses itself into a fourfold division or four 
species, which are understood as different manifestations of the same universal 
principle.  
 
A core problem being addressed is the relationship between creation and creator, 
between God and God‘s creation, which Moran expresses as follows: ‗Are God‘s 
ideas and willings part of God and hence uncreated, or do they belong to the 
structure of created nature?‘ This is essentially the conundrum that Eriugena 
grapples with throughout the Periphyseon, and his efforts to explore it reflect his 
belief in the ultimate oneness of all reality. It is not, however, a kind of ‗oneness‘ 
that is monistic but rather it is relational—hence the centrality of the trinity for him. 
And while Eriugena is not always clear in his use of philosophical concepts (often 
using them in quite a loose way), nor accurate about the nature of the natural world, 
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he is clear from the outset about where he wishes to go with his explorations: for 
Eriugena the concept of phusis or nature, understood as the dialectical process of 
revealing and concealing, ‗stands as the absolute frame of his thinking.‘253 
Presenting created reality in such a dynamic way is not always associated with 
Christian understandings of nature or creation.  
 
While the notion of hierarchy is obvious in Eriugena‘s conceptions of reality, the 
centrality of a dynamic approach tempers the kind of rigidity generally associated 
with hierarchy. As Moran argues: ‗Eriugena‘s hierarchical scheme of nature is to be 
understood not as a fixed set of metaphysical levels or degrees of reality but, rather, 
as a set of theoriae, or mental acts of intellectual contemplation, which allow human 
subjectivity to enter into the infinite divine subjectivity and nothingness.‘ Thus the 
divisions are real or fixed only in the sense of being aids to the mind ‗entering into 
and grasp[ing] the anarchic play of infinite nature.‘ Moran goes on to suggest that 
this division is an icon or a pattern which transmits divine infinite theophanies to 
human minds, and they in turn enter into and celebrate that infinite multiplicity. The 
physical world is transformed into a world of sign, symbol, image, or, for Eriugena, 
mystery or sacrament. Everything is turned into the restless unfolding of divine 
apparitions or theophanies. Nature then is not just external objective existent world 
but can be understood as the ‗site of the meeting of minds‘, the location of the play 
of infinite subjectivity.‘254 
 
Essentially Eriugena is offering an understanding of creation, which belongs to a 
stream of thought that critiques the dominant strongly Augustinian way of thinking 
in the Christian West—critiques a way of thinking that emphasises a clear distinction 
between the Creator and created (nature and grace) and an absolute dependency of 
creation on Creator. The dichotomy was not a feature of the Greek East, nor (as 
recent research shows) was it a feature of the Irish Sea Province writings, which had 
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an influence on Eriugena.
255
 The term natura in this scheme is understood as 
articulating, in a dynamic manner, divine nature as beginning, middle and end of 
things; involved in an endless cycle of unfolding and return, which is both 
synchronic and diachronic.
256
 It is a ‗process of concealing and revealing, hiddeness 
and manifestation, which is one with the nature of truth itself.‘257  Creation is 
understood as continuously unfolding rather than being created: a more dynamic 
sense of creation is being offered. Siewers describes Eriugena‘s efforts as developing 
‗a non-Western meontology (cosmology of natural transcendent nonbeing), and goes 
on to claim links between his four-fold natura and ideas about ‗hidden-yet-appearing 
Being‘ found in Heideggerian influenced environmental philosophy.258 
 
Despite the gigantic scope of Eriugena‘s concept of natura it appears that the human 
mind serves as its leading principle. Eriugena clearly displays a strong positive 
anthropology, which was not a feature of the early Middle Ages, with its more 
common emphasis on the fall and human sinfulness. Yet, as we saw emphasised in 
Willemiem Otten‘s work, Eriugena seems to want to stress the integration of that 
subject with surrounding nature. There is a holding together of his anthropology and 
his physiology. What is at issue here is a more ancient kind of subjectivity than is 
associated with modernity or with modern readings of Augustine. These latter 
notions express a more psychological and inward looking reading of the reflective 
subject. Instead, as Otten argues what is more pertinent is a kind of humanism that 
Richard Southern termed ‗medieval humanism.‘259  
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B. Kūkai and the embodiment of all reality 
In turning to how the triad of ‗divine-human-earth‘ might be said to be expressed in 
Kūkai‘s vision of reality, it is necessary to look firstly at how in his form of esoteric 
Buddhism he conceives of the Buddha. In fact this conception underpins his entire 
philosophical outlook, and gives rise to one of his core doctrines—hosshin seppō 
(‗the Buddha‘s reality embodiment (hosshin or dharmakāya) expounds (setsū) the 
true teachings (hō or dharma‘260). Kūkai first concretises the hosshin (which, in 
traditional Mahayana doctrine, was considered an abstract principle) and then 
personalises it. Put succinctly, the Hosshin, the ultimate Buddha mode or form, is not 
an abstract principle transcending the mundane world but is embodied in all 
phenomena and all ‗thing-events‘ of the cosmos. All the manifestations of the 
Buddhas (both celestial and historical) are themselves forms of the hosshin—even in 
its samsaric self-enjoyment this hosshin (this abstract principle) is preaching the 
Dharma in its ‗cosmic monologue‘. In a broad sense this preaching is via the cosmos 
and in a narrower sense it is via esoteric Buddhism itself.  
 
Moreover, Kūkai equates hosshin—the abstract principle— with the Buddha 
Dainichi Nyorai.
 261
  While Kegon Buddhism also personalises the reality 
embodiment, reality embodiment is still so abstract in that school of thought that it is 
not capable of expounding the dharma.  This Kūkai does via the Six Great Elements 
doctrine – earth, water, wind, fire, space and consciousness. These are at once the 
creator and created – in a state of perpetual interfusion – making all diverse 
phenomena identical in their make-up. Thus no absolute difference exists between 
the human and nature; body and mind are nondual, making the value of mind no 
higher than that of body. Thus, the ‗concrete cosmic identification between Buddha, 
truth, and the cosmos of thing-events,‘ is made ―personal‖.262  
 
 
                                                          
260
 That is the Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana or Dainichi Nyorai for Kūkai expounds the true 
teachings. 
261
 Sanskrit: Mahāvairocana or the Great Sun Buddha. Hakeda, ‗Thought of Kūkai‘ p. 89 
262
 Krummel, ‗Kūkai‘,  p. 11 
96 
 
For Kūkai (as is found in his text on ‗Introductions to all the Sutras‘) the primary 
sense of dharmas is phenomena. Therefore, as Thomas Kasulis puts it, the ‗Buddha‘s 
reality embodiment expounds [or preaches] the true teachings through all the 
phenomena constituting the universe.‘263  This thinking culminates in ‗Meanings of 
sound, word and reality.‘ He asserts that the Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana is Reality, 
and is revealed through all objects of sense and thought. All things in the universe 
reveal the presence of Mahāvairocana.  In this we understand that the cosmos, at this 
moment, is the Buddha, and all trace of transcendence is removed.  The Buddha is 
present here and now in every aspect of the universe and so we do not need to know 
something higher or deeper. Yet, as Graham Parkes points out, there is here also an 
equivocation or ambiguity: While Kūkai in this regard says that ‗the existence of the 
Buddha [Mahāvairocana] is the existence of the sentient beings and vice versa,‘ he 
goes on to say: ‗They are not identical but are nevertheless identical; they are not 
different but are nevertheless different.‘264 One might wonder then if there is in this 
some possibility of a kind of immanental transcendence. 
 
 
It is important to note that Kūkai emphasises that Dainichi expounds the teachings 
for his own enjoyment rather than for human benefit, which highlights, as Parkes 
points out, ‗the element of mystery‘.265 The cosmos as Dainichi speaking is not first 
and foremost speaking to us. The reality embodiment in the first place just is. We are 
like all things simply ‗letters or symbols‘ in his self-expression. Yet as human beings 
we have the capacity to fathom the universe as expression of Dainichi—Dainichi 
deigns to let it be known to us. According to Kūkai by engaging in Shingon practice, 
particularly through the practice of verbal intimacy, we can harmonise with the 
activities of the cosmic Buddha that is with the universe itself.
266
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The human, through bodily ritual praxis, partakes in the cosmic body that is the 
Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana. 267 In this way enlightenment—the goal of human 
existence—is attained, giving rise to a second core doctrine: sokushin jōbutsu which 
can be translated as ‗the achievement of Buddha nature or attainment of 
enlightenment is in, and through, and with this very body.‘ This became the motto of 
Kūkai‘s Buddhism. According to Hakeda the core teachings of Kūkai reflect very 
positive attitudes towards the world and all phenomena as the ‗very realm in which 
the highest enlightenment can take place.‘268  So at the heart of his teachings are 
notions of the body and as Thomas Kasulis points out his body theory was also his 
way of ‗relating religious theory and religious practice.‘ 269  
 
Enlightenment is understood as sudden and complete, available to all at any time 
implying that enlightenment is not some other-worldly truth to be grasped via a 
mystical experience. Enlightenment is available to us through this embodiment. A 
translation of Kūkai reads: ‗the word body (shin) refers to one‘s own body, the 
[cosmic] Buddha‘s body and all sentient beings‘ bodies; these are called ―body‖‘.270  
According to Hakeda the choice of the word ‗body‘ over the more obvious one of 
‗mind‘, ‗underscores the basic character‘ of Kūkai‘s religion, which is that the 
‗emphasis is on direct experience through one‘s total being and not merely through 
the intellect,‘ bringing the tests of meditative practice and of daily living to bear on 
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his theory.
271
  There is a parallel here with Eriugena‘s desire for his teachings to have 
a pragmatic aspect in that they would not merely be for intellectual stimulation but 
would be a means towards ‗spiritual enlightenment.‘ 
 
 
In summary then I have highlighted, to some degree, the aspects of Eriugena‘s and 
Kūkai‘s thought that correspond to the divine-human-earth relations model being 
explored in this work. While Kūkai does not talk of divinity in any sense that is 
comparable with the Christian God, at the same time it is possible to explore how 
Kūkai conceives of ultimate reality and to see its potential for dialogue with 
Eriugena‘s concept of divinity. There is a clear effort in both thinkers to maintain a 
sense of the unity and relationality of all reality, and both present a positive view of 
the place and role of the human person within their respective overall schema. To 
these areas I will turn in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Eriugena and Kūkai in Dialogue   
 
In the overview of both Eriugena‘s and Kūkai‘s philosophical positions in the 
previous chapter, I noted three general areas that offer a possible framework for a 
comparative analysis of their work. These are: first, the sense of the divine in their 
respective philosophies (the extent to which transcendent and immanent views of 
ultimate reality can be found in their work
272
); second, their cosmological 
understandings of the phenomenal world (the actual earth/universe); and third, the 
role and place of the human person vis-à-vis the phenomenal world in their 
respective schemes. These perspectives mirror my initial concern regarding the value 
of exploring philosophical understandings of divine-human-earth relations, as 
responses to current ecological destruction, as well as the value of a focus on less 
well-known thinkers within mainstream religious traditions.  
 
I. Conceptions of Ultimate Reality 
Both Eriugena and Kūkai wish to emphasise the idea of a unified whole—one 
ontological realm—such that any sense of ‗divinity‘ is to be found within this unity. 
The very fact that Eriugena begins his exploration by grappling to find one overall 
term—natura/phusis—is indicative of this emphasis. The central teaching of Kūkai 
is that the universe is the cosmic Buddha (Dainichi). In terms of an 
‗immanence/transcendence‘ approach a clear emphasis on an immanental sense of 
ultimate reality come through in their respective emphasis on unity.  Writing in 
contexts where the mainstream of their traditions placed the emphasis on a radical 
sense of the otherness and transcendence of a divine principle, often with an 
ambiguous attitude towards ‗this world‘, this emphasis on divine immanence 
distinguishes both writers as radical and innovative within their respective traditions. 
The divine in early Christian Neoplatonism and the Dharmakāya in Buddhism prior 
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to that time were understood to be unknowable and incomprehensible.  This mark of 
distinction in both thinkers makes comparison of their work on the point of 
immanence quite plausible.  
 
A much more difficult task is a conversation concerning notions of transcendence. 
While Eriugena‘s philosophical position is strongly immanental to the point where, 
in certain instances, he seems to suggest that God and created being are one, a clear 
idea of divinity in-itself, a very specific sense of transcendence, is still maintained. In 
fact Eriugena‘s entire thesis is built on the dialectic of what we could call 
immanence and transcendence.  In Kūkai, however, a desire to maintain a distinct 
transcendent entity, a sense of absolute transcendence, is not to be found, even 
though one can sense a certain equivocation or tension in his work. The ultimate and 
remote cosmic Buddha, the Dharmakāya, (hosshin) is understood to radiate 
throughout the entire phenomenal world. This allows us to experience a sense of the 
numinous in all things, with a strong suggestion of identity between all phenomena 
and the cosmic Buddha, while at the same time maintaining a semblance of 
distinction. The kind of distinction being made here between the Dharma-body and 
the phenomenal world is not in any sense absolute, while such an emphasis on 
absoluteness is to be found in Eriugena. What can provide us with a form of 
engagement between both thinkers on the point of transcendence is the notion of 
immanental transcendence. In fact (as will become clear) Eriugena‘s concept of 
transcendence is also best understood as immanental transcendence. But before 
exploring this notion, I wish to unpack their respective emphasis on divine 
immanence.  
 
A. Aspects of immanence 
The idea of God being in creation, near us, is not unfamiliar to the Christian 
tradition. However, while one hears such expressions as ‗God is nearer to us than we 
are to ourselves‘ this nearness is conceived more like our nearness to each other—a 
kind of spatial nearness with (in this instance) one invisible partner— and is often 
understood in terms of what Thomas Kasulis refers to as external relationship 
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mode.
273
  Eriugena (and the mystical tradition that he inherited from pseudo-
Dionysius and that subsequently emerged in various writers over the centuries) 
presents an immanence that suggests internal links between God and creation. He 
can then be considered an especially valuable contributor to the ecological debate 
from the Christian side because of his particular emphasis on God‘s being 
manifested in creation.  This manifestation is expressed in a variety of aspects of 
Eriugena‘s thought, and these are generally considered to be the proofs for the 
various charges of pantheism levelled at his work. Here I explore his concept of 
emanation, his emphasis on the unity of God and created reality, and the presence of 
a triadic structure within the fourfold framework of his overall scheme. While I shall 
attempt to treat these notions separately they are also implicated in each other. 
Eriugena‘s concept of emanation emphasises the unity between creator and creation, 
as does the notion of God being the beginning, middle and end of all things. 
Ultimately Eriugena seems primarily interested in positing an overarching oneness to 
all things. 
 
In the second book of the Periphyseon Eriugena speaks of the created universe as 
proceeding ‗by a wonderful and divine multiplication into genera and species and 
individual, and into differentiation and all those other features which are observed in 
created nature‘.274 He is referring here to the second and third divisions of natura, 
(the primordial causes and their effects—both of which are said to be created). In 
brief, while both are created the effects, understood to be the corporeal or visible 
realities of the universe, emerge from the incorporeal primordial causes. Thus 
incorporeal gives rise to the corporeal.
275
 Overall the created order is understood as 
emanating from the ‗One‘. Eriugena‘s dynamic unfolding of created reality can be 
understood in terms of the standard Neoplatonic schema of processio and reditus. 
This sense of God, expanding into, and as, created being, is variously described by 
him as emanating or flowing forth. It suggests a sense of the logical and indeed 
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necessary outflowing of creation from God and (within the second and third 
divisions) of the effects from the causes.  
 
As well as the outward flow of created being Eriugena posits a return to the ‗One‘, 
thus indicating that these divisions are a means of reflecting the dynamic interplay of 
reality as outgoing and return. In terms of the fourfold we can say that the first 
division emanates outward as the second and third divisions but yet the entire 
emanation returns as the fourth division. Both first and fourth divisions are God as 
mysterious essence or uncreated reality, and the second and third divisions are 
understood to be God as created being. Since God is one, therefore in both sets of 
divisions we are talking about the one reality giving to divinity a strong sense of 
immanence.
276
   
 
Eriugena‘s inheritance of the Neoplatonic concept of emanation is seen here.277 This 
notion of emanation, as a way of understanding cause and effect, holds that every 
effect remains in its cause, proceeds from it and returns to it, suggesting that there is 
no absolute separation between God as cause and the universe as effect. Eriugena 
explores this idea in the context of talking about how the universe is at once eternal 
and made; arguing that any notion of God being prior to the universe can only be 
understood in the sense of God being its cause and not in any temporal sense. ‗The 
creation of the universe is not in God as accident but is in accordance with a certain 
mysterious reason on account of which caused things subsist always in [their] 
cause.‘278  This makes the universe eternal in its cause, or we can say God is 
immanent in his effects. Here we are reminded of the Plotinian notion of the One: it 
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is not the case that the One first is and then produces difference either from itself or 
from something else, like a kind of organic unity coming eventually to self-
differentiate. Rather it is ‗Differentiating‘ itself.279  
 
The almost linear or two-dimensional —vertical— process of procession and return 
is complicated by another form of reditus (with the emphasis on reduction), which 
Eriugena describes as ‗an ―analytical‖ or regressive collection‘ of the divisions.280 
This latter reditus results in the conflation of the fourfold divisionary structure, and, 
as it further suggests the unity of the whole, it heightens the sense of divine 
immanence.  Eriugena achieves this form of reduction by aligning the first with the 
fourth and the second with the third, and then conflating these two divisions into 
one. Since the first and fourth divisions are understood to be of God alone they can 
be understood to be one. Eriugena reasons that, while we can distinguish in our 
minds between God as source or cause of all things and God as end to which all 
things will return, in God, these are not two but one. Thus, the first and fourth 
division can ultimately be reduced to one. Likewise with the second and third, which 
are aligned to created being, namely the primordial causes and their effects.  Because 
they are contained within the same genus of created nature they are one, since forms 
are a unity in their genus. Behind Eriugena‘s assertion here is the Neoplatonic theory 
of causation where ‗everything that is contemplates itself and in this contemplation 
becomes productive.‘ It is the activity of contemplation that makes a thing to come 
into being, as it were. Thus, the causes remain in the effects and ‗every caused thing 
subsists in its cause‘.281  
 
Eriugena then goes one step further, and reduces the two new divisions to one, thus 
joining the creator with the creature. Since nothing apart from God ‗alone truly is‘, 
he reasons, due to the fact that ‗all things that are nothing else, in so far as they are, 
but the participation in Him who alone subsists from and through Himself‘, then 
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‗Creator and creature are one.‘282 The universe of God and creature is reduced to an 
indivisible ‗One‘, giving rise, according to Moran, to Eriugena‘s most explicit 
statement of pantheism. The four species are seen as under one genus, God. This 
idea is reinforced in an often used expression of Eriugena: God as Beginning, 
Middle, and End. Within the fourfold division is a triadic scheme of emanation from, 
and return to, the One, who is unchanging. There are a number of places where this 
formula is used. For instance, in a discussion of all created things God is described 
as the ‗causal beginning of all those things, and the essential Middle, which fulfils 
them, and the End in which they are consummated.‘283  What is suggested is that, 
while God can be understood as three, there is ultimately only one God. Again, in 
this regard, God is spoken of as the genus of which the forms of nature are species. 
The overall impression given here is that God‘s immanence in creation is so central 
to Eriugena‘s thought that God and created nature are presented as being one and the 
same. 
 
The centrality of an immanental sense of ultimate reality is clearly evident in 
Kūkai‘s thought. In fact much of his writing is concerned with showing that the 
remote ineffable realm, previously considered to be beyond accessibility, is actually 
available when one engages in the right kinds of ritual practices. In a number of his 
key texts, Kūkai argues that other Buddhist schools held that the Dharmakāya was 
ultimately so remote that it was not possible for it to communicate.
284
  While the 
traditional way of reading Kūkai‘s contribution to Buddhist thinking —that his 
method of argumentation was to distinguish all other schools of Buddhism in Japan 
at that time, which he described as exoteric, from his own newly introduced brand of 
Buddhism, which he termed esoteric and which he claimed was superior to all other 
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teachings—has been critiqued especially by Abé, who suggests the need for a more 
nuanced and contextualised approach, it nevertheless does have merit.
285
 And while 
scholars argue that Kūkai unfairly imputed a kind of dualism to those other schools, 
especially the Mahayana tradition, emphasising this dualism to the point of 
suggesting that such schools postulated the existence of another realm that was 
transcendent and ontologically separate, it is still worth exploring his claim for the 
superiority of his esoteric doctrine since it gives insights into his understanding of 
ultimate reality.
286
   
 
The first formal presentation of Kūkai‘s central doctrine hosshin seppō is to be found 
in ‗The differences‘. The opening of his essay reads: 
The Buddha has three bodies, and the teachings are of two kinds. The 
sermons of the response and transformation [bodies] are called the exoteric 
teachings; their language is plain, cursory, and accommodated to the religious 
capacity [of the listener]. The discourses of the Dharma-Buddha are called 
the esoteric treasury; their language is secret, recondite, and veridical.
287
 
Kasulis draws attention to three perspectives from which the exoteric and esoteric 
teachings are contrasted: source, audience, and form of expression.
288
 These three 
perspectives, I suggest, emphasise the immanence of Kūkai‘s ultimate reality. The 
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source perspective derives from the Buddha body doing the teaching.  The 
Nirmānakaya and Sambhogakaya (‗response and transformation‘) Buddhas preach in 
exoteric language, while the cosmic embodiment itself preaches the esoteric or secret 
teachings.
289
 This latter teaching is what Kūkai refers to by the formula hosshin 
seppō. Since the Dharmakāya is the cosmic embodiment, it is the enlightened 
cosmos itself that expounds the ultimate truth or Dharma, and it does so as the 
dharmas of the universe. This is a very clear expression of the immanence of 
ultimate reality.  
 
While the exoteric teachings are adapted to the needs of the audience and so change 
form, the esoteric truth does not rely on its hearers for ‗authentication‘. The former is 
pragmatic and its truth depends on what it does for the listener, while the latter just 
simply is, without being adapted in any way. Logically this follows from the hosshin 
seppō principle itself. Since the Dharmakāya is the enlightened cosmos itself, there 
is no other audience to which the cosmos would need to adjust its teachings.
290
  
 
Again from the perspective of audience the immanence of the remote Buddha is 
emphasised.  Kūkai suggests that exoteric teachings are expressed in forms adapted 
to the needs of the audience.  In explicating this point Kasulis makes a distinction 
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between what he terms external and internal modes of relating.
291
 In the external 
relating model where the distinction between the two relating parties is clear—both 
are absolutely distinct—the modes of expression are understood as transferring a 
body of knowledge from one to the other. The knowledge itself is separate. This 
corresponds to the modes of expression used by exoteric forms of preaching. The 
exoteric mode uses concepts and words (an external body of knowledge) to ‗bridge 
the gap‘ between the two. In the esoteric the teaching is obscure and secret. Here 
secret does not mean ‗in secret‘ but it can be understood as something akin to one‘s 
innermost desire, the most intimate, truest part of one. Thus this ‗secret‘ teaching is 
not something that, by definition, is kept a secret or kept hidden, but in order to 
know this teaching one has to be intimately related to the other. This is a point I shall 
return to later in the context of the human role in the cosmos. Here I wish simply to 
say that through the mode of expression of the esoteric teachings (the teachings of 
the ultimate reality) we can again glean the radical immanence of ultimate reality. 
The ‗innermost desire‘ of ultimate reality (truth in its ultimate sense) is the cosmos 
in its enlightened state.  
 
Kūkai goes on to offer a wide range of textual evidence for his notion of the 
superiority of esoteric over exoteric, and for his claim that ultimate reality preaches 
ultimate truth. He quotes a variety of sources representing the four main Buddhist 
schools in existence at that time in Japan (Kegon, Tendai, Hossō and Sanron) as well 
as from an important text for Kūkai, the Commentary on the Awakening of Faith, 
which he incorrectly attributes to Nagarjuna. In each of these cases he quotes texts 
and then glosses these quotes in order to highlight that the Dharmakāya Buddha is 
remote and inaccessible for exoteric schools, but, from the perspective of the esoteric 
tradition, this ‗transcendence‘ is accessible. 
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For instance he quotes texts from the Huayan tradition that make a distinction 
between the causal realm and the resultant realm, stating that the first can be taught 
while the latter cannot. The causal stage refers to those not yet enlightened, while the 
resultant stage refers to those who have reached enlightenment. In glossing these 
texts Kūkai comments: ‗that the causal stage can be expounded is the province of the 
exoteric teachings, while the inexponibility of the inherent nature of the result 
corresponds to the proper domain of the esoteric treasury.‘292 Likewise from the 
passages relating to the Yogacara tradition he cites: ‗The supreme [truth] of the 
supreme principle is subtle in essence, removed from language, and far beyond all 
things and so it is called ―supreme principle‖‘,  and again he comments that ‗absolute 
remove such as this corresponds to the domain of the exoteric teachings….It is 
beyond the reach of all four kinds of speech of people in the causal stage…and there 
is only the own-nature of Dharma body that is able to expound this sphere of 
absolute remove.‘293 Thus Kūkai sets up his distinction between the two types of 
teachings, highlighting the superiority of the esoteric, and emphasises the immanent 
nature of the remote Cosmic Buddha.  
 
More obvious expressions of the immanent nature of the Dharmakāya are to be 
found elsewhere in Kūkai‘s writings. For instance, in his essay on ‗Attaining 
Enlightenment‘ Kūkai expounds on a two-stanza verse as a means of analysing one 
of his central teachings: that one can achieve enlightenment in this very existence.
294
 
The first stanza, which has been described as ‗a principle of universal 
interpenetration underpinning all existents‘, explains the meaning of ‗in this body‘, 
while the second explores the methods by which enlightenment is attained.
295
. Here I 
wish to focus on some lines from the first stanza that stress the immanent nature of 
the Dharmakāya.296  A key line in this stanza is the following: ‗Infinitely interrelated 
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like the meshes of Indra‘s net are those which we call existences.‘ In his commentary 
on this line Kūkai explores the notion of existence, which is also translated as body:  
Existence is my existence, the existence of the Buddhas, and the existences of 
all sentient beings. Also designated by this word is the Mahāvairocana 
Buddha in Four Forms, which represent his absolute state, his state of bliss, 
his manifesting bodies, and his emanating bodies. The three kinds of 
symbols—letters, signs and images—are also included in this category.  All 
of these existences are interrelated horizontally and vertically without end, 
like images in mirrors, or like the rays of lamps. This existence is in that one, 
and that one is in this. The existence of the Buddha [Mahāvairocana] is the 
existences of the sentient beings and vice versa.
297
  
 
In this passage, which typifies his theory of embodiment, Kūkai first lists what he 
means by existence or body: it refers to one‘s own existence, to all phenomena and 
all Buddhas. He emphasises that it includes the Dainichi in four forms. It also 
includes the outcomes of thought, word and action, the three main activities of 
bodies. Most importantly, he emphasises the intertwined nature of these existences.  
As Kasulis comments, despite the polysemous nature of this concept of body or 
existence, the various meanings are not to be understood as ‗separate significations 
in different contexts but as meanings which ―penetrate each other‖ in one specific 
context.‘298 It is like placing a lamp in the midst of an octagon of mirrors resulting in 
each mirrored image being reflected in every other to an infinite degree. This is 
perhaps one of the clearest expressions of the immanence of ultimate reality. The 
remote Cosmic Buddha‘s existence is deemed to be also that of all other reality.  
 
Again, in his gloss on the next line: ‗there is one who is naturally equipped with all-
embracing wisdom‘, one gets this sense of identity. Here, Kūkai uses the concept of 
primordial quiescence as a means of describing this all-embracing wisdom, and he 
quotes from the Mahāvairocana Sutra in his exposition of the text:  ‗I am the origin 
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of all. I am called the One on whom the world depends. My teachings are peerless. I 
am in the state of quiescence and there are none who surpass me.‘ Going on to 
expound on this statement he points out that the ―I‖ refers to the Mahāvairocana 
while ―all‖ refers to the range of phenomena. Therefore, the Dharma body and the 
essential nature of sentient beings are identical, both being in possession of the 
principle of primordial quiescence.
299
  
 
It is obvious that both Eriugena and Kūkai emphasise a sense of immanence with 
regard to the nature of ultimate reality, with a very clear focus on an internal 
relationship between the phenomenal world and their respective perceptions of an 
ultimate principle of reality. While Kūkai‘s scheme easily points to an identification 
of ultimate reality and the phenomenal world, it is perhaps somewhat surprising to 
find such a close form of identity in Eriugena—to the point that divine and created 
being are at times understood to be one and the same.  This is however tempered by 
notions in Eriugena of divine essence and so a more searching question concerns the 
issue of transcendence particularly with regard to Kūkai‘s philosophical system.  
 
B. Absolute Transcendence 
It is possible to read in Eriugena‘s Periphyseon a sense of what we might term 
absolute transcendence.  Alongside the pantheistic tendencies that speak of God and 
creation being one and the same, Eriugena holds firmly to the idea of God‘s 
transcendent essence. Following the tradition of mystical theology initiated by 
pseudo-Dionysius, Eriugena emphasises a distinction between God in Godself (the 
divine essence) and God as manifested in creation. However, this significant 
distinction, which Eckhart would later refer to as God and Gottheit (the godhead), 
differs markedly from the more familiar distinction between God in all his aspects as 
it were, including God ‗working‘ in creation, and creation itself.  
 
The purpose of such a distinction can be understood as holding onto the close 
connection between God and created reality and yet maintaining an ‗element‘ of God 
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as absolute transcendence. There is a lack of a definite distinction between what 
would be called supernatural and natural in later medieval Europe. As Siewers points 
out, ‗the linguistic distinction of a supernatural category of life as opposed to the 
natural only emerged sharply…with the flourishing of Scholasticism‘, though it can 
be argued that the source of this emphasis is in Augustine. Instead Eriugena is 
reflecting a tradition where paradoxically one could find a sharper distinction 
between God as hidden mystery (essence) and creation as the expression of that 
mystery than between God working in creation and physical nature (supernatural and 
natural).
300
  While God is one, speaking in this way allows us to express the paradox 
of God as both immanent within creation and yet transcendent to it, or between God 
as manifestation (creation) and God as essence.  At a superficial level this suggests a 
certain dualism. 
 
 The point to be noted however is that Eriugena‘s essential God is not a remote, 
inaccessible principle; rather it is a mysterious essence unknowable in itself just as 
the essence of all reality is unknowable in itself, and yet incapable of being separate 
from its expression since God is one, and Eriugena is keen to emphasise the oneness 
of all reality. Thus this mysterious essence might be better understood as the depth of 
reality rather than a separate reality. Moreover, since Eriugena makes clear this 
distinction is not actually in God but only in the human capacity to perceive God, it 
does not contradict his Neoplatonist belief in the oneness of reality. In this way 
Eriugena maintains an ontological unity. The distinction, therefore, might best be 
understood in terms of the strain placed on human language to give expression to 
what is considered the mysterious nature of the divine within the Christian 
tradition.
301
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In responding to a query from Alumnus about including, ‗that nature which is 
separated from the universe of all natures‘, among the divisions of the universe, 
Nutritor emphasises the primary division on which Eriugena‘s entire edifice 
stands.
302
 This is the division into that which is and that which is not, or which is 
beyond being. The query stems from the fact that this former nature would appear to 
be infinite and unbounded — ‗it would seem that the nature which creates the whole 
universe is infinite and ‗bounded by nothing‘— while the nature it creates (the 
universe) ‗does not extend to infinity.‘ Nutritor replies by emphasising this 
distinction between God in essence and God as immanent. Introducing the concept 
of universal Nature (universalis natura), he says: ‗For the first and greatest division 
of universal Nature is into that which creates the established universe and that which 
is created in that established universe.‘303 Eriugena maintains a strong distinction 
between the ‗divine‘ that is accessible and the ‗divine‘ that is beyond the grasp of the 
human mind.  
 
C. A Perspectival Approach 
The fact that this distinction is not ontological is of central importance to Eriugena, 
since it allows for the primary emphasis that he places on the unity of reality. Instead 
we can speak of perspectival distinction, as Moran does, when he describes 
Eriugena‘s fourfold division of natura as four perspectives on reality, rather than as 
actual ontological divisions within reality itself. Moreover, this emphasises that 
reality itself is ‗a dynamic process of different manifestations or revelations, 
depending on the point of view of the viewer, his location in time, space, history,‘ as 
well as his own moral and spiritual level of awareness. Thus Eriugena attempts to 
move away from the emphasis on universal nature as a rarefied substance with all 
things as modifications of it, and instead offers his particular framework as a way of 
speaking about that reality from particular points of view. This approach recognises 
that other reasoned mechanisms are equally valid, and it takes the emphasis off a 
rigid understanding of reality.  The focus is not on dividing up ουσíα into rigid 
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categories, but it is on the perspective of the one viewing. For Moran, this is 
Eriugena‘s highest understanding of the meanings of natura.304 What it suggests is a 
claim, on the part of Eriugena, that to define reality is ultimately beyond the human 
person‘s capacity, and, that the perspective taken is always from within that reality, 
placing the one viewing within and not outside the totality. Ultimately, we are part of 
the totality and, at best, have only a limited vision of reality.  
 
Kūkai also considers different perspectives on reality through his magnum opus ‗The 
Ten Stages‘, though he does claim the possibility of having a full vision of reality – 
of reaching ultimate truth via Shingon teachings and practice. The ‗Ten Stages‘ and 
‗The Precious Key‘both attempt to classify the various schools of Buddhist and non-
Buddhist thought.
305
 Kūkai correlates the different stages of the development of the 
mind with what he considers to be an appropriate set of teachings, ‗as its perspective 
and lived experience of reality.‘ Thus, there is a level of truth for each stage even 
though it is limited in scope, since according to Kūkai, as one moves up the 
hierarchy of levels of mind one experiences more intensely the unfolding of the 
Dharma. The ultimate state of nonduality with the Dharma is reached in the tenth 
state via the Shingon teachings and practice.
306
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D.  ‘Immanental’ Transcendence: 
The question we now need to consider is whether there is any semblance of 
transcendence in Kūkai‘s understanding of reality. While any sense of an absolute 
transcendence is alien to Kūkai‘s thought, there is the possibility of attributing what 
is often termed, in contemporary philosophy of religion, the concept of immanent 
transcendence to his thought.
307
  The kind of paradoxical emphasis that is found in 
Kūkai could be termed something akin to this idea of immanental transcendence. 
Thus we can find it in a comment by Kūkai on the line (referred to earlier):  
‗Infinitely interrelated like the meshes of Indra‘s net are those which we call 
existences.‘ Kūkai writes: ‗They are not identical but are nevertheless identical; they 
are not different but are nevertheless different.‘ Or again it is expressed in some lines 
from ‗The Memorial‘: ‗The Dharma is beyond speech, but without speech, it cannot 
be revealed. Suchness transcends forms, but without depending on forms it cannot be 
realized. Though one may at times err by taking the finger pointing at the moon to be 
the moon itself, the Buddha's teachings which guide people are limitless.‘308 These 
kinds of paradoxical expressions indicate the difficulty of using language to express 
ultimate reality. They give a hint at a notion of transcendence, understood as being 
beyond the normal channels of expression, in Kūkai‘s understanding of the Cosmic 
Buddha. Kūkai uses this paradoxical language to retain a sense of distinction, so that 
while ‗one is within many, and many are in one, yet no confusion arises.‘309  
 
 
David Gardiner makes an interesting and relevant point on this passage concerning 
the issue of identity and non-identity, based on understandings of metaphor found in 
the work of Paul Ricoeur. Metaphors are best thought of as ‗forming a specific 
tension‘ rather than as a ‗form of substitution‘. This tension makes possible ‗the 
holding together of both sameness and difference…without simply mixing the two‘ 
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and in the process ‗manages to become a matrix of emergent meaning.‘310  Gardiner 
then points out that the Shingon practices, which are generally interpreted as the 
means of creating a relationship of identity between the Buddha and the practitioner, 
might be better understood as creating a ‗tensive‘ relationship 'as it is in metaphorical 
thinking‘.311 
 
 Elsewhere Gardiner highlights another expression of the idea of immanental 
transcendence, by emphasising the skilful way that Kūkai uses the concept of the 
Japanese ri or Chinese li (meaning ‗apart‘ or ‗separate‘ or ‗transcendent‘). The term 
ri is used initially in a negative way, to designate how the other schools speak of the 
cosmic Buddha as transcendent and remote, for which Kūkai criticises them.  
However, it is then used in a positive sense, to speak of the uniqueness of the 
Shingon tradition. In other words the term used to speak of separateness and 
remoteness is now used to speak of that which is accessible through the teachings of 
Shingon. The implication here is profound: what others considered unreachable and 
utterly removed is, via Shingon teachings and practices, the ever-present nature of 
ultimate reality. Such rhetoric on the part of Kūkai results in an expression of the 
standard Mahayana move of placing nirvana within samsara, but within a tantric 
context.
312
 
 
As noted previously, while Eriugena‘s theology emphasises the absolute 
transcendence of God this cannot be understood in the traditional sense. In many 
respects the concept of immanent transcendence would more accurately describe his 
position.  In fact it is in his particular interpretation of both transcendence and 
immanence, these standard aspects of divinity, that his radical understanding of 
reality is most clearly manifested. One can discern a basic tension in his 
understanding of the divine, which can best be explored as a paradox at the heart of 
reality itself, a paradox that allows for a perception of reality as always beyond 
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human comprehension at every level. The Christian Neoplatonic tradition is clearly 
reflected here, in that the transcendent divine is understood as creating and 
manifesting itself both within, and as, created reality, in a way that blurs the 
distinction between transcendence and immanence, or Creator and creature. Eriugena 
writes:  
We ought not to understand God and the creature as two things distinct from 
one another, but as one and the same. For both the creature, by subsisting, is 
in God; and God, by manifesting Himself, in a marvellous and ineffable 
manner creates Himself in the creature.
313
 
Thus, in these kinds of expressions Eriugena is emphasising a concept of God as 
both essence and manifestation or transcendence and immanence. This particular 
interpretation that he makes of these standard Christian theological concepts is 
markedly more dynamic and radical than the mainstream Christian tradition. His 
wish to hold onto a fluid understanding of reality is evident here, and the term 
immanent transcendence can easily be applied.  
 
This desire to blur the distinction, or to hold to a nondual position, with regard to 
Creator and created being, can be seen in his discussion of the term ‗God‘. Early in 
the first book of the Periphyseon, and referring to the evidence of scripture to 
support his claim, Eriugena points out that the word ―God‖ is used both to refer to 
God in essence and to God as manifestation: the transcendence and immanence of 
God are both meant when we use the term.  
For it is not only the divine essence that is indicated by the word ―God‖, but 
also that mode by which God reveals Himself in a certain way to the 
intellectual and rational creature, according to the capacity of each, is often 
called ―God‖ in Holy Scripture. This mode the Greeks are accustomed to call 
theophany, that is, self-manifestation of God.
314
  
 
                                                          
313
 Periphyseon III:678c 
314
 Periphyseon I:446d, See also I:448b 
117 
 
Some passages later Eriugena traces the etymology of the term ―God‖ to the Greek 
verbs ―I see‖ and ―I run‖, pointing out that both roots are correctly held to be valid. 
His argument supporting this highlights the paradox of motion and rest in God, a 
reflection of God as immanent and transcendent. Where the term God comes from 
the verb ‗I see‘ (God, understood as ‗the one who sees‘), Eriugena explains that God 
sees in ‗Himself all things that are [while] He looks upon nothing that is outside 
Himself because outside there is nothing.‘ In the form of the one who runs, the name 
can be understood to mean that God ‗runs throughout all things and never stays but 
by His running fills out all things.‘ Yet, while God is at rest in Godself, God, 
nevertheless, is in motion through all things in order that those things, which 
essentially subsist by God, may be. However, what subsists is God, since nothing 
exists outside God, thus motion and rest, becoming and being, are the same in 
God.
315
  
 
E. Language and the communication of Ultimate Reality 
The idea of the transcendent rests very much on the use of language for both Kūkai 
and Eriugena. Kūkai chooses a passage from the Commentary on the Awakening of 
Faith, which repeatedly states how different standpoints belong to ‗the extremity of 
ignorance and not to the station of knowledge‘.316 The emphasis here seems to be on 
the inability of language to express enlightenment. The passage concludes that most 
strands of Mahayana Buddhism recognise that the highest truth is ‗more mysterious 
than the mysteriously mysterious and more remote than the remotely remote.‘317  
According to Gardiner, implicit in this quote from Nagarjuna—with its repeated 
protestations against the possibility of ultimate reality being represented—is the idea 
that somehow the state of enlightenment can, in fact, be represented. There are 
means of communicating ultimate truth. In his gloss on the Nagarjuna statements 
Kūkai indicates this by saying that ‗if you examine them closely, then you will be 
able to reach the ultimate [goal]. Every single profound meaning cannot be 
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expressed on paper – think carefully on this.‘318 The implication is that while they 
cannot be expressed via the normal channels (via ink on paper) they can be 
expressed by other means, and these for Kūkai are the ritual practices. 
 
Again in his use of another quote from the same commentary concerning negative or 
apophatic renderings of Mahayana insights, Kūkai brings attention to the inability of 
language to communicate ultimate truth:  
the ―one‖ [mind] cannot be one [since it is one yet all], but it is provisionally 
called ―one‖ from the standpoint of entry [to the Mahayana]….it is termed 
[―self‖] as if it were the self, but this is not the real self.319  
The struggle around talking about ultimate truth is evident in this passage, and we 
can see similarities to Eriugena‘s use of language when referring to the transcendent. 
Given his distinction between God in Godself and God manifested as creation, 
Eriugena makes clear that knowledge of the former is beyond human 
comprehension, indeed it is beyond the comprehension of all creatures. In 
Periphyseon I he writes: ‗The Divine Essence is comprehensible to no intellectual 
creature…We shall not see God Himself in Himself for not even the angels do so – 
since this is impossible for every creature‘320  In fact not even God can know this 
essence, which means that God knows only that God is, not what God is. 
 
Eriugena suggests that anyone wishing to speak on such a subject must make use of 
‗the two branches of theology‘ called by the Greeks the affirmative, or kataphatic, 
and the negative, or apophatic—where the former affirms that all things, which take 
their being from the divine substance, can be predicated of it, while the latter denies 
the possibility of any such predication.
321
  He goes on to argue that, since God is one, 
nothing opposed to, or conceived alongside God can exist. By ‗opposed‘ he means 
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‗either deprived of Him or contrary to Him or related to Him or absent from Him‘, 
and ‗by conceived alongside God‘, Eriugena means ‗something that is understood to 
exist eternally with Him without being of the same essence with him‘. Since God is 
one then logically speaking opposites of Him cannot be conceived, but since all 
attributes or names for God (such as essence, goodness, truth, wisdom etc) are found 
to have opposites, these cannot be attributed to God in any absolute sense. In each 
case God is seen to be more than the attribution in question. Thus, it is 
metaphorically rather than properly that the divine Nature is referred to as essence, 
truth or wisdom. Instead ‗it is called superessential, more-than-truth, more-than-
wisdom.‘322  
 
Yet, as the Nutritor points out, to say that God can be properly spoken about as 
superessential or more-than-truth must also be questioned, since it too suggests 
speaking of that which cannot be spoken of:  
For in whatever way the Divine Substance is spoken of, whether by simple 
parts of speech or by compounds, whether in Greek or Latin, provided only it 
be a proper way, it will be seen that it is not ineffable. For that is not 
ineffable which can be spoken of in any way.
323
 
It is here that Eriugena makes the claim that the two branches of theology are not in 
conflict or opposed to each other when applied to the divine nature. This is so 
because these compound names, predicated of God, hold within them the two 
branches of theology such that in ‗outward expression they possess the form of the 
affirmative, but in meaning the force of the negative.‘ For instance, superessential 
suggests outwardly an affirmation, yet its inner meaning suggests a negative since it 
denies the notion of essence. ‗For that which says: ―It is superessential‖, says not 
what it is but what it is not; for it says that it is not essence but more than essence, 
but what that is which is more than essence it does not reveal.‘324 
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While Kūkai recognises the use of the apophatic, and, in that sense, a kind of 
immanental transcendence with regard to ultimate reality, he also claims that this 
language is the ultimate stance only for other Buddhist schools: ‗the exponents of the 
Middle View put a stop to frivolous arguments and regard quiescence and absolute 
remove as the school‘s ultimate [standpoint].‘325  Because the exoteric is concerned 
with analytical and conceptual interpretations of ultimate reality, the only means of 
speaking about it is the ‗non-speaking‘ of the apophatic.  Instead ‗the exponents of 
the mantra treasury (Shingon teaching) regard this (the apophatic stance) as the first 
gateway for entering the path‘ of Buddhahood or enlightenment.326 Kūkai claims a 
further form of expression for this tradition, a form of language that is symbolic 
rather than discursive.
327
 In this claim he is bringing together the notions of theory 
and practice: Ultimate reality ‗communicates‘ (and can be ‗reached‘), via the three 
mysteries of mudra, mantra and mandala—which means via the body.  
 
It would seem that in order to ‗protect‘ a sense of absolute transcendence (but not in 
any ontological sense) the ultimate realm for Eriugena is best talked about using 
apophatic language. Kūkai, who does not hold an absolute transcendence, makes use 
of more symbolic forms of language. Yet in the second book of the Periphyseon we 
do find passages such as the following, which indicate a different kind of knowing, 
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one that emerges from the kind of deep contemplation associated with forms of 
prayer:  
But these are things which are contemplated at a deeper and truer level than 
they are expressed in speech, and understood more deeply than they are 
contemplated, and are deeper and truer than they are understood to be; for 
they pass all understanding.328 
 
From an ecological perspective it would seem that Kūkai‘s particular version of 
immanental transcendence leaves one in no doubt about any kind of dualism in his 
vision of reality. There is less clarity in Eriugena‘s philosophy as there is a much 
greater emphasis on the notion of the distinction of the absolute. The notion of the 
interpenetration and interconnectedness of all things is also more obvious in Kūkai‘s 
philosophy. However, Eriugena‘s emphasis on the notion of a perspectival approach, 
that the view of ultimate reality open to us is ultimately only partial since we are part 
of it, recognises a more considered approach in our understanding of it. It suggests 
the need for a form of ecological humility that recognises our place within the 
overall scheme of things. I shall explore these ideas in greater detail in the next 
chapter when I turn to more contemporary implications of their systems of thought.  
 
II. Conceptions of the Phenomenal world  
Before turning to consider how both thinkers regard the phenomenal or 
spatiotemporal world itself, I wish to explore a related issue to the emphasis on 
immanence, which concerns how the supreme principle actually manifests itself 
within and as reality. This also serves as a bridge to understanding how both thinkers 
view the phenomenal world. 
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A. Manifesting Ultimate Reality 
Kūkai has developed a technical and complex understanding of how ultimate reality 
manifests itself as the ultimate truth of the universe, but at its core is the sanmitsu. 
For Kūkai the cosmic Buddha Dainichi manifests himself as the phenomenal world 
(the cosmos) via the sanmitsu or the three mysteries—mantra, mudra and mandala. 
From the enlightened perspective (the perspective of the Buddha) the world is the 
activity of Dainichi, which makes it the embodiment of truth. Correspondingly, 
Eriugena uses the concept of theophany to describe how the divine manifests itself as 
the world of created being, such that the cosmos can be seen as ‗an infinitely varied 
showing or appearance of God.‘329 
 
i. The Three mysteries 
In his treatise ‗Sound, Word, and Reality‘ the concept of hosshin seppō serves as a 
starting point. Kūkai begins as follows: 
First, the statement of the gist: The Tathāgata invariably makes use of 
patterned signs when expounding the Dharma. The essence of patterned signs 
lies in the six sense objects, and the six sense objects have their basis in the 
three mysteries of the Dharma-Buddha. The undifferentiated three mysteries 
pervade the Dharma realm and are perpetual; the five wisdoms and the four 
bodies [of the Dharma-Buddha] are found in all ten realms without 
exception.
330
 
Thus the expounding or preaching of Dainichi is understood to be the phenomenal 
world in all its aspects. Every entity and event in the universe, as an object of the six 
senses, is this preaching. The setsū (truth of) is manifested as the phenomena. This is 
a kind of omnipresencing of the hosshin throughout the cosmos, which permeates 
every part of it. Krummel describes this as ‗perpetually informing all things of the 
Dharma‘, because inherent in this omnipresencing idea is a kind of ‗dynamism of 
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continuous activity‘ and this explains all physical and mental movements within the 
universe. Thus the visible alterations in the cosmos (when a ‗thing-event‘ changes 
place or shape) are the movements of the Cosmic Buddha‘s body. Audible 
alterations can be understood as Dainichi speaking, while mental alterations refer to 
the movements of Dainichi‘s thoughts. Moreover, since everything is itself the 
manifestation of the Buddha, then the preaching can be understood as a monologue. 
Thus the Dharma can be understood as ‗the Buddha‘s monologic expression of his 
own self-enjoyment in samadhic bliss.‘331  
 
In Kūkai‘s ‗Meanings of Hūm‘ we find a similar idea. The three mysteries are said to 
be in every phenomenon in the universe—stones, gods, humans, trees, places—such 
that each serves as ‗a ―linguistic‖ medium that communicates Dainichi‘s sermon in 
his omnipresencing.‘ Thus for instance what is conveyed by the mandala in pictures 
is what the mantra conveys in sound. Together the three mysteries convey in 
different forms the meaning of the Dharma.  English translations do not always pick 
up on the total understanding of what Kūkai wishes to convey here. For him the idea 
of sound or voice includes more than what we normally consider sound. It also refers 
to inanimate sound or to what we might refer to as the ‗soundless—meaning beyond 
ordinary human capacity to hear—vibration of all material reality.‘  Word or ‗sign‘ 
includes both the sinographs and what they correspond to—their conceptual 
constructs—while ‗reality‘ includes the concepts of suchness and emptiness. Thus 
through the three aspects of sound, sign and reality the cosmic Buddha is understood 
to be the cosmos.
 332
 
 
Kūkai‘s personalising of ultimate reality as Dainichi means understanding ultimate 
reality as functioning in the ways of personhood—thought, word, and deed. 
However, in keeping with the Buddhist perspective of personhood as being not so 
much an agent who acts but as the act itself, Kasulis writes with regard to Kūkai‘s 
understanding: ‗Dainichi, like any other person, is not what has a body; he is the 
corporeal process. Dainichi is not what has speech; he is the verbal process. He is 
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not what has mind but the mental process itself.‘ This makes the reality embodiment 
an event not a thing and as that person is the cosmos, this makes the universe a 
personal event. The universe is ‗Dainichi‘s style.‘333   
 
The notion of person as the act itself rather than an agent who acts mirrors the 
Neoplatonic notion (found particularly in Plotinus) that the One is not a being who 
acts but is productive activity itself.
334
 Influenced by Plotinus (at least via pseudo-
Dionysius and others) we find this notion reflected in Eriugena‘s claim that the 
Creator is not prior to creation in any temporal sense and that it is the same nature 
that both creates and is created. In book I a certain puzzlement arose around the 
claim that not only does the Divine nature ‗create all things that are, but itself also is 
created.‘335  The Nutritor concludes that ‗it creates all things which it leads forth out 
of nothing so that they may be, from non-being into being; but it is (also) created 
because nothing except itself exists as an essence since itself is the essence of all 
things.‘ And again ‗although [divine nature] creates all things and cannot be created 
by anything, [it] is in an admirable manner created in all things which take their 
being from it.‘336  Rather than there being a [personal] Creator who then creates, 
Creator and created appear as one. 
 
The understanding of person therefore is key in this regard, which is a point 
highlighted by the philosopher Keiji Nishitani when he claims that there is a need to 
re-examine the concept of personhood as it is normally understood today and within 
mainstream Christian thought.
337
 The ordinary view is that the Christian, with an 
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awareness of his or her sinfulness, encounters the absolutely transcendent God in the 
context of a personal relationship that is divorced from the rest of the world—the 
world presented us by science. This reflects the modern Cartesian sense of subject 
and moreover human salvation is grounded in this personal relationship—this ‗I-
thou‘ between a personal God who calls and a human being who responds to that 
call.  Nishitani argues that ‗the transcendence and transcendent omnipresence of God 
can also be termed a personal relationship between God and man‘ but in a very 
different sense. He coins the notion of an ‗impersonally personal relationship‘ or a 
‗personally impersonal relationship‘ to describe what he means. Here, however, the 
idea of ‗impersonal‘ is not to be understood as the antonym of personal, but more 
like the original meaning of persona.  
 
He suggests that the Holy Spirit in the Christian tradition has the characteristic of 
such an understanding.  While being understood as one persona of the Trinity it is 
also ‗the breath of God,‘ making it ‗a sort of impersonal person or personal 
nonperson.‘ Nishitani goes on to say that from the perspective of those with faith 
(those breathed with this kind of spirit) ‗all creatures are seen as God-breathed.‘ 
Nishitani is dealing with this subject from an existential perspective and argues that 
experience of this kind of understanding does not occur on the field of consciousness 
where there is separation of subject and object. Such an experience is possible only 
at a level where there is no separation between subject and object, (what he terms 
within or without)—where God is ‗encountered as a reality omnipresent in all things 
of the world in such a way as to be absolutely immanent as absolutely 
transcendent.‘338  
 
Nishitani argues that hints on this sense of the omnipresence of God, which he also 
refers to as transpersonal, are only found in the tradition of negative theology. He 
draws on the work of Eckhart, particularly the distinction he makes between God and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Christianity has not historically provided us with a means of dealing with this problem. ‗Only with 
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what he terms Gottheit or godhead.
339
 We can equate this distinction with Eriugena‘s 
distinction between God manifested and God‘s essence. The essence of God is 
located beyond the personal God understood as one who stands over against created 
beings, giving rise to a sense of a transpersonal God. In other words we can 
understand the personal God in a transpersonal sense as the ultimate ground of all 
reality where unity in the sense of absolute oneness is the overwhelming emphasis.  
 
ii. Theophany  
For Eriugena this (trans)personal God communicates and does so as the theophany of 
God, and in this sense we can claim that creation is the divine style.
340
 Theophany 
can be understood as both the ‗means‘ by which the divine expresses itself and the 
‗result‘ of God‘s self-expression. Moreover, it seems to be the only way in which 
Eriugena‘s God can know himself, since in talking of the divine essence Eriugena 
makes clear that ‗God knows only that he is not what he is.‘ In other words 
theophany is central to his overall system, concerning not only how he understands 
the active expression of the divine but also how creation can be understood, and 
furthermore how humans come to union with God. However, in order to fully 
understand this dimension of natura we need to take a closer look at the notion of 
the apophatic in Eriugena. 
 
As we have already seen, this is the means by which the divine nature in its essence 
is first discussed by Eriugena, following the pseudo-Dionysian tradition. The 
ineffability of the divine nature is such that it can only be talked about in terms of the 
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negative or the apophatic. Since created reality is the self-manifestation of the divine, 
Eriugena talks of this nature as a transition from nothingness to something. There is 
a movement from the ‗nothingness' of the divine nature into the ‗somethingness‘ of 
created nature. Metaphorically speaking original darkness now becomes light.  
 
Two notions arise here that need further elaboration. The first is the idea of 
nothingness in God, and the second, emerging from the first, is the doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo. Eriugena‘s credentials as a Christian philosopher have been 
questioned on this point. Etienne Gilson claims that, while Eriugena does develop a 
philosophical system— since such systems are based on certain assumptions and 
Eriugena bases his on the assumption that the first principle is non-being—his 
epistemological basis is suspect.   Gilson argues that philosophy as knowledge must 
rest on being. In terms of Christian philosophy then, he claims that the ‗He Who Is‘ 
—the Judeo-Christian God—is (being). This is an affirmative statement within the 
Thomistic framework of analogy, one that takes account of the proper distinction 
between the affirmation that God exists and knowledge of what God is. It is clear 
that Eriugena recognises this distinction and makes reference to it, but he also 
follows pseudo-Dionysius in positing an alternative mode of speaking of God as 
beyond the categories of being and non-being.  What is really at issue is a failure on 
Gilson‘s part to appreciate the richness of the concept of nihil as used in Eriugena. 
Gilson seems to understand nihil only as privation in the Augustinian sense.
341
  
 
However, Eriugena posits two ways of looking at negation: firstly there is negation 
via privation while secondly there is the negation that can be translated as more-than, 
or excess. It is the latter that is referred to here with regard to the divine nature. The 
movement from the nothingness of God to the created being is from excess into 
creation. Eriugena‘s approach to the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, can, therefore, be 
understood as a creation out of the abundance that is the ‗nothingness‘ of God. This 
paradoxical idea of something from nothing is more clearly understood as the 
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emergence of creation from the ‗beyond being‘ of the godhead. In Eriugena‘s words 
‗everything that is understood and sensed is nothing else but the apparition of what is 
not apparent, the manifestation of the hidden, the affirmation of the negated…‘342  
What, effectively, is being expressed here is the movement from the ‗negative‘ of 
excess—the nothingness beyond being—to the positive of the theophany.    
 
It is possible to argue that this ‗negative‘ of excess —as the essence of ultimate 
reality for Eriugena— speaks to the Buddhist notion of emptiness—the doctrine of 
śūnyatā and how that manifests itself in Kūkai‘s thought. The idea of śūnyatā in 
Buddhism, while translated as emptiness, is not the emptiness of privation or 
nihilism. Even though Mahayana Buddhism is based on the doctrine of emptiness 
throughout its long history it has rejected any attachment to emptiness as a 'view of 
annihilatory nothingness.‘ As Masao Abe points out emptiness must empty itself, it 
must become non-Emptiness and so becomes ‗Wondrous Being.‘ We go beyond the 
notions of u and mu (being and non-being) to the absolute U-tathagata (the ultimate 
reality), but again this is not to be understood as over against u and mu in any kind of 
dualistic sense. Using absolute Mu as the ultimate formless emptiness allows both to 
stand just as they are in reciprocal relationship.
343
  Kasulis suggests this notion of 
fullness in terms of Nishitani‘s conception of śūnyatā by saying that ‗emptiness is a 
self-emptying (kenosis) of itself into the world, or more precisely, a self-emptying of 
itself as the world.‘ This makes the notion of ‗true emptiness‘ (shinkū) identical with 
‗wondrous being‘ (myō-u).344 Here again in terms of the Buddhist doctrine of 
śūnyatā we can talk of a kind of fullness.  
 
 
                                                          
342
 Periphyseon, III: 633a-b. This hidden and non-apparent cannot be something else apart from the 
manifestation. If it was then it would not be hidden or incomprehensible and the manifestation would 
not be all that is. Transcendence thus is found within the world which is established by it.  
343
 Masao Abe 'Non-Being and Mu the Metaphysical Nature of Negativity in the East and the West' in 
Religious Studies, Vol. 11: 2, June 1975, pp. 181—92 
344
 Thomas Kasulis, ‗Whence and Wither: Nishitani‘s View of History‘, in Taitetsu Unno (ed.)  The 
Religious Philosophy of Nishitani Keiji, Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1989, p. 268—9 
129 
 
Eriugena introduces theophany by referring to it as the term the Greeks used to 
define how God is revealed to intellectual and rational creatures.
345
 The emphasis is 
on the fact that ultimate mystery is known because it is revealed, not in its essence 
but by manifestation as and through creation, and this Eriugena decides to call 
theophany. Eriugena explores the concept more comprehensively by quoting 
Maximus‘ treatment of the subject:  ‗Theophany is effected from no other (cause) 
but God, but that it happens as a result of the condescension of the Divine 
Word…downwards, as it were, upon human nature which was created and purified 
by Him… and of the exaltation upwards of human nature to the aforesaid Word by 
divine love.‘346 Theophany is portrayed here as an initiative of God: Eriugena claims 
that it is by divine condescension and invitation that theophany comes about.   
 
This is important because it highlights why, as Willemien Otten suggests, theophany 
gradually takes over from the use of negative theology as Eriugena‘s preferred 
method of dealing with his concept of natura, because theophany seems to contain 
something that human abilities cannot contain. As Eriugena points out in a long 
passage concerning the three levels of the human soul—speech, reason and 
contemplation—the human capacity to understand at each level is inadequate to 
express the divine essence.
347
 Even negative expression, recognising the absolute 
ineffability of God, inevitably stands silent in the face of infinity. Thus Eriugena 
moves from it to theophany, as this is recognised as being from God‘s side as it 
were, and operates almost like a divine ‗trompe-l‘oeil‘ allowing for the only proper 
way of expressing God—‗that which is properly thought of as beyond all essence is 
also properly known in all essence.‘348 This optical illusion, this ‗trick‘ of theophany, 
what Otten notes as the veluti proprie, maintains a kind of equivocation with regard 
to the manifestation of God. It can speak of God manifested in creation yet without 
compromising the ineffable essence of the divine nature. There is the possibility of 
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positive expression and yet a protection of what is regarded as the true essence of 
God.  
 
As Otten notes, while ‗God appears to be able completely to obliterate himself to the 
point of getting fully absorbed by created nature‘ yet ‗the distance which is so 
forcefully embodied and preserved in the veluti proprie character of theophany will 
prevent God and creation ever coinciding, for every coincidence will be retracted 
ultimately by the same dynamism that brought it about.‘349  Having ‗safe-guarded‘ 
the essence of ultimate reality, then ‗every visible and invisible creature can be 
called a theophany, that is a divine apparition. For every order of nature from the 
highest to the lowest, that is from the celestial essences to the last bodies of this 
visible world, the more secretly it is understood the closer it is seen to approach the 
divine brilliance.‘350 
 
B. A dynamic world 
Yet no aspect of nature will reach the divine brilliance in any absolute sense, and so 
the emphasis on the level of identification between ultimate truth and the expression 
of that truth varies for Eriugena and Kūkai. There is a greater sense of equivocation 
or distinction between Eriugena‘s God in his essential nature and created reality, to 
the extent that absolute coincidence can never be considered possible. On the other 
hand, Kūkai‘s claim is that the phenomenal world is Dainichi‘s movement, sound, 
and speech, at least from the perspective of the enlightened. What is evident for both, 
however, is a strong sense of the phenomenal world as dynamic. The notion of 
created reality as the theophany of God suggests a dynamic sense of reality in 
Eriugena, which resonates with Kūkai‘s understanding of the world as very much 
alive.    
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i. A living world of nature 
Within Kūkai‘s overall view of reality as being the personal expression of the cosmic 
Buddha, he understands nature (what we generally refer to as the natural world) as 
dynamic and very much alive. For him, it was a constant source of inspiration. To 
understand how this came to be, it is helpful to look more closely at his experiences 
of the natural world that both deeply influenced him and shaped his conception of 
the world. Firstly, growing up on the island of Shikoku, which even to this day is 
still quite rural, and surrounded by the influence of the indigenous religion of Shinto, 
Kūkai was formed in an environment where the human and the natural were 
intimately related. He was undoubtedly accorded ample opportunities of seeing and 
understanding the natural world as alive.  In this regard let us look at how in the 
opening of his historical novel about Kūkai Shiba Ryotaro discusses his physical 
environment: 
The province of Sanuki in which Kūkai was born borders on the five inner 
provinces around the capital, separated from them by the water of Chin. The 
plains are broad, the mountains exceptionally low. Conical hills dot the 
landscape as though sprinkled here and there across the fields. Probably 
because the plains are broad, the sky—shining with the light off the sea—is 
opened up in a terrible expanse. Formed in the shoals, the clouds shift 
through their variegated forms. Is this not a natural setting that would nurture 
visions in a man.
351
 
 
Secondly, his sojourn training to be a government minister was short-lived, and, 
while he was disillusioned by the political scene, in all likelihood he dropped out of 
college because he felt drawn to a more ascetic religious experience, which he found 
in the world of nature. Kasulis points to an escapist theme in some of his earlier 
writings, as an indication of this draw. For instance in the Sangōshiki (Indications of 
the Goals of the Three Teachings) he outlines his preference for Buddhism over 
Confucianism and Daoism because it provides the only true escape from the world of 
ephemeral pleasures. While such an escapist theme contains a strong otherworldly 
aspect, it reflects Kūkai‘s idea that religious practice could really only be pursued in 
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the mountains away from urban life.
352
  It led to his spending time, at this early 
period of his life, with the Natural Wisdom School in the Yoshino Mountains. This 
consisted of a group of monks who engaged in ascetic ritual practices and who 
wanted also to escape the more scholastic environment of the city.  
 
Such experiences of the natural world stayed with him throughout his life, as can be 
seen in the poetry he would have written in later life. For instance this attitude can be 
deduced from this verse that is also a take on his name:  
This teacher of the great emptiness (kū) does not stay, does not.  
This child of [Shingon Buddhism‘s] milky sea (kai)  
Does not weary of seeing Mount Kōya‘s rocks and pines,  
And is continually, moved by its clear-flowing streams.  
 
Throughout his life Kūkai seems to have often abandoned his court duties so that he 
could retreat to Mount Takao and Mount Kōya to meditate, and be inspired and 
influenced by his surroundings in the natural world. In fact, Kūkai seems to have 
risked censure and disapproval of court through his refusal to interrupt these retreats 
for any reason whatever. On one occasion he did not reply to a request from the 
emperor for two months because of his retreat time. The quality of his reply (an 
apology) displays the eloquence of his composition as these lines attest: ‗I had 
immersed myself in the visualization of emptiness during the day and in the breath-
counting concentration at night. I thus found no time for sharpening my sword of 
brushes or sporting in the pond of ink.‘353  
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In his classic study on the mantra, Ryūichi Abé contrasts the use of writing by the 
intellectual mainstream of the late Nara and early Hein period with Kūkai‘s use of 
writing. For the former writing (including poetry) was a practical and political 
technology necessary for the ruling class to ‗establish and maintain the order of 
society‘, while for Kūkai it was a ‗sacred technology necessary to create and 
maintain cosmic order.‘  Court poets such as Minemori and Yasuyo, acquaintances 
of Kūkai, saw poetic writing as important in capturing and transforming natural 
beauty ‗into an offering to the emperor that would enhance his authority‘ and so 
‗assist his rule‘. In this way writing became ‗symbolic of culture‘s taming of nature.‘ 
In contrast Kūkai seems to have highlighted nature ‗in its naked, wild aspect‘, and 
because of this ‗unadulterated quality‘ it ‗cultivates his mind‘. Thus, for Kūkai, ‗it is 
nature‘s taming of the mind, rather than culture‘s control over nature, that provides 
the inspiration for his poetic compositions.‘ 354 In this regard we find him writing 
such inspirational lines as the following: 
Water scooped from the moonlit valley stream sustains my life,  
A breath of evening mist returning from the peaks refreshed my spirit… 
The moonbeams before dawn and the breeze at daybreak wash away dust 
from my mind.‘355 
 
 
ii. Natura – inherent dynamism 
It is not possible to find similar experiences with regard to the natural world in 
Eriugena‘s writings, and even though he wrote poetry the consensus among scholars 
is that poetry was not his forte.
356
  As previously pointed out, we know next to 
nothing about his background and early years, apart from the fact that he was born 
and educated in Ireland. It can perhaps be surmised from this that his education 
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happened in a monastic setting, and he would have been influenced by this cultural 
background (as I have highlighted in Chapter 2). While his Neoplatonic schema gave 
to his concept of nature a dynamic sense, we can also surmise that his Irish Celtic 
background contributed as well. As the Eriugenian scholar Édouard Jeauneau claims: 
his attitude towards the bible and his esteem for the ―Book of Nature‖ are both Irish 
in origin.
357
 And according to Siewers, Eriugena‘s view of spatiotemporal creation, 
while emerging from a ‗genealogy of Greek and Syriac writers‘, was also influenced 
by ‗unique twists attributable to his cultural background in the archipelago.‘358 
 
We can infer the influence of the natural world on Eriugena from his use of the term 
nature as the framing device for his vision of reality. As Dermot Moran argues, in 
spite of Eriugena‘s loose use of philosophical concepts and particularly his lack of 
accuracy concerning facts about the natural world, he is crystal clear about what it is 
he wants to convey concerning his understanding and use of the term phusis, or 
natura.  It stands as the ‗absolute frame of his thinking‘ and is understood as ‗a 
dynamic process of self-manifestation, at once manifesting itself as Creator and 
created, and in the same dialectical process withdrawing into its nameless origin.‘359  
Willemiem Otten also stresses this strongly active understanding of natura, 
describing it as a religious force. In an article comparing Eriugena‘s and Emerson‘s 
ideas of nature, she suggests that Eriugena portrays nature as having an inherent 
dynamism, and claims that his use of the idea of nature can be described as an 
anchor for his understandings of creation.
360
   
 
It is worthwhile exploring Otten‘s argument more fully, since it contributes to the 
larger concern of this dissertation by stressing how a dynamic sense of nature can 
enhance understandings of created reality within the Christian tradition. Otten begins 
by outlining the standard perception of the creation/nature relationship in early 
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Christianity, which I shall summarise briefly. The concept of nature that was linked 
to the demiurge in the Timaeus and to sexual desire in the Symposium became muted 
in Neoplatonism as ‗philosophically stratified forms of organic emanation‘. This 
‗muting‘ of the ancient natura in the Neoplatonic structure was likely to become a 
full rebellion against Christianity and ‗its newly imposed biblical Divine Maker‘, 
which would force it into a ‗role of passive confinement.‘ In order to avoid such a 
rebellion, Christianity sought to cast nature in the role of creation. Thus, nature 
would become ‗a material object subjected to the divine power whence it ultimately 
originated‘, with the climax of such subjugation being reached in the idea of creatio 
ex nihilo. In other words, the understanding is that the monotheistic Christian God 
sought to rob nature of its material roots and of its mythic origins.  
 
Also in this understanding, the radical dependency of created nature on the divine 
excess is emphasised. As Moran points out, we can understand why Augustine 
writes with such vigour in his confessions that creatures cry out: ‗God made me‘, 
and also understand the extent of Augustine‘s influence on classical western 
Christianity.
361
  This notion of dependency and passivity on the part of created nature 
is reinforced when viewed through the notion of a personal God inherent in 
mainstream Christianity and examined earlier. 
 
While Otten acknowledges this new emphasis in Christian thought, she nevertheless 
wishes to transcend the kind of binary stalemate inherent in it. Instead, she posits a 
view of nature that would draw on resources from within the Christian tradition and 
yet maintain nature‘s own dynamism. Nature would become a ‗macrocosmic imago 
Dei‘, allowing it to be seen as giving expression to multi-faceted dimensions of co-
creatorship. Such a view, she argues, would see nature less as a rival and more as an 
anchor for creation, and would enrich rather than undermine more standard Christian 
views of the created world. Moreover, nature‘s concrete revelatory character would 
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be emphasised, thus relativizing the priority given to scriptural revelation since the 
Reformation – the book of nature as distinct from the book of scripture.362   
 
Otten argues that Eriugena‘s notion of nature is just such a resource from within the 
Christian tradition.  Eriugena uses ‗via negativa‘ (the apophatic) as a means of 
including the infinite within the totality described by the term natura. However, as a 
consequence of including the negative (what reason cannot grasp) within natura, 
natura cannot be defined, and as a consequence of being beyond definition it is 
given an ‗inherent dynamism‘ from the very beginning. According nature such 
dynamism, from within the tradition, runs counter to the standard concepts of 
creation that tended to have around them fixed boundaries.
363
 Such concepts 
emphasised the distinction between creator and creation, and in the process reified 
the world as an object.   These approaches, which tend to form the core of the 
orthodox position, found an ally in Augustine‘s emphasis on the dependency of 
creation on a creator, where God watches over and provides for the realm of 
spatiotemporal creation.  
 
Eriugena advocates a shift away from such absolute dependency, and instead accords 
to the realm of creation the much more active role of manifesting the hidden 
transcendent realm, even to the point of suggesting that the Creator is dependent on 
creation in that he requires creation as the means of its own self-manifestation. In 
fact this is what nature as creation/created being (as the second and third aspects of 
the four-fold division) now becomes for Eriugena—the ‗self-manifestation of God.‘ 
Eriugena therefore defines creation in the active expression of self-manifestation. 
The divine nature ‗creates itself, that is, allows itself to appear in its theophanies, 
willing to emerge from the most hidden recesses of its nature in which it is unknown 
even to itself, that is, it knows itself in nothing…but descending into the principle of 
all things and, as it were, creating itself, it begins to know itself in something.‘364 
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Moran points out the radical implications of this: creation which was traditionally 
understood as an attribute of God can now be understood as ‗a fulfilling of the divine 
nature.‘365 
 
What is stressed here is the Greek view of nature: the physical entities are in essence 
incorporeal and are underlined by ‗the mysterious infinite reality of hidden ousia.‘366 
The distinction spoke of earlier between God manifested and God as essence 
Eriugena also applies to the outer and inner aspects of all reality. ‗For just as God as 
He is in Himself beyond every creature is comprehended by no intellect, so is He 
equally incomprehensible when considered in the innermost depths of the creature 
which was made by Him and which exists in Him.‘ 367 What we then perceive as 
nothing other than ‗some accident to each creature‘s essence…is known not as to 
what it is but that it is‘368 In other words the essence of all things is equally 
inaccessible since it ultimately is the essence of God.  
 
C. Understandings of the phenomenal world: Cosmologies 
What then, we might ask, is the nature of the universe and how does this world 
emerge? For Kūkai the world (as the body of Mahāvairocana) is constituted by the 
Six Great Elements (rokudai). These are interfused with or are interpenetrating each 
other. In ‗Attaining Enlightenment‘ this notion of interpenetration forms the essence 
of the first line of the two stanza verse that is at the core of this text (noted in the 
previous section). Kūkai identifies these elements as earth, water, fire, wind, space, 
and consciousness. Essentially then there are five material elements and one spiritual 
element making up reality—the universe is both material and spiritual (body and 
mind).  He describes these as being ‗interfused and…in a state of eternal harmony.‘  
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Kūkai emphasises that while ‗differences exist between matter and mind,‘ they are 
the same in their essential nature: ‗Matter is no other than mind; mind no other than 
matter. Without any obstruction they are interrelated. The subject is the object; the 
object, the subject. Nothing differentiates them.‘369 In Exoteric Buddhism the first 
five constitute the materiality of the universe, but Kūkai emphasises the fact that they 
are the bodily components of the Dharmakāya, while the sixth element is his 
consciousness. Thus, these five and the sixth ‗spiritual‘ element together constitute 
the Body and Mind of Dainichi.  
 
In talking about the constituents of the natural world, Eriugena refers to the Greek 
‗four elements‘ theory of earth, air, fire and water. However, instead of seeing any 
kind of interfusion of elements where material and spiritual elements are equal, in 
typically Neoplatonic fashion Eriugena quite clearly values the spiritual or 
immaterial over the material, since the material is most real, while the immaterial is 
most actual.  Moran suggests that he sees these elements as stumbling blocks in his 
efforts at reducing all things to immaterial causes.
370
 In Book II Eriugena explores 
various theories concerning these elements.
371
 He incorporates the four elements into 
the primordial causes, either being those causes or contained within them, and so 
claims them, in themselves, to be most pure and simple. In general he argues that the 
visible world emerges from ousia through the causes, and then through the reasons, 
and gradually there is a spreading out of the ‗divine ray‘ until the whole cosmos is 
generated into its particular species and forms. His ultimate aim is to show how the 
world emerges from invisible causes.
372
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In trying to grasp their respective understandings of the emergence of the world there 
seems to be a profound difference between them, since Eriugena talks of a creator 
and creation. While the implication of dualism inherent in this approach is 
counteracted by the dialectic interplay that characterises his notion of creator and 
creation, the tension is still palpable. We could refer to this as a kind of a ‗dualistic‘ 
oneness. On the other hand Kūkai‘s Buddhist position gives a definite sense of what 
we might term a ‗monistic‘ oneness. As far as Kūkai is concerned the six Great 
elements ‗create all the Buddhas, all sentient beings, and the material worlds...The  
Six Great Elements are the creating; and the Dharmakāya in Four Forms and the 
threefold world are the created… Although we speak of creating and created, there is 
in reality neither the creating nor the created.‘ Clearly then the only ‗creator‘ is the 
Six Great Elements itself, which is simultaneously shoshō and nōshō,—creation and 
creative force.  The Dharmakāya (the Six Great elements) is all there is—the totality 
of the universe is identical with the Cosmic Buddha or ultimate reality.   
 
Both Eriugena and Kūkai speak about the causal nature of reality and both claim that 
the ultimate cause of all things is in some sense unobtainable. Kūkai explores this 
notion in his text entitled: ‗The meanings of the word hūm‘ by analysing the mantra 
hūm. He describes the ultimate meaning contained in each syllable. The first syllable 
Ha—the letter H—stands for cause and in discussing its true meaning Kūkai says: 
‗as for the real meaning of the letter Ha, ―the gateway of the letter Ha stand for the 
inapprehensibility of cause in all things.‖‘ This is inapprehensible or unobtainable 
because of the regressive nature of causality. While it is obvious that all things are 
based on some cause, this cause is then based on another and another such that it is 
logically impossible to reach a fundamental cause of existence. Kūkai thus concludes 
that nothing can ultimately be said about the causal nature of existence other than 
that the absence of cause (the causeless cause) or ‗nonabiding is the origin of all 
things.‘ 373 The true cause of all things is the causeless cause.  
 
For Eriugena God, as ultimate cause of all reality, also remains unobtainable, but in 
the sense of being unknowable. Thus while both Eriugena and Kūkai suggest a sense 
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of the ultimate unobtainability of the cause of all things there is a clear difference in 
their emphasis. For Eriugena it is due to the divine essence being essentially beyond 
the grasp of knowability; for Kūkai it is because there is no ultimate cause of all 
things.  And yet paradoxically for Eriugena we can say that this ultimate cause, while 
being all there is, is still a nothingness beyond being. This nothingness can only be 
(in the sense of being known) in its effects. Thus in the image of Umberto Eco the 
universe is peeled like an onion, but the onion is all peel. After peeling nothing 
remains: all is outside with nothing inside or conversely all is inside with nothing 
outside. 
 
D. A Positive view of the world 
Ultimately then the mysterious nature of the world comes through for both Eriugena 
and Kūkai giving rise to a positive sacred sense of reality. There is another aspect of 
the Neoplatonic formulation of nature, adopted and recast by Eriugena, which is 
worth considering in this regard. In the standard Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation 
there is the principle of reduced causal power: the farther one gets from the One the 
lesser is the power of the central force. However, Eriugena seems to imply an 
expanding outwards rather than a diminishing of the central power. This suggests a 
subversion of the Neoplatonic principle of reduced causal power in favour of a 
multiplicity of expression. Whereas for Plotinus and Proclus, that which is produced 
is necessarily inferior to that which produces, Eriugena talks of a ‗wonderful and 
divine multiplication into genera and species and individual and into differentiations 
and all those other features.‘374 This reversal gives a positive sense of all created 
reality, that one is exhorted to appreciate the many expressions of the divine. Moran 
refers to this as a ‗horizontal expansion‘ alongside the typically ‗downward 
diminution‘ inherent in and as the unfolding process.375  Thus as the process of 
unfolding happens all of created reality retains the power of the creative principle 
itself.  
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Kūkai also displays an affirmative attitude towards the phenomenal world as he 
emphasises very strongly that it is the place of attaining enlightenment. The unique 
aspect of attaining enlightenment for him is contained in his motto: ‗in this very 
body‘ or existence. For him, the highest ‗glorious mind, the most secret and shared is 
fully present even in the lowest level of mind. This suggests a strongly affirmative 
attitude towards the world since it is the realm where the highest enlightenment is 
attained. As Hakeda points out, Kūkai rejected the theory of universal degeneration 
that was prevalent in Japanese Buddhism.
376
 And, as we have been exploring in the 
context of how the Cosmic Buddha preaches—as the body, mind, speech that is the 
phenomenal world—this coinciding of ultimate reality with the world as such is clear 
evidence of Kūkai‘s positive attitude towards it. All phenomena both point to an 
underlying truth and are that truth expressing itself. 
 
E. Language, Text and the Cosmos  
In going more deeply into how this is so, and before exploring the role of the human 
as in some sense interpreter of that expression, it is helpful to look more closely at 
ideas such as language and text in relation to the world. In his early writings 
concerning the Mahāvairocana Sutra, Kūkai explains how the sūtra itself can be 
read in three ‗editions‘:  
As for the text of this sūtra [Mahāvairocana Sūtra], there are three kinds. The 
first is the [the vast, boundless] text that exists spontaneously and 
permanently, namely, the mandala of the Dharma of all the Buddhas. The 
second is the broader text that circulated in the world, that is, the sūtra of ten 
thousand verses transmitted by Nagarjuna. The third is the abbreviated text of 
over three thousand verses in seven fascicles.  
 
The first text then is equated with vast and limitless cosmos, while the second and 
third are abridged translations into human language. Tradition has it that the second 
(consisting of twenty thousand volumes) was transmitted to Nagarjuna by 
Vajrasattva somewhere in Southern India, but was subsequently lost. A much 
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smaller version (the third) was brought from China by Kūkai. With regard to the 
third Kūkai goes on to say that even if abbreviated  
it embraces in its brevity comprehensive, broader texts. That is because its 
each and every word contains countless meanings, and every single letter, 
even every single stroke or dot, encapsulates within itself innumerable 
truths.
377
 
Kūkai claims that the three editions of the Sutra are in fact inseparable, and, as Abé 
points out, the second and third are not merely an abridgement of the first but they 
are more particularly a condensation of it. The cosmic Sutra‘s contents are already 
encapsulated in the characters of the abbreviated forms, giving rise to an inter-textual 
form that exemplifies a kind of synecdochic interpenetration: the entire whole is 
contained within each part.  
 
Using the same model for the Vajraśekhara Sutra (the other great Sutra in esoteric 
Buddhism) Kūkai presents esoteric texts ‗as books that reflect within themselves 
everything in the world.‘ However, Abé goes on to point out that this ought not to be 
understood as a kind of summa mundi—a complete tome like an Enlightenment Age 
encyclopaedia. Rather, it must be understood as ‗never-to-be-bound—constantly 
reworked manuscript.‘ Text therefore for Kūkai is not to be understood as a book, 
but as a ‗writing that remains open-ended.‘ Ultimately, the world is constituted of 
text ‗not of their representational function but of their materiality.‘ For Kūkai instead 
of the text of the world we have the more compositional mode: text as the world or 
the world as the text.
378
 
 
Pierre Hadot points out since earliest antiquity in the West one can find the idea of 
the world being understood as some kind of text.  For instance Plato understood the 
universe to be a kind of poem composed by God, as did the Stoics and Plotinus, 
while Proclus referred to Apollo as the great poet of the universe. Later thinkers, 
especially during the Latin middle ages and into the modern period used the 
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metaphor of nature as a book. Alongside this developed the theme of a language of 
nature, where the forms of various beings were the ‗words‘ of this language.379 For 
Eriugena this language is the divine speaking the word and it is through this 
speaking all things come into being. ‗It is the prerogative of the divine nature to call 
forth from non-existence into existence whatever it wishes to make.‘380 The creation 
then becomes the speech or word of God, in essence the self-manifestation of God, 
and as such can be understood as a text.  
 
The philosopher Eric D. Perl‘s interpretation of the idea of the world and text in the 
Periphyseon, particularly Eriugena‘s notion that ‗everything which is understood or 
sensed is nothing other than the appearance of the non-apparent, the manifestation of 
the hidden‘ and so forth, highlights another dimension. Just as God manifests 
himself in and as creation, which makes the world his self-creation, an author creates 
the text. However, what Perl draws attention to here is the relationship with meaning. 
Thus he argues that ‗[j]ust as meaning occurs within a text which it produces, so 
transcendence is found within the world which it establishes‘. In thinking of the 
world as a book that is produced by God, then, we need to see this relation ‗not as 
that of a text to its author but as that of a text to its meaning.‘ While the meaning 
grounds the text it ‗occurs only in the text‘ and cannot be understood apart from the 
text. This makes the text simply a sign of the meaning, and yet there is nothing else 
but the text (or the sign), just as in the example of a dance: without the still point 
there would be no dance yet there is only the dance. We are therefore left, not with 
the dualism of ‗God-and-the-world, but with, only, the theophanic world.‘381 From 
his Neoplatonic perspective with its focus on the ‗One‘, Eriugena ultimately wants to 
overcome any kind of dualism, including that between things, words and their 
meanings.  
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As with Kūkai this theophanic world read as a text, this book of nature, is also open 
ended. For Eriugena nature and scripture are the two sides of wisdom as it were, but 
are united in that both can be read as books, reflecting the traditional notion of the 
book of nature alongside the book of scripture.
382
  Yet these books of wisdom 
cannot, in any sense, be understood as closed and completed.
383
  Both books are 
collections of signs that symbolise or point beyond themselves to deeper mysteries; 
reflecting Eriugena‘s ultimate preoccupation with the pseudo-Dionysian notion of 
language as pointing towards the divine, while acting as a veil or screen that hides 
it.
384
 Thus one must not stop with the words or things but move towards the 
unutterable mystery behind the words and things, implying that there is no finality or 
closure to these texts. In this regard there are infinite interpretations, and no 
interpretation or perspective is to be privileged over another.  
 
Eriugena goes beyond the traditional understanding of the relationship between 
words and things where a word represented or stood for a thing, to claim that the 
relationship is reciprocal: words may stand for things but things also stand for words. 
In exploring this idea Moran looks at his understanding of incarnation, where 
Eriugena suggests that in saying the word was made flesh we also say the flesh 
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(matter) is word.
385
  In this regard Eriugena claims that the word being made flesh is 
both metaphor and synecdoche. Since flesh is part of the body but stands for the 
whole person (including spirit), then to say that the word is flesh is to use the notion 
of the part standing for the whole or the whole being in the part. At the same time 
utterance of ‗the word becoming flesh‘ can be understood as metaphorical. This is so 
because what is normally associated with something made up of sound or vibration 
(uttering a word) is now ‗embodied in physical skin, bones and blood.‘ Also the 
reverse —his claim that flesh is word—is metaphorical as this implies that ‗the 
physical‘ is changed into ‗meaning‘. This notion of language displays richness, 
complexity and dynamism on the part of Eriugena where language is understood as 
much more than simply a representation of reality.  
 
Equally we find a dynamic use of language in Kūkai, and while for him also words 
do not simply represent reality, in effect, they are reality. However, reality itself is 
not in any sense substantial and this is what gives rise to the notion of dynamism. 
His theory of language is most systematically presented in his Shōji, jissō ji, which 
Abé translates as ‗Voice, Letter, Reality.‘ In the opening verse Kūkai claims that ‗all 
in the six sense-fields are letters, the letters of the Dharmakāya, which is reality.‘ 
Then throughout the work he repeatedly states that the letter is nothing but 
differentiation. In other words Kūkai‘s conception of language or signification is not 
as representing the world but can only be understood in his prior understanding of 
identity as differentiation. The identity of anything is not an ‗essence‘ in the sense of 
substance, but it emerges from how an object is differentiated from other discrete 
objects. It is the interplay of differentiation that gives rise to identity. All sensory 
objects can be understood as manifesting themselves as if they were ―things‖. The 
signifying function of language (while it gives rise to discrete objects according to 
Kūkai) then has at its heart the notion of differentiation. While it produces things, it 
is grounded in differentiating movement from differentiation is coterminous with the 
formation of a cosmos.‘386 Thus while word is reality it is so in a dynamic sense.   
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Underscoring the interrelation between sign/letter or text and things/reality is the 
idea of sound. From an analysis of ‗Sound, Sign and Reality‘ we can talk of shō 
(sound) as the breath or primordial speech of Dainichi.  Ji (meaning sign, word, 
letter, or character/graph) is the signification of this sound—its meaning. Then jissō 
(reality) is that which is named or meant by shō becoming ji.  This, Dainichi‘s 
sermon, this vibrating sound (which is the vibrations of the six great elements) gives 
rise to all the significations which gives rise to all the phenomena that constitute the 
universe.  Moreover, as mentioned above, all the phenomena, the universe as such, is 
a text articulating the Dharma – it is the text of hosshin seppō. The sermon is the 
scripture—signs that constitute the world and its phenomena— which is the world 
and the scripture is also the sermon preached. 
 
Just as we can talk of Kūkai referring to nature as sermon and scripture/text, so also 
with Eriugena we can talk of reality as speech and book. Even though Eriugena is 
more concerned with the symbolic function of language—as pointing beyond itself 
towards that which is ultimately nameless— nevertheless and in keeping with 
tradition Eriugena holds that the spoken word—sound— is prior to the written one. 
For Eriugena the creative act itself is referred to using the metaphor of speech while 
the created universe is referred to as book. Out of his linking of creative speech and 
the trinity where he speaks of the generation of the Word, Eriugena argues that 
already contained here is the whole creation in a unified form. [In a like manner the 
monad contains all numbers and the centre contains all radii of the circle.] It is this 
which gives rise to creation itself. The notion of crying out leads to the act of 
creation itself.  Thus the divine word encompasses all things in its unity and is also 
the condition for their being articulated in multiplicity. This creative act of speech is 
not like the work of a primordial craftsman who is simply shaping what already is, 
but can be imagined ‗as an enduring cry which constitutes the very being of its 
created artifact.‘ In his homily on the Prologue to the gospel of John, Eriugena says: 
‗Just as when one who is speaking ceases to speak, his voice ceases and dies away, 
in the same way if the Father of heaven should cease so speak his Word, the created 
universe would not subsist.‘387 As Donald Duclow comments ‗God is as 
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constitutively present throughout created nature as the speaker is in his speech, or the 
singer in his song‘388 
 
III. Conceptions of Human Nature 
The efforts to articulate the meaning of reality is not an intellectual exercise for 
either Kūkai or Eriugena. Both are concerned with the notion of enlightenment as 
that which ultimately exercises the human person.  David Gardiner describes the 
project of enlightenment, in the context of Shingon, as a kind of transformed 
vision.
389
 This definition can easily be applied to the Christian idea of union with 
God, which could be described as Eriugena‘s version of Christian salvation.  Thus 
for both philosophers we can understand the project of enlightenment as a matter of 
attaining some kind of union with ultimate reality. In this regard, the idea of praxis 
can be understood as an integral aspect of reaching that enlightened state.  
 
While attaining this kind of union or enlightenment is a key aspect of an 
understanding of the human within the divine-human-earth triad, there are other 
aspects that are also important. In particular it is necessary to look more specifically 
at how the human is understood to relate to both ultimate reality and to the 
phenomenal world—the divine and earth aspects of this triad. This entails looking at 
the concepts of microcosm and mediator. While both Eriugena and Kūkai hold the 
human in a very positive light, Eriugena in particular esteems that role very highly, 
with most scholars indicating that it is through the figure of the human one ought to 
approach Eriugena‘s overall system of ideas, even while recognising that his 
anthropology needs to be understood as embedded in the larger setting of natura.
390
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A. Comprehending Reality /Achieving Enlightenment: 
In turning firstly to how Eriugena understands the way in which humans are to 
achieve enlightenment or salvation, we need to again return to the concept of 
theophany, particularly his rendition of the subject in Book II.  As we have noted, 
Eriugena firstly explains what he means by theophany—that it is an initiative of 
God. It is ‗effected from no other (cause) than God, but that it happens as a result of 
the condescension of the Divine Word… downwards, as it were, upon human 
nature… and the exaltation upwards of human nature to the aforesaid Word by 
divine love.‘ Further on in the text he puts it as follows: ‗from this condescension of 
the Wisdom of God upon nature through grace, and the exaltation of the same nature 
to that same Wisdom through choice, the theophany is brought about.‘ Here is 
explained the elements and the process of theophany. It results from the interplay 
between the human choice and the divine ‗condescension‘ by which is meant the 
‗deification of the creature‘. While the theophany comes from God, there is a 
requirement for the human to have the capacity to ‗recognise‘ it. There is an element 
of choice here for the human being (even if a limited one) in terms of responding to 
the condescension of the divine. The theophanic reality is available to the eye that 
sees and the ear that hears, as it were. In other words, the human must activate the 
capacity in itself to recognise divine manifestation, which, paradoxically, is only 
possible through divine grace.  
 
There is a similarity here to Kūkai‘s notion of kaji.391 This is a central concept with 
regard to how the human sees reality as Dainichi, and its meaning is translated in the 
following line from his two-stanza poem: ‗When the grace of the Three Mysteries is 
retained [our inborn three mysteries will] quickly be manifested.‘392 Kūkai‘s gloss 
here is that kaji ‗indicates great compassion on the part of the Tathagata and faith 
(shinjin) on the part of sentient beings.‘393  In his commentary on this idea of Kūkai, 
Krummel suggests: ‗Through the help of Dainichi‘s compassionate con-descension 
of kaji, the practitioner is enabled to inter-resonate with the sermon of the cosmos.‘ 
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Even though the Buddha is in a ‗monologic exposition mode‘ at the same time he is 
expressing his compassion for the unenlightened so that they also can ‗enjoy the 
fruits of the Dharma‘.394 In ‗Sound, Word, and Reality‘, Kūkai claims that ‗sentient 
beings are infatuated and blind, and know no way of attaining enlightenment on their 
own. Through grace (kaji), therefore, the Tathagata shows them the way to return.‘395 
This gives rise to the idea of the intimate relationship between the Buddha and the 
one wishing to achieve enlightenment. 
 
But there is more, since elsewhere, in a commentary on the Mahāvairocana Sūtra, 
Kūkai states:  
Kaji used to mean that which the buddhas protect and preserve, and was also 
called kahi [receiving a divine power], but these interpretations do not yet get 
at its full implications. Ka receives its name because [the Buddha‘s three 
secret functions] are added from upward to downward to that of man. Ji has 
its significance by virtue of man‘s holding on to the Buddha‘s downward 
guiding [of sentient beings] without separation. That is, [kaji] means ―I enter 
[the Buddha] and [the Buddha] enters me.
396
 
There is more to kaji then than the incorporation of protective power. As Yuasa 
points out interpreting the concept in this way is limited and its significance is not 
sufficiently clear. Kaji is about an interpenetrating of the activities of each so that the 
karmic actions are transformed into the actions of the three mysteries. Presupposed 
then is the experience of cultivation to which I shall explore shortly.
397
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Furthermore, as Krummel points out, the two central teachings of Kūkai— hosshin 
seppō and sokushinjôbutsu—are the means by which this connection is achieved. 
Thus  
the Buddha‘s hosshin seppō on the one hand descends from the summit and 
spreads out from the center, and the practitioner‘s sokushinjôbutsu on the 
other hand raises him from below and gravitates him to the center. Their 
simultaneity means their non-duality as different aspects of the same 
dynamism of a cosmic emptiness. To realise this, is to affirm one‘s own 
original enlightenment in one‘s present body in simultaneous reception of 
Dainichi‘s expounding of the Dharma.398  
 
While we must acknowledge the much greater sense of equality and identity between 
the Buddha and the practitioner of enlightenment (since the Buddha is understood to 
be the phenomenal world) than is to be found between the human and God (which 
holds definitively to the divine initiative in terms of the human ability to respond, 
even while recognising its capacity to do so), nevertheless, in Eriugena‘s position, 
we find that theophany seems to require the ‗other-than-God‘(created being) for it to 
happen. Thus we can understand this as one dynamic event just as there is a 
simultaneity in Kūkai‘s rendition that suggests a nonduality (as we can note from 
Krummel‘s description). For both Eriugena and Kūkai, then, we can say that the two 
movements are merely two aspects of the same dynamic.  
 
Eriugena proceeds with his description of theophany by using the image of sunlight 
and air to describe what is happening in this process of enlightening the human 
person:  
[J]ust as air illuminated by the sun appears to be nothing else but light, not 
because it loses its own nature, but because the light prevails in it so that it is 
believed itself to be light, so human nature when it is united with God is said 
to be God through and through, not because it ceases to be (its own) nature 
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but because it receives a share in Divinity so that only God appears to be in 
it.
399
  
 
He goes on to say, however, that what we see is not God in Godself but God as 
theophany, and in this way he again preserves this sense of distance, not between 
creator and created, but between God as essence and as manifestation. Through our 
bodies, now having the capacity to see differently, and in all bodies around us we see 
the divine itself. Thus, on the one hand, all is suffused with the holy, while on the 
other hand we now have the eyes to see and all that we see is holiness itself.  
Eriugena cites Job in this regard who declares ―even in my flesh I shall see God.‖ 
 
Once again we can find a parallel with Kūkai‘s concept of kaji both in terms of the 
imagery used and with regard to the sentiment expressed. Having spoken of the 
compassion of the Buddha and the faith of the sentient being Kūkai elaborates: 
The compassion of the Buddha pouring forth on the heart of the sentient 
beings, like the rays of the sun on water, is called ka [adding], and the heart 
of sentient beings which keeps hold of the compassion of the Buddha, as 
water retains the rays of the sun, is called ji [retaining].
400
 
Eriugena‘s metaphors of sun and air, and Kūkai‘s images of sun and water suggest a 
very strong sense of identification between the expression of ultimate reality and the 
one attaining enlightenment. Here also is the strong positive sense of the human 
person in Kūkai‘s understanding in so far as the human can only respond (is able to 
retain) because of the innate presence in it of the three mysteries, the honnu 
sammitsu, which are united with the Three Mysteries of Dainichi. What is being 
referred to here is the notion of hongaku—original enlightenment considered to be 
innate in every human being, as one commentator put it: ‗When enlightenment is 
actualized, one realises that it is identical to ―original enlightenment,‖ the mind of 
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suchness that one possessed all along.‘401 Hakeda emphasises that the human can 
only achieve enlightenment here and now because of hongaku, that unless one is 
enlightened from the very start, one has no way of reaching enlightenment. Hakeda 
goes on to point out that this was not a naïve optimistic view on the part of Kūkai: he 
was clearly aware of the human tendency towards ‗evil karma‘ but believed that 
original enlightenment could still be perceived ‗through the veils of evil karma.‘402 
 
This belief in the innate capacity of the human person is expressed in ‗The 
Difference‘. Here Kūkai makes the point that the esoteric teachings—being the 
teachings of the Cosmic Buddha / the Dharmakāya itself—are beyond the ordinary 
person‘s comprehension. They are even beyond those in the final stages of the Ten 
Stages and, in effect, are available only to those who have reached the ‗result of 
enlightenment‘. However, Kūkai does give the impression that remaining at this 
level is not the end.  
 
When he describes those caught in exoteric teachings as being like ‗rams butting 
against a hedge [in which they have ensnared their horns]‘ or ‗blocked by the 
barriers of the expedient‘, by the provisional Mahayana teachings, it is obvious that 
they have given up advancing any further.
403
 They wish to remain in an illusory city. 
As a result such people cannot see, for instance, references in the various sutras and 
commentaries to the fact that the Dharmakāya actually preaches. As far as Kūkai is 
concerned these people do not have the capacity to go further since ‗the same water 
may be seen as emerald by heavenly beings and as burning fire by hungry ghosts‘: 
the same darkness may be seen as light by nocturnal birds and as darkness by 
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[human beings].‘404  And yet, Kūkai claims that it is possible to go further, saying 
that ‗if men and women once grasp the fragrance of this [Esoteric Buddhism], they 
will have in their minds a clear understanding, as things are reflected in the mirror of 
the Emperor of Ch‘in‘405  
 
B. The issue of praxis 
Going further involves a different kind of knowing, and so Kūkai turns to more 
symbolic forms of expression, which are ultimately about praxis. He is adamant that 
engaging in such ritual practices as reciting mantras, making the appropriate mudras, 
as well as the visualisations attached to the mandalas are central to the quest of 
reaching enlightenment—to realising one‘s nonduality with the dharma. Such 
engagement enables one to align one‘s own behaviour with that of the Buddha‘s self-
expression. This unlocks ‗an unseen dimension of one‘s own spiritual potential‘ 
resulting in the various bodies all coalescing in ‗a multilayered texture of meaning.‘  
This makes one‘s body ‗the avenue for accessing the sacred.‘406 
 
 Krummel describes the process of interaction as an inter-permeating one between 
the three mysteries of hosshin seppō and the three corresponding activities of the 
practitioner. In this way, these activities are ‗already expressions of the three 
mysteries of the hosshin, making the inter-permeation ‗―always already‖‘. All that is 
lacking for its realisation is our awareness of this truth. Thus, Kūkai prescribes the 
ritual practices, and enlightenment is realised in ‗one‘s own embodied dynamism of 
bodily, verbal, and mental acts‘. In other words, through using all the faculties of 
one‘s embodied existence the human ‗is led via kaji to comprehend the Dharma, not 
merely conceptually but through one‘s body-and-mind.‘ Due to the mirroring of the 
macrocosmic reality in the microcosmic of the human we have nyugo ganyu—the 
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Buddha enters me and I enter the Buddha. As one‘s mind becomes enlightened and 
one‘s body becomes ―adamantine‖, one attains Buddhahood.407  
 
By engaging in those practices in a ritualistic format (the rituals associated with 
body, speech, and mind) the human person achieves immediate insight into the 
nature of the universe. As Kasulis expresses it: ‗By introspection on the nature of 
their own thoughts, words, and deeds, the Shingon Buddhist is said to achieve 
insight into the thoughts, words, and deeds of the Buddha, Dainichi.‘ Thus, his 
schema suggests that by understanding oneself, one understands the person that is all 
of reality.
408
 This is what enlightenment or attaining Buddhahood is about.  
 
This notion of introspection raises the issue of body and mind, which is also linked 
by scholars such as Yuasa to theories on cultivation. While body mind duality is not 
to be found in Eastern thinking, and the term bodymind has been coined to express 
the unity of the thinking, primacy is given to the body. This is so also for Kūkai. 
Kūkai regards a Shingon cultivator as one who practices esoteric Buddhism. At the 
outset of ‗The Ten Stages (which is adapted from The Mahāvairocana Sūtra) Kūkai 
says that he will ‗reveal the process through the stages of the mind for a cultivator of 
the Shingon approach.‘409 Here Kūkai is concerned with (as Yuasa points out)how 
the theoretical organisation of these stages —the theory—emerges out of the 
experience of developing one‘s personhood via the process of cultivation. While 
Kūkai creates a kind of hierarchy of value with regard to these different stages, 
culminating in the penultimate stage of Shingon Buddhism, his purpose is not to 
engage in a theoretical debate to determine the superiority of any particular system 
of thought; rather it is to point out that the meaning of the different levels is made 
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intelligible as the cultivator progresses on his or her path of personal religious 
experience.
410
 
 
Kūkai‘s central teaching—the Dharma body expounds the Dharma— as we have 
noted already highlights how the ultimate cosmic remote Buddha Dainichi does 
communicate, and does so as the universe. In terms of Kūkai‘s particular cultivation 
theory then, the cultivator hears the cosmic Buddha‘s voice when he or she is turned 
towards the mind‘s interior. In a poem entitled ‗Wandering in the Mountains 
Longing for a Mountain Sage, Kūkai writes: ‗Who is called Mahāvairocana? From 
the start, it is the king of my mind.‘411 The absolute Dharma body who usually sits in 
the centre of the mandala map of esoteric Buddhism is here equated with one‘s mind. 
The question then becomes how this is linked to the notion of the body for Kūkai. 
 
In a work written on his return from China Kūkai wrote: ‗If you direct your mind to 
the Exoteric teaching, it will take three kalpas [eons], [but] if you keep your body in 
the Esoteric treasury [of teachings], the lives of the sixteen [is attainable] 
instantaneous[ly].
412
 Kūkai does not seem to be interested only in the quickness of 
achieving enlightenment but the juxtaposing of body with esoteric, (while 
juxtaposing the mind with exoteric) emphasises the priority of the body for Kūkai. 
This priority of the body rather than speed of attaining enlightenment is also 
emphasised in expressions that he uses in his teaching ‗Attaining Enlightenment‘.413  
For instance, he cites Nagarjuna‘s Aspiration to Enlightenment where it says: ‗If 
seeking after the Buddha Wisdom, a man penetrates into the enlightened mind 
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(bodhicitta), he will quickly realize great Buddhahood in the very body given him by 
his parents.‘414  
 
The link between the idea of cultivation and the body is brought out more clearly in 
the third line of the summary verse in ‗Attaining Enlightenment‘:  ‗When the grace 
of the three mysteries is retained, [our inborn three mysteries will] quickly be 
manifested.‘415 Having previously explored the idea of kaji here I want simply to 
highlight the link with cultivation. While grace originally expressed the Buddha‘s 
protection, a kind of mysterious power, Kūkai seems to say that this is not enough. 
One must by cultivation reach the state where one can receive or realise this power. 
What this ultimately means is that one can recognise the world as it truly is—the 
vision of the world hidden beneath the everyday experience—when one has been 
engaged in cultivation practices. Kūkai is clear here in suggesting that it is the body 
—which is the vehicle of the cultivation practices— rather than the mind that takes 
precedence. As Yuasa points out ‗cultivation corrects the mind‘s mode of being by 
first placing the body into a ―Form,‖ enabling the mind to be directed towards the 
base of the body‘ and so ‗disclose the body‘s invisible ground—the ‗location‘ where 
the world in its true state, is visible.
416
 In other words, the mind or consciousness in 
the ordinary way of being regulates the activities of the body. Now this order is 
reversed. 
 
An important aspect of cultivation and its relation to the bodymind concerns the 
notion of eros. Eros can be taken to represent the various delusions that come under 
the concept of kleśa. Specifically, Kūkai sees cultivation as an inwardly oriented 
practice that enables the practitioner to ‗break through the darkness of kleśa 
symbolized by eros.‘ Simultaneously, ‗a light radiates from beyond this darkness, 
and the cosmic energy issuing from the metaphysical dimension flows into the self 
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and fills it.‘ 417 Eros however can be seen as a paradox, a source of delusion but also 
an aid. Thus it is not a case of suppressing eros but of sublimating, and so eros can 
also guide the cultivator to the Buddha world.
418
   
 
Eriugena on the other hand has emphasised mind over body. Yet his theory of the 
body offers an interesting kind of paradox. He held that the body emerged from 
incorporeal qualities which the soul, by thinking them and synthesizing them, creates 
into a body for itself. If this is how Eriugena saw the body is it just an illusion? This 
responds to the ontological question: what is the nature of the body and of the body 
soul complex? In a sense Kūkai does not engage with questions regarding the nature 
of things to the same degree; as with East Asian thinking he is responding more 
particularly to questions of how the body functions and how body and soul relate to 
each other. To that degree we can also approach this question with regard to 
Eriugena, since implied in Eriugena‘s notion of the body being the result of 
incorporeal qualities can be understood an opportunity to come to 
salvation/enlightenment. The question therefore I address is how the body functions 
in the process of reaching enlightenment or coming to salvation for Eriugena and for 
Kūkai. 
 
Ultimately Eriugena argues for the idea that the mind creates the body and indeed the 
entire sensible universe as a mode of self-expression. He does this by mirroring it 
with the idea of the divine creating the world to manifest itself as found in the 
Doctrine of the Trinity. He also positions this notion of the body as the creation of 
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the mind in the context of the Christian Doctrine of the Fall which suggests a certain 
ambiguity about the material world. However, it ultimately allows for a positive 
view of the body and materiality generally as the means by which humans return to 
God.  
 
Firstly, then in terms of the trinity the super essential divinity becomes its own cause 
in the first person (the Father) and creates itself in the Word (the primordial causes), 
and these causes, which are in an undifferentiated mode in the Word are distributed 
or broken up into a multiplicity of effects via the role of the Spirit. In a commentary 
on the opening lines of the Book of Genesis and the role of the Spirit Eriugena says 
‗For what is to be understood by the Spirit of God fermenting, fertilizing (and) 
nourishing the waters of the primordial causes except the distribution and ordering of 
those things which in the Word are made simply, as of one form and one (substance), 
into the differences of all the genera (and) species, and wholes [and] parts and 
individuals?‘419 In that sense from the perspective of causality ‗the Trinity 
exteriorizes itself in the multiplicity of individual effects.‘420  Eriugena compares this 
causal understanding of the Trinity with what he terms the human trinity of intellect, 
reason and sense: ‗For the likeness of the Father shines forth most clearly in the 
intellect, that of the Son in the reason, that of the Holy Spirit in the sense.‘ These are 
for Eriugena the three movements of the soul. In that context Eriugena goes on to say 
[in the person of the Alumnus]:  
We do not doubt but that the trinity of our nature, which is not the image of 
God but is made in the image of God,…is not only created out of nothing but 
also creates the senses which are subjoined to it, and the instruments of the 
senses and the whole of its body—I mean this mortal (body)… For, by the 
action of the soul, which cements together the incorporeal qualities [and] 
takes [from quantity] as it were a kind of substrate [for these qualities] and 
places it under (them) it creates for itself a body in which she may openly 
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display her hidden actions (which) in themselves (are) invisible, and bring 
(them) forth into sensible knowledge.
421
 
 
Just as the divine creates the phenomenal world as the means of expressing the 
divine essence, so it would seem the soul creates the body as a means of expressing 
its inner reality. However, Eriugena talks about the mortal body in the context of 
original sin and the notion of the Fall, suggesting that it is the result of sin. At first 
glance this idea indicates a certain ambiguity around the notion of body and the 
material world generally. However, it might be better described in a dialectical sense 
rather than an ambiguous sense as a passage from the fourth book illustrates where a 
wise and foolish person, upon being offered a vessel of pure gold, are affected very 
differently and subsequently respond differently: ‗The wise man by a simply mental 
process entirely refers its beauty, the phantasia of which he ponders within himself, 
to the glory of the Creator of natures.‘ He is not enticed by its beauty and adversely 
affected. On the other hand the greedy person, on absorbing the phantasia of the 
vessel, ‗blazes with the fire of cupidity‘ is consumed, poisoned and dies.422 In that 
way we can understand this as Eriugena ultimately allowing human beings the 
choice to respond to the reality as we find it.  
 
These notions are built upon Eriugena‘s understanding of sin as a turning in on 
oneself and away from others or the ‗Other‘. Rosemann translates Eriugena‘s 
expression ‗ad se ipsum conuersus‘ as suggesting that sin can be understood as 
‗excessive self-reflexivity‘.423 As Rosemann further points out, original sin is not a 
historical event but rather is a ‗structure deeply inscribed in human existence, 
although not in human nature as such.‘424 The primary consequence of this turning in 
on oneself is the creation of the material body. Eriugena claims that human nature 
would have been free of the limitations of ‗the animal, earthly, and corruptible body‘ 
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if it had not sinned. These were added to human nature as external to it at the time of 
its creation on account of its sin.
425
 Metaphysically Eriugena understands the impact 
of sin and the Fall as resulting in the loss of the unity of human nature. Not only 
human nature but all of nature loses its simplicity or unity, however, as a result of 
the Fall. In other words the essences of everything ‗descend‘ into the multiplicity and 
transitory sense of the material effects.
426
  
 
In order to see how the material reality offers both possibility and danger we need to 
ask why it is that the Fall results in the creation of physicality. We can understand 
sin – the excessive self-reflexivity — as a closing of one‘s eyes to one‘s true nature 
as a creature. This sense is returned via the material body which is what enables the 
human to turn back to its Creator.  In that sense the material world is both blessing 
and curse, possessing ‗a twofold ambiguous character, being at once a temptation 
and a sign‘. The attractions of the world can cast a spell on the human being to the 
point where he or she forgets his or her creaturely status. For Eriugena human nature 
is ultimately an idea in the mind of God, whose essence is unfathomable. On the 
other hand we can see through the material appearances and realise the depth 
dimension of all reality. Thus the material world —including our mortal bodies—
just is: we have a choice as to how we may respond to it. This can be about seeing it 
as the means of a return to God—seeing it as a theophanic expression—or engaging 
with it as the occasion of sin. Ecologically speaking this raises the issue of 
enoughness. 
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While nowhere in Eriugena‘s Periphyseon do we get direct evidence of engaging in 
any form of practices that would lead to deeper insights into the nature of reality, 
Eriugena does talk of theoria—the intellectual contemplation of reality—as a means 
to the ultimate goal of union with the divine. Extrapolating from his Neoplatonic 
outlook and his mystical background, we could perhaps speculate with a degree of 
safety that he would have engaged in some form of meditative practices leading to 
the kind of insight suggested by the Latin contemplation or the Greek theoria. As B. 
Alan Wallace points out, both these terms concern ‗a total devotion to revealing, 
clarifying, and making manifest the nature of reality.‘ While the concept of 
contemplation for us today means thinking about something, its original meaning 
had to do with directly perceiving reality: it was ‗an experiential means for gaining 
direct, contemplative insight into the nature of reality.‘  
 
However such insight was not achieved via the senses or even by thinking, but by 
mental perception, which is the direct observation of one‘s thoughts and action.427 
This focus on awareness of oneself however does not occur in a vacuum: since one is 
in constant relation with one‘s environment, then awareness of self necessarily 
involves awareness of the various relations one is engaged in at any given moment. 
Contemplation was aided by the process of meditation, which involved a training of 
the mind to cultivate an understanding of reality. Alfred Siewers refers to this as a 
process of experiential mindfulness,
428
 which can be understood as a means of 
preparing oneself to see reality in a certain way (as divine manifestation).  
 
Nishitani alludes to this notion of seeing reality in a particular way in his discussion 
of his conception of religion, which he defines as ‗the real self-awareness of 
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reality.‘429 By this notion he means the simultaneous acts of ‗our becoming aware of 
reality‘ and ‗reality realising itself in our awareness‘. Our ability to perceive reality 
implies reality comes to actuality in us. This is not a theoretical knowledge, he notes, 
but a real appropriation that embraces the whole of the person—mind and body. 
Such an appropriation is what gives us our essential determination—makes us truly 
real. Thus ‗[t]he real perception of reality is our real mode of being itself and 
constitutes the realness that is the true reality of our existence….the self-realisation 
of reality can only take place by causing our existence to become truly real.‘  
 
Nishitani goes on to explore what can be meant by reality, noting that there are 
multiple realities depending on the standpoint of the viewer. The ‗real‘ that he 
wishes to expound upon (and the one that both Kūkai and Eriugena are concerned 
about with regard to the true nature of reality) is altogether different from the 
everyday standpoint or the natural science standpoint. He comes to explore this 
having first introduced death and nihility, pointing out that all life and existence 
come to seem as unreal in the face of these notions.  Quoting a passage from 
Dostoevsky‘s The House of the Dead where the author—who is in prison at that 
point—is, as part of his prison duty, carrying bricks by the bank of a river when he is 
suddenly so awestruck by the ordinary scene around him that he later describes it as 
the only spot from which he sees ‗God‘s world‘ and is able to forget his ‗wretched 
self.‘ While the things the author focuses on, are ordinary everyday sights—a woman 
tending sheep, a poor hut, a bird in flight—the ‗intense concentration‘ with which he 
focuses on them is no ordinary occurrence nor is it the result of scientific or 
philosophical speculation. Nishitani comments that:  
Things that we are accustomed to speak of as real forced their reality upon 
him [Dostoevsky] in a completely different dimension. He saw the same real 
things we all see, but the significance of their realness and the sense of the 
real in them are something altogether qualitatively different. Thus was he 
able to forget his wretched self and to open his eyes to "God's world."  
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While this ‗remarkable sensibility‘ may have been connected to the deprivation of 
freedom resulting from prison life, Nishitani argues that acquiring such sensibility is 
within the remit of each of us.
430
 
 
Both Eriugena and Kūkai seem to suggest this kind of experience of the real when 
they talk of theophany and of the Dharmakāya expounding the Dharma. It is the 
sacred reality, the most real, reality. Where they differ however, is also clear: In 
Eriugena there is a much greater focus on a kind of conceptual understanding than on 
the more holistically bodymind orientation that is emphasised by Kūkai. In fact, 
Kūkai is adamant that conceptual understanding alone does not suffice in one‘s 
efforts to reach enlightenment. As Yasuo Yuasa points out ‗Kūkai insisted that the 
substance of religion should be understood not through letter and doctrine 
intellectually, but through religious experiences…in man‘s soul.‘431 One requires a 
more integrated kind of engagement with reality. Hence Kūkai stresses the three 
aspects of body, mind, and speech, and, as many commentators suggest, the 
emphasis is on an embodied engagement.  
 
C. The human within the context of the world/universe: 
Eriugena gives the human a pivotal position in his overall scheme, highlighting the 
imago Dei aspect of human being as found in the Genesis story. Because of that, and 
to glean a more complete understanding of Eriugena‘s notion of humanity, there is 
great need to emphasise his efforts to embed the human in the wider context of 
natura. Otten emphasises this point when she says that studying the human being 
within the overall framework of the Periphyseon, ‗one will find that man cannot be 
isolated as a creature of independent status‘, but ‗functions as a vital and integrated 
part of the whole complex of natura.‘432  
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There is, then, a dual understanding of human nature in Eriugena‘s system: on the 
one hand he emphasises its universality or mirroring of all things and, on the other, 
its uniqueness or exclusive link with the divine. Through the use of his dialectic 
method Eriugena here highlights the presence of what are seen to be two 
contradictory aspects of human nature: The human is animal and not animal, 
spiritual and not spiritual, and in this regard mirrors the divine nature.
433
 The human 
belongs to the corporeal world of the animal and to the spiritual realm of the divine. 
  
In Book IV Eriugena defines humanity as ‗a certain intellectual concept formed 
eternally in the divine mind‘.434 Even though this definition suggests a link with the 
intellect or non-corporeal, because all things are ideas in the divine mind, such a 
definition instead emphasises humanity‘s link with the rest of reality. This, in turn, 
suggests a view of the human as a microcosm of the universe. While Eriugena 
endorses this link, he rejects the idea of the human as a microcosm since it does not 
adequately account for its uniqueness. Instead, quoting Gregory of Nyssa, he opts for 
a definition that offers the possibility of uniqueness: ‗the greatness of man lies not in 
his likeness to the created world but in the fact that he is created according to the 
image of the Creator of nature.‘435 This strong sense of the human as imago Dei 
tends to give an initial impression of separating the human from the rest of created 
being (as it certainly does) and in the process we can see how it might devalue the 
rest of reality—a point, as we have seen, raised with regard to Christianity by many 
writers concerned with ecological issues. Yet, when we recall Eriugena‘s emphasis 
on the ‗One‘ that characterises his Neoplatonic inheritance, we can understand that 
there is ultimately no separation or division in reality, even while certain aspects 
appear to be valued more highly than others. 
 
Eriugena speaks of a mediator role for human nature, describing it as the ‗workshop 
of all things.‘ He declares that the human ‗by a certain and intelligible division…is 
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divided into two parts, in one of which he is created in the image and likeness of the 
Creator, and participates in no animality…while in the other he communicates with 
the animal nature and was produced out of the earth...‘436 Thus, human nature 
contains elements from the corporeal and intelligible worlds. While much is made of 
human nature‘s mirroring of divine nature, as part of that mirroring the human also 
mirrors all other created things. In that regard it is through the human that all else 
unfolds and returns to the One.
437
 Human nature is ‗wholly in the wholeness of the 
whole created nature, seeing that in it every creature is fashioned, and in it all are 
linked together, and into it all shall return, and through it must all be saved.‘438  
 
Such a singularly exalted role for the human person— one that distinguishes him/her 
in such a unique way—is not to be found in Kūkai. This may be because the notion 
of interpenetration found in his system does not have any kind of ultimate future-
oriented goal or teleology (apart from the focus on attaining enlightenment). Thus, 
there is no need for a role such as that played by the human in Eriugena‘s scheme—
where it is through human nature that all other created nature unfolds and returns to 
the One. The primary emphasis in Kūkai‘s anthropology is to see humans as part of 
the whole of reality: a reality that is the Buddha Dainichi perpetually expressing 
himself for his own enjoyment. In that regard, Kūkai develops a whole-part theory of 
human nature where the human is integral to the whole. Humans are part of the 
phenomenal world which itself expresses ultimate reality in its fullness (unlike 
Eriugena where all is created/unfolded and gathered back into the supreme principle 
through the human being.) When, then, humans speak in a true manner they are not 
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just referring to reality, but they are ‗reality‘ expressing itself. They, like all 
phenomena, are the self-expression of reality.  
 
Such a position, Kasulis notes, ‗undermines any philosophical tendencies towards 
idealism‘ in Kūkai‘s thought.439 This is in contrast to how Eriugena has been 
interpreted as a forerunner of idealism. It also highlights the lack of any hint of a 
mind-body dualism in Kūkai that one might get from the complex system found in 
Eriugena with regard to the two aspects of human nature (even though Eriugena is 
adamant that the human is a whole entity). Instead Kūkai develops the idea of 
bodymind which does not in any way divide human nature but instead exemplifies a 
radical nonduality.  
 
Rather than speaking about the human person in terms of his/her role in the natural 
world Kūkai focuses on developing an understanding of the development of human 
consciousness.  He thereby offers a unique understanding of the human person 
through The Ten stages of the development of the Mind and its shorter version The 
Precious Key to the Secret Treasury.
440
 Kūkai outlines ten stages in the progress of 
the human person towards enlightenment (considered to be a masterpiece in 
philosophical and religious thinking), which for him is adherence to Shingon theory 
and practice. Thus, the stages range from the ‗goatish mind of lowly people, filled 
with desire‘, through various levels of enlightenment that include other religious 
expressions and the various exoteric Buddhist forms, to the final stage where the 
practitioner enters the Adamantine ground and the ‗secret treasures are at once 
manifested and one realises all values.‘441 Thus within the triad of divine-human-
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cosmic relations Eriugena emphasises the mediating role of the human, while Kūkai 
is more concerned with an evolutionary understanding of the person.  
 
The dynamic interplay of this triadic structure as found in the philosophies of 
Eriugena and Kūkai have much to offer contemporary current religious discourse on 
ecological issues.  Their emphasis on the oneness of reality with its inherent sense of 
mystery allows for a view of the world as being sacramental in the deepest and 
broadest sense of that word. We can perhaps reinterpret Eriugena‘s insertion of the 
human (and his/her relationships with the divine) within the broader context of 
natura as an example of a kind of cosmic creation story that contemporary Christian 
thought needs to re-imagine for itself. Kūkai‘s sense of the world as Dainichi 
expressing himself for his own enjoyment allows us to view nature just as it is. We 
are drawn out into the world and there to meet the really real, what Nishitani calls 
true religion. The particular focus of Kūkai on integrating theory and praxis 
alongside Eriugena‘s notion of contemplation or theoria allows for a rich and total 
engagement with the world as a whole.  
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Chapter 4: Ecological Connections 
 
I. A Twofold approach 
Two related approaches will focus the discussion of linking the dialogue to 
ecologically oriented understandings of more contemporary thought. What is being 
argued is that such thought reflects notions of reality similar to the two medieval 
thinkers.  The first approach considers the overall nature of reality as it emerges in 
Kūkai and Eriugena, and how that might contribute to an ecological ethic relevant 
for our times. By ethical here I mean the more holistic notion that is implied in the 
Greek term ethos. Initially ethos meant a kind of place or abode and only later did it 
come to mean custom or habit. Thus the scope of the word extended beyond ethics 
narrowly understood to include, in the expression of Mark Manolopoulos, ‗our 
inhabitation in creation.‘442 The concept of ethos engages all of human existence and 
not just particular actions. This distinction is reflected also in. Cooper and James 
argue that there has been a revival in this form of ethics, suggesting that 
contemporary understandings of virtue ethics reflects a form that was central to 
ancient and medieval Christian ethical discussion.
443
  
 
Moreover this distinction brings to mind Eriugena‘s notion of sin and disobedience 
in his interpretation of the Christian story of the Fall and expulsion from Eden. For 
him lack of obedience had to do with a lack of wonder and listening to the larger 
Divine Nature, the larger Whole.
444
 In reflecting on East-Asian philosophical and 
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religious traditions (especially Confucianism and Buddhism) within the context of 
human induced global climate change, Graham Parkes argues that driving the 
‗current insanity‘ is a ‗lack of awe and humility in the face of the wonders of the 
world.‘445 Ultimately, what is at issue is the cultivation of a way of living, and in the 
initial inquiry in this chapter the exploration is about a view of reality that would 
lead to an attitude of respect and reverence for the whole of the phenomenal world. 
 
Such a view of reality is to be found in the philosophical systems of Eriugena and 
Kūkai: for Kūkai the phenomenal world is the cosmic Buddha, Dainichi Nyorai, and 
for Eriugena it is the manifestation of the Divine.  This suggests that both their 
cosmological understandings indicate a sense of the numinous at the heart of all 
things. The phenomenal world is by no means an inert objective reality, as instanced 
by Eriugena‘s positing of the notion of creation as manifesting the hidden 
transcendent realm. While Kūkai‘s religious philosophy does not endorse any kind 
of absolute transcendence, his immanental approach to reality allows for a certain 
equivocation or tension in his understanding of reality, which in turn suggests the 
numinous in all things. These ideas, with their intimations of mystery, can also be 
understood in more secular terms as highlighting a sense of ‗otherness‘ or alterity in 
reality. It is abundantly clear however in both Eriugena and Kūkai that such alterity 
needs to be understood in the context of the overriding notion of the interrelatedness 
of all things. The primary emphasis must remain the unity and oneness of reality. 
The entire dissertation is built on the notion of this unity as a central focus in the 
lesser known streams of thought found in the mainstream traditions that I am 
exploring. The notion of alterity explored then is understood to be firmly within this 
overall unity. In a sense what I am talking about can best be described using the 
image of a matrix. 
 
At the same time recognising this understanding of alterity offers the possibility of a 
more respectful attitude towards the world of nature since it emphasises the depth 
dimension in all things, and in the process it deemphasises nature as object and 
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resource for human use. In that way it offers a possible basis for an ecological ethic. 
Such an understanding has possible parallels in more contemporary philosophical 
literature, particularly in phenomenology.
446
 In order to explore this notion more 
fully, I draw on such thought in phenomenology as ecological interpretations of the 
later writings of Merleau-Ponty. In particular I explore how Toadvine interprets 
ideas in Merleau-Ponty that focus on what I have been referring to as the depth-
dimension of reality. More specifically Toadvine looks at Merleau-Ponty‘s use of the 
concept il y a. I suggest that there are parallels here with the numinous in all things. 
Moreover, my contention is that these ideas are also reflected in the understandings 
of givenness and gift found in the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion.  Such 
notions, with their religious overtones are, I argue, appropriate in the context of 
exploring religious contributions to responding to the ecological crisis. 
 
Secondly, I focus more particularly on the notion of subjectivity in relation to the 
human person.  By this I mean an understanding of the human as the one who 
perceives and ultimately engages with the world it inhabits.  What does it mean to 
talk of the human person in this way? What does subjectivity mean? There is 
considerable emphasis on the role of the human subject in Eriugena, in fact the 
human person is considered central to his philosophical system. There is a sense in 
which his entire notion of natura is presented as the speculation of the human mind, 
and within that view of reality he emphasises the human role of mediation—the 
human person is the one through whom all things return to the One. At the same 
time, the human person‘s sense of himself or herself is as one who belongs within 
the larger context of natura. This is the ultimate framework for all aspects of reality.  
Moreover, in terms of achieving salvation or reaching enlightenment—what can be 
described in more general terms as coming to know reality as it really is—the human 
plays an active role in its own recognition of reality as theophanic expression. In 
participating in theophany the human person realises himself or herself. Kūkai‘s 
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philosophy, on the other hand, with its whole-part theory of human nature and its 
notion of the human as a microcosmic expression of the whole, suggests a clearly 
integrated sense of the human subject. At the same time, Kūkai also endorses a 
strongly positive sense of the human as agent, highlighted particularly in his belief in 
the human capacity to reach enlightenment, an understanding that gives to the human 
subject a certain level of autonomy. 
 
In neither Eriugena‘s nor Kūkai‘s case are we talking of understanding the human 
person in terms of the autonomous subject of modernity, where no cognisance is 
taken of the wider reality or of relationality being an integral aspect of human 
identity. Nor is it a case of the human disappearing into a kind of monistic oneness, 
without any sense of individuality and any role in achieving its own enlightenment. 
My suggestion is that echoes of the tension between the human as subject and as part 
of the larger reality found in both Eriugena and Kūkai, and expressed especially in 
its role of coming to an enlightened view of reality, are also to be found in 
contemporary phenomenological understandings of the notion of the subject. These 
understandings in turn provide a basis for cultivating a more ecological attitude in 
the human person with regard to the phenomenal world. In exploring a link with 
contemporary understandings I engage particularly in a critical appraisal of the 
notion of the human subject as found in Marion‘s phenomenology of givenness.  
 
II. Some preliminary issues 
Before turning to the specific issues in question it is necessary to make a very brief 
inquiry into what has been termed tournant théologique —‗the theological turn‘— in 
French phenomenology.
447
 This turn concerns the emergence of a ‗third form of 
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phenomenology‘ distinguishable from ‗Husserl‘s transcendental inquiry and from 
Heidegger‘s hermeneutic thinking.‘448  Such an inquiry provides the basis for my 
exploration, since this ‗turn‘ takes account of the ‗impossible‘ —understood as that 
which lays outside direct human experience —as well as the possible in terms of 
human experience. Secondly, because I draw on Marion‘s philosophical 
understanding in exploring both my approaches to making ecological connections 
(the nature of reality and the notion of subjectivity), it is helpful to outline his 
phenomenological method. This involves an understanding of his notion of 
givenness and his concept of the gift.
449
 I begin with the turn in French 
phenomenology. 
 
A. A turn in phenomenology 
In a recent article Laszlo Tengelyi outlines the emergence of new forms of 
phenomenology in the 1960s, in response to a realization by a number of 
phenomenologists (including the later Merleau-Ponty and Marion) that certain 
special phenomena, such as the face, symbol, flesh, and life, resisted the more 
traditional phenomenological methods and techniques.
450
 While these phenomena 
                                                                                                                                                                    
others, however, take a more nuanced approach. Felix Ó‘Murchadha argues that the new 
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differ from each other in many respects they all have in common the fact that they 
are ‗indescribable, inapparent, deprived of phenomenalization.‘451 They seem to 
overflow the boundaries of their phenomenality. 
 
The question that needed to be addressed was: if phenomenology concerned itself 
with the possible in the sense of that which lends itself to experience, how ought one 
to deal with that which cannot be grasped by direct experience? It was not a case of 
leaving behind phenomena altogether, even if the phenomena these thinkers were 
interested in ‗showed the particularity of manifesting themselves only indirectly 
through traces and indications without appearing directly.‘ So, for instance, while 
‗the ―flesh‖ of the world‘ might remain invisible it is still ‗so to speak, the invisible 
of this world.‘  Moreover these thinkers came to realise that ultimately their concern 
was not just with special phenomena but with all phenomena—with ‗the 
phenomenon as such,‘ and how phenomenologically we approach all phenomena.452   
 
B. So much reduction, so much givenness  
While Marion describes special phenomena as saturated phenomena, he also argues 
for the notion of excess in all phenomena, and in that sense is concerned with the 
phenomenological project as such. In Reduction and Givenness, he simply asserts his 
claim that ‗a reduction to givenness means that all phenomena can be given in 
themselves and as themselves because such a reduction has an original ‗absence of 
conditions and determinations.‘453 The conditions and determinations refer to the 
emphasis on objectivity and on the autonomy of the subject that he claims to find, to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
with the following figures as representative of each: the event, the painting, the flesh, the face and 
finally revelation.  In describing them he follows and then inverts the Kantian categories. Thus he 
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different degrees, in both Husserl‘s and Heidegger‘s phenomenological methods.  It 
is in Being Given that he develops his particular method.  
Marion‘s claim is that in order to remain true to the phenomenological enterprise one 
must engage a third reduction or new principle, which he sums up as ―so much 
reduction, so much givenness.‖454  The English term ‗givenness‘ translates the 
French donation and the German Gegebenheit. Marion here is pushing beyond the 
emphasis on the subject that is associated with modernity, which had the effect of 
either emphasising the objectivity of objects as in Husserl or the Being of beings as 
in Heidegger. In other words, he pushes through the horizons of consciousness and 
of being to reach what lies at their base: givenness itself, the fact that of every 
phenomenon whatever, the first thing that must be said is that it is ―given‖. The 
fundamental structure of the world for Marion then is one of pure givenness.
455
  To 
emphasise his position of pure givenness and a corresponding non-constituting 
subject he posits the notion of saturated phenomena. These are phenomena that are 
so saturated with intention that they cannot be limited or grasped by the constituting 
subject.
456
 However he claims that the characteristics of saturated phenomena are 
also the characteristics of all phenomena—so in a sense all phenomena can be 
understood as saturated.    
 
                                                          
454
 Thomas Carlson translates this as ‗as much reduction, as much givenness. See In Excess, p. x for 
his reason. It underlines the proportionality of the formula. 
455
 It is interesting to note here that Marion‘s more theological ideas emerged in conjunction with his 
philosophy, and also that they reflect the apophatic tradition. While Marion wishes to maintain a 
distinction between his philosophy and his theology, Johannes Zachhuber notes some structural 
parallels between the two. ‗Just as the positive truth about reality is revealed to phenomenological 
research only as the result of a process seemingly designed to reduce to immanence all outward layers 
of transcendence,‘ Zachhuber notes, ‗so the theological truth of God as love becomes manifest only 
after the complete destruction of his idolatrous representations.‘ A primary consequence of this is that 
‗the radical otherness of God is revealed by careful attention to reality as it is—not by turning away 
from it.‘ This also reflects Eriugena‘s approach to ultimate reality. See J. Zachhuber ‗Jean-Luc 
Marion and the Tradition of Negative Theology‘, Online. Available HTTP:      < 
http://www.academia.edu/3074278/Jean-Luc_Marion_and_the_Tradition_of_Negative_Theology> 
(accessed 20 August 2013) 
456
 These are chosen in relation to Kant‘s conditions of possibility. What Marion wants to show is that 
each saturated phenomenon in its own way exceeds these conditions of possibility. Thus the event is... 
etc. They are outlined in both Being Given and in In Excess. 
175 
 
In turning to the notion of the gift he asks: ‗how are we to think givenness in such a 
way that it accomplishes the pure appearing of the phenomenon arising in person on 
the basis of nothing other than itself?‘ The way to do this is to introduce an 
understanding of givenness such that it ‗determines all the primal phenomenological 
acts, and first of all the reduction.‘ His claim is that such a new model of givenness 
will come from the gift.
457
 Marion wishes to criticise ‗the standard model of gift‘ 
which he claims ‗eliminates the gift.‘ This, in effect, boils down to a ‗question of 
overcoming‘ two models—‗the causal interpretation of givenness and the economic 
interpretation of gift‘—which are one for Marion.458  Gift within the metaphysical 
system is considered within ‗the system of gifts exchanged‘, and in that system 
givenness is understood in terms of a giver, the gift given and a givee.
459
 Contrary to 
Derrida, from whose work in this regard he draws heavily, Marion concludes that 
there is another line of argument that would allow for the gift not losing itself.
 460
 
While Derrida sees the gift as impossible and ultimately never attainable, Marion 
concludes that we can see the notion of gift as an impossible possibility.
461
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Derrida‘s problem was that the gift in appearing would lose any notion of givenness: 
if the gift appears as gift, as present, and is recognised as such, then it no longer is 
gift.
462
 Marion‘s argument however is that ‗losing presence‘ (i.e. avoiding being 
frozen in present objectness) does not mean the gift loses itself. It simply loses ‗what 
is not suited to it.‘463 He therefore holds that a gift could have conditions of 
possibility other than those of its impossibility. The ultimate condition of its 
possibility, for Marion, is the gift‘s givenness. Thinking the gift in this way will 
mean that exchange and return will no longer be seen as its truth, and in this regard 
he quotes Aquinas as saying: ‗A gift... is literally giving that can have no return, i.e. 
it is not given with the intention of being repaid.‘464  What Marion effectively is 
doing here is releasing the gift from any sense of connection with exchange, and in 
the process he wishes to reduce the understanding of gift to givenness and 
subsequently givenness to itself.
465
 Moreover, with the focus on the givenness of 
phenomena, intuition is emphasised over intention. The world is given rather than 
constituted by the subject to the point where the subject is now understood as the 
adonné, and actually receives itself in the appearing of the phenomena. Marion‘s 
claim then would suggest a notion of subjectivity that is very much reduced, an 
understanding that I shall, presently, critically appraise. 
 
III. The invisible in the visible: A basis for an ecological response  
Studies in more recent decades, in adapting the new turn in phenomenology, have 
resulted in an ecological form of phenomenology that can provide a more adequate 
environmental ethic, and that reflect aspects of our dialogue. This is particularly the 
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case in some ecologically focused adaptations of the later writings of Merleau-Ponty. 
For instance, Ted Toadvine describes as ‗wrongheaded ‘an environmental ethic that 
is built on a kinship model between humans and nature and which emphasises the 
intrinsic value of everything.
466
 In this trend there is an insistence on placing the 
human subject within a continuum of value that begins with the ecosystem or natural 
organism. Toadvine and the field of ecophenomenology are not alone in this 
criticism. Others, from vastly different fields, also point out the unviability of the 
notion of intrinsic value as a basis for ethics. For example, working in the area of 
Neoplatonism and environmental concerns, the philosopher David Lea argues that 
deep ecology with its emphasis on intrinsic value is somewhat misguided and 
unworkable. He points out that praxis grounded in such value ‗is in itself insufficient 
for one cannot consistently act in such a way as to preserve all perceived intrinsically 
valuable states of affairs.‘ One may have to undermine the ecosystem in order to 
protect all non-human animals or, conversely, the protection of the overall system 
may demand the destruction of individual animals.
467
 
 
Toadvine claims that the focus on intrinsic value (found in both environmental 
philosophy and more recently in phenomenology) emerges from a worldview that is 
based on a dialectical understanding of culture and nature, where the culturalization 
of nature and the naturalization of culture are modes of expression. His argument is 
that we must move away from this kind of dialectical worldview, and that such a 
continuum of value is not possible because of the ‗impossibility of reducing [nature] 
to the homogeneous, the continuous, the predictable, the perceivable, the 
thematizable.‘  While not denying the importance of traditional ethical inquiry and 
practical activism, he suggests that nature‘s value (if, of course, value is the right 
word) and a possible ethic should be based on something outside this dialectical 
system: on what he terms a ‗phenomenology of the impossible.‘  This he describes 
as:  
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An attentiveness to the resistance of what cannot be thought or perceived, to 
the opacity of a wild being that circumscribes our concepts and percepts. It is 
at the margins of our experience, in the desirous response of our flesh to the 
Il y a, that we are confronted with a wildness with which we can never come 
face to face.
468
 
Here Toadvine is building on the phenomenology developed by Merleau-Ponty in 
his later works.
469
 While Merleau-Ponty‘s phenomenological focus in all his writings 
concerned mediation between the self and the world, in his earlier works this 
―coition‖ was understood to be a union of complementarity where he often spoke of 
a kinship with all things.  However, Toadvine draws attention to another tendency 
that is present in all his writings, but is thematically expressed only in his later 
works.
470
  This is a tendency that ‗finds a certain invisibility at the heart of the 
visible, namely the blind spot of phenomenology‘ for which Merleau-Ponty 
appropriates the phrase Il y a —the ―there is.‖  Merleau-Ponty is not here talking 
about something added on: ‗It must not be imagined that I add to the visible perfectly 
defined as in Itself a non-visible...one has to understand that it is the visibility itself 
that involves a non-visibility.‘471  
 
Toadvine describes Merleau-Ponty‘s usage of the term as ‗the invisible that cannot, 
in principle, be brought within the sphere of the visible.‘ It is ‗in excess of 
perception‘, not in the sense of some kind of absolute other but as ‗the other side of 
the perceivable and thinkable.‘ 472 Elsewhere Merleau-Ponty equates the il y a —this 
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more primordial reality—with his notion of la chair —the flesh—or simply with 
nature. What is obvious is that it is not nature understood as a complex set of objects 
and processes but as ‗the biosphere as it is experienced and lived from within by the 
intelligent body — by the attentive human animal who is entirely a part of the world 
that he, or she, experiences.‘473 I contend however, in keeping with Toadvine, that 
this is not all that is being intimated in Merleau-Ponty‘s use of il y a and its equating 
with la chair and Nature.  Toadvine describes it as ‗a ―wild‖ or ―brute‖ being,‘ a 
kind of alterity, ‗being as it shows itself in the impossible limit experience.‘ In all of 
this, while the language may be completely different, there are here intimations of 
the grand scheme of natura as envisioned by Eriugena. 
 
This sense of excess concurs with the sentiments of the environmentalist and 
philosopher Holmes Rolston III in his suggestion that ‗[w]e take ourselves to nature 
and listen for its forms of expression, drawn by a realm of values not of our 
construction. We ought not destroy this integrity but rather preserve and contemplate 
it.‘ For Rolston such an experience of nature is aesthetic and ‗one that leads toward 
religious experience.‘474 It is not so much our kinship with nature that is emphasised 
(in the sense of an ontological continuum—though this is not denied) as the basis for 
an ecological ethic; rather it is nature‘s uniqueness, its otherness. It is an 
understanding of nature that suggests a world that conceals as much as it reveals. It is 
this kind of reality—a view that allows for a sense of mystery at the heart of 
reality— we have heard expressed in both Eriugena‘s and Kūkai‘s philosophies. This 
is not to be understood as a ‗something‘ beyond reality or enclosed within it in any 
dualist sense, but at its heart in a totally integrated sense. It is the ‗in excess of 
perception‘, this sense of ‗something more‘ —a ‗something more‘ that is completely 
integrated—that provides the basis for the truly real, phenomenologically 
understood. It is the recognition that the phenomenal world in its most real state is 
not completely knowable. Not only phenomenologically but also from the 
enlightened perspective, as is expressed in Kūkai and Eriugena, the world is 
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understood as having a depth that exceeds the ordinary view of reality. So, while 
Toadvine is not operating in any kind of religious domain, it is possible to note a 
similarity in his claims with the kind of numinous perspectives on reality offered us 
by Eriugena and Kūkai.   
 
Similar echoes can be found in Marion‘s phenomenology of givenness. Firstly, in 
terms of his radical reduction to sheer givenness as the ‗ultimate reality‘  we have a 
culmination in what Jack Caputo describes as ‗an event of bedazzling overflow ... 
which opens up a field or horizon where being and objectivity have no sway.‘475 For 
Marion it is givenness, rather than Being, that is to be considered a more ultimate 
reality. Moreover, implicit in his notion that gift can be understood in terms of 
givenness is the primacy of process rather than of substance—the emphasis is on a 
very fluid sense of reality.  Here are similarities with Eriugena‘s notion of a dynamic 
relational notion of reality as well as the interpenetration and dependent co-arising of 
all things in Kūkai‘s schema.  Nature in process suggests a living vibrant reality not 
easily susceptible to the objectifying stance associated with ecological misuse.  
 
In this regard Mark Manolopoulos claims that in terms of religious discourse on 
ecological issues:   
[those] driven by the notion and phenomenon of givenness would be the most 
radical kind, for they would respect and cherish all things ―just because‖ they 
are here/there. I concur that perhaps an ultimate or ideal perception and 
reception of things-in-relation would move beyond a hermeneutics of gifting 
to generate an ecological comportment towards each pragma: Entities‘ sheer 
givenness would procure our respect.
476
 
While Marion is adamant that all gift is givenness, he is non-committal and quite 
equivocal with regard to the reverse understanding—every given is a gift.477  This 
may be because he does not wish to come across as having any kind of theological or 
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religious agenda. He repeatedly claims not to name or indicate any kind of giver for 
his idea of givenness. Whatever the reason for Marion‘s lack of clarity on the point 
of the giftedness of everything, there is a certain validity to the idea. At the very 
least, as Manolopoulos points out, it is useful to be open to the possibility of 
creation—the phenomenal world— being a gift.  He argues that seeing the world as 
gift is a powerful and ancient representation, one that has the ‗power to move 
us...and what we need today—with the urgency provoked by the ecological crisis—
are rhetorically powerful discourses...to change and modify the way we think and 
act.
478
  
 
IV. The responding human 
I now want to look more closely at the nature and role of human person within the 
context of what might constitute the most ‗ultimate reality‘ (what is most real or 
true). Firstly, concerning the nature of the human, I explore notions of subjectivity 
that have arisen with regard to Eriugena and Kūkai, and also in Marion‘s 
phenomenological method. I noted in the dialogue that there were similarities 
between Eriugena and Kūkai in relation to the concepts of theophany and kaji. 
Theophany, in terms of the human perceiver becoming enlightened (or from an 
ecological perspective cultivating an appropriate sensibility) comes about, in some 
sense, through the interplay of divine condescension and human response. Kaji, in 
Kūkai, is that which empowers the human person in the process of achieving 
enlightenment, but which also requires the engagement of the one wishing to be 
enlightened. My suggestion is that echoes of these notions can be found in a critical 
appraisal of Marion‘s conception of the subject. 479 In particular, I look at the 
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criticism offered by Shane Mackinlay and his suggestion of viewing the subject as an 
active receptor. 
 
Having explored the notion of the perceiving subject, I then turn to ways of viewing 
the role of such an active receptor, which might best reflect the notion of reality 
already expressed.  This will involve emphasising the cultivation of an attitude of 
respectful attentiveness towards the phenomenal world, one described by 
Manolopoulos as ‗a radically ecological sensibility or consciousness.‘480 Such work 
reflects, and adds to, the kind of work engaged in by a number of thinkers in the field 
of ecology and religion. It endeavours to engage streams within religious traditions 
with contemporary thinking and from an ecological angle. It mirrors for instance 
Primavesi‘s concept of ecological humility. Speaking with a theological emphasis 
Primavesi claims that embracing this kind of virtue requires of us humans an 
acceptance of ‗our place within the whole earth household rather than acting as if 
God had conferred ―most favoured species‖ status on us.‘ Engaging such an attitude 
brings us to the insight that we are not alone on this planet and, from a more 
specifically religious perspective (not withstanding our specific role and capabilities) 
we are not the only species that matters in the ultimate scheme of things.
481
  
Moreover it mirrors—in an ecological context—the type of humility reflected in the 
notion of learned ignorance found in the apophatic tradition. This term coined by 
Nicholas of Cusa suggests the awareness that while one can be erudite, true 
knowledge also involves coming to know just how ignorant I am of what still 
remains to be known. The apt phrase, ‗the more I know, the more I realise just what I 
do not know‘, sums up this idea. At a theological level Cusanus linked this idea to 
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Paul‘s idea in Corinthians: ―The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God.‖482 
Such ideas are also reflected in Eriugena‘s approach to knowledge of the divine 
essence.   
 
A. Reinterpreting subjectivity: 
  
i. The human as responding to call  
The idea of grace or empowerment expressed within the process of theophany and 
the concept of kaji find echoes in how Marion characterises the ‗giving‘ in his 
phenomenological understanding. This characterization is often expressed in terms 
of a call, prompting Thomas Carlson to refer to Marion‘s third reduction as 
‗fundamentally vocative.‘ In other words, Marion‘s reduction to unconditional 
givenness can be termed a ‗reduction to the unconditional givenness of the call.‘ 483 
He outlines four characteristics to this call and its impact on the receiver.
484
 These 
are worth mentioning here as they not only reinforce the notion of the giving nature 
of reality but also highlight Marion‘s understanding of the perceiving subject. 
 
Firstly, the call summons in the sense that the interloqué experiences a claim ‗so 
powerful and compelling that he must surrender to it.‘485 Secondly, this summons 
results in the interloqué being overwhelmed, taken over, or surprised. Thirdly, there 
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is an interlocution, but not in a dialogical way where ‗two speakers converse with 
each other in equal relation.‘ Rather, Marion likens this to being ‗assailed.‘ It is the 
receiving of ‗my self from the call that gives me to myself before giving me anything 
whatsoever.‘486 Finally, there is a facticity about the call.  It is an already given fact, 
a fait accompli.  Marion points out: ‗For not one of us mortals has ever lived, if only 
for an instant, without having received a call and being discovered interloqué by 
it.‘487 Relation precedes essence, and in fact the individual essence results from 
relation. In terms of the interloqué ‗there is a mutation of the I into the me.‘488 The 
autonomous constituting subject of modernity has been transmuted into the receptive 
me.  
 
ii. The human as manifesting givenness 
Conversely, much of Marion‘s analysis of the role of the subject also concerns the 
transformation that occurs when the given is manifested as a phenomenon, which 
suggests a more active role than the passive one referred to already. That is why I 
speak of the need for a critical appraisal of his interpretation of the subject. Yet, it is 
important to understand that he is not talking of a transformation of givenness in the 
sense of replacing givenness, but rather of accomplishing it. Givenness is transmuted 
into manifestation. There is an unfolding of the ‗fold of givenness‘, and so the 
transformation is understood as an unfolding of what is already there.
489
  The active 
role has again become somewhat passive. He notes: ‗The receiver in and through the 
receptivity of ―feeling,‖ transforms givenness into manifestation, or more exactly, he 
lets what gives itself through intuition show itself. In receiving what gives itself, he 
in turn gives it to show itself—he gives it form, its first form‖490 Marion‘s use of 
images, such as a filter or a prism, is helpful here.  The receiver acts like a filter or 
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prism ‗manifesting what presents (gives) itself, but which must still be introduced 
into the presence of the world (show itself).
491
  
 
There would seem to be a great deal of ambiguity in Marion‘s position regarding the 
notion of subjectivity.  In his efforts to remain loyal to Husserl‘s concern for the 
things themselves, he insists on the notion of a pure given to the extent that often 
what is suggested is an inversion of intention and intuition in the act of perceiving. 
While this seems to be the overriding notion in his work on the phenomenological 
method, there are also strong indications that he wishes to maintain the role of the 
subject. These are to be seen implicitly in what has already been discussed. More 
explicitly, at the end of Being Given Marion clearly states that he wishes not to 
‗contest‘ the subject‘s position as a centre; he wishes only to ‗contest its mode of 
occupying and exercising‘ that centre. Rather than occupying it as ‗an origin, an ego 
in the first person, in transcendental ―mineness‖‘ and in that way holding the centre, 
the subject ‗is instead held there as recipient, placed where what gives itself shows 
itself, and that there it discovers itself given to and as a pole of givenness.‘ 492  For 
Marion then, it is not a subject in any transcendent sense that is at the centre but the 
birth of the receiver.  
 
Mackinlay raises some concerns about what he perceives to be Marion‘s inversion of 
the role of the subject: from ‗the transcendental constituting ego‘ to ‗the entirely 
passive addressee‘. This would seem to suggest the complete elimination of the 
subject which, of course, is an impossibility.
493
 Moreover, he considers the passive 
role to be a ‗misleading emphasis‘ in Marion‘s work and believes an alternative 
exists in the texts themselves, one that could be described as ‗active reception of 
what is given.‘494   
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iii. The human as active receptor 
Mackinlay offers the notions of ‗active receptor‘ and ‗hermeneutical space‘ as a 
means of interpreting a more nuanced sense of givenness, which would allow for a 
more balanced sense of the subject. It is pertinent to explore these in greater detail 
since they parallel more accurately the understanding of subjectivity found in 
Eriugena‘s and Kūkai‘s notions of the human person. Both these thinkers regard the 
human—the subject—in a positive light, with an active, and so interpretative role to 
play. However, this is not in the sense of the modern autonomous subject developed 
by Descartes and Kant, because both, in different ways, present a relational sense of 
subject. 
 
Ultimately, Mackinlay is looking for a ‗middle-voiced‘ description of the encounter 
with phenomena by the subject. His position is that ‗a phenomenon‘s appearing to a 
subject would be understood in terms of active reception of what is given,‘ instead of 
passively receiving ‗the imposition of pure givens.‘ Rather than emphasising that 
phenomena give themselves from themselves, he argues that ‗they are presented and 
understood in a hermeneutic space that is opened by a subject‘s active reception.‘495  
The subject interprets and such a hermeneutic ‗militates against the notion of pure 
givens.‘ This means that the active reception of givenness belongs to the very 
structure of phenomena itself. In that sense ‗an account of what a phenomenon is 
cannot be set out in terms of its givenness alone, but must also include the way it is 
interpreted by the one who receives it.‘ As the interpreter, the subject cannot be 
entirely passive. He further notes that such an argument is already inherent in 
Marion‘s own position, if at times it appears contradictory.496 
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Mackinlay brings attention to a number of instances where such contradictions are 
evident. For example he notes that Marion offers two different accounts of 
irregardability.
497
 In the first account where he builds on Levinas‘ notion of the face, 
the emphasis is on the phenomena ‗looking at‘ the subject rather than the perceiving 
subject looking at them. The impression given is of an entirely passive subject who 
is imposed upon. However in the second account the phenomena do not impose 
themselves on me, the subject. Instead they are made possible by the subject opening 
itself up in a particular way. Thus, an anamorphosis will appear only if I situate 
myself at the right viewing point, or an icon appears only if it is venerated by me. 
While this second account does not endorse the constituting subject of classical 
metaphysics, there are contradictions in Marion‘s overall position.498  
 
However, regardless of the ambiguity his second account is noteworthy for our 
purposes. This kind of phenomenological approach (where there is ‗a ―crisscross 
[croisée]‖ of looks‘) parallels the notion of subjectivity in Eriugena and Kūkai with 
regard to coming to the enlightened state, which is about recognising and indeed 
manifesting the true nature of reality. Both Eriugena and Kūkai posit the human 
person‘s involvement in achieving his or her own enlightenment. Our exploration of 
the concepts of theophany and of kaji (linked to the sanmitsu) has shown this. 
Therefore to manifest reality the human as perceiving subject must be actively 
involved. He or she plays a role that could be described in terms of active receptor. 
  
B. Cultivating an appropriate sensibility 
In this final section I explore more closely how this active receptor might live in a 
more ecologically appropriate manner within, and in response to, a world as dynamic 
and mysterious as the one encountered in the writings so far. I am concerned here 
with what Manolopoulos refers to as our comportment towards creation or towards 
the phenomenal world. He outlines a number of elements of such comportment that 
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reflect an oscillating approach to the world as givenness or as gift. These elements 
have to do with ‗letting things be, with gentleness, with our desire for mastery, and 
with our destructiveness.‘499 Recognising the element of excess in the givenness of 
phenomena elicits responses such as remaining silent or trembling before this excess, 
as well as letting be or playing gently with creation.  The emphasis is more clearly 
on the passivity of the human as subject. In maintaining his oscillating approach 
there is recognition also of the exchange aspect in the gift. For instance, there is a 
type of letting be that is reflected when an individual makes a very conscious 
decision not to interfere. The decision while resulting in inactivity nevertheless is 
still a decision of the subject.  Moreover, the notion of instrumentality or use of the 
gift emphasises this exchange aspect as well as the active role of the subject. Given 
the level of human interference in the natural world a certain level of proper 
stewardship is required. Reflected here is the ongoing struggle to know how best to 
protect nature from further degradation by continued human intervention.  It is the 
effort to create what Larry Rasmussen refers to as sustainable community, which is 
about ‗the earth‘s carrying capacity, its powers for sustaining present and future 
generations, the ability of natural and social systems to live together indefinitely.‘500  
 
Manolopoulos does not claim to offer a response to the many cultural issues that 
arise in relation to the ecological crisis. His focus is on ‗changing sensibilities‘ at a 
personal level. The notion of developing a more appropriate sensibility towards the 
phenomenal world is not new, and it is found in the literature in ecology and 
religion. For instance, Sallie McFague writes about such a change as expressing 
subject-to-subject rather than subject-to object relationships with nature. We should 
extend how we relate to other humans, to the natural world. Drawing from insights 
in feminist epistemology, process philosophy, the field of literature and ecological 
science and based on the idea of the ―loving eye‖ knowledge of others, she develops 
                                                          
499
 Manolopoulos, If creation is a gift, p. 107 
500
 Rasmussen, Earth Community, Earth Ethics, p. 24. This idea of sustainable community recognises 
human involvement in the ‗protection‘ of the earth, but does so from the perspective of situating 
humans within the natural processes, where their primary role is as members, rather than as 
consumers or users, of the natural world. By contrast the notion of sustainable development focuses 
more on the human as agent without any real emphasis on its belongingness in the larger earth 
community. 
189 
 
a subject-to-subject model reminiscent of the philosopher Martin Buber‘s I-Thou 
approach to relationships. McFague speaks about the need to pay attention to things 
other than ourselves so that we come to know that otherness as real. The reason for 
doing this is that unless we come to know it in this way, we cannot love it or care for 
it or treat it with dignity. The loving eye, in contrast to the arrogant eye is not staring 
at or grasping the other: rather it is ‗relating to the other more like a Thou than an 
It.‘501  
 
Manolopoulos‘ approach is interesting in that, based primarily on a critical 
understanding of Marion‘s notion of givenness, he claims that we create our ethos 
out of a ‗relentlessly aporetic-oscillational thinking of gifting.‘  Moreover, his claim 
is that this notion of engaging the logic and language of oscillation with regard to the 
gift is indicated by Marion‘s own fluctuation. 502  A critical appraisal of Marion‘s 
position reveals that inherent in it is recognition of the sheer givenness of reality—
the emphasis on excess— but also a desire for the subject to be involved. In that way 
he has come to recognise, on the one hand, reality as givenness and on the other the 
ambiguity of the role of the human subject. Manolopoulos‘ concept of oscillation, 
with its notion of ‗swinging backwards and forwards like a pendulum or moving to 
and fro between two points giving rise to an unceasing alteration within limits, 
recognises the tension within the gift idea.‘503 
 
One of the elements Manolopoulos highlights, which I would like to explore, 
concerns the notion of silence. I focus on this one in particular since the reception of 
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the gift both ‗precedes and exceeds discourse.‘  Moreover the interplay of silence 
and language finds echoes, in different ways, in both Eriugena and Kūkai. This 
interplay emphasises the mystery of reality and yet ultimately relates to the issue of 
knowledge of reality. Therefore, a second element I explore is what it might mean, in 
this context, to know reality, and how the interplay of knowing and not-knowing 
leads to a deeper kind of understanding.  Much of this emphasises a non-
interventionist approach, which is recognition of the gift‘s excess. What might 
constitute appropriate interventionist responses that would reflect the gift‘s aporia 
and the subject as active agent? In this regard I explore notions of necessary and 
unnecessary violence in our engagement with nature. Finally, there is a strong 
current of approaching the world as a place to be enjoyed, inherent in the idea of gift. 
In that regard I examine Manolopoulos‘ oscillation of play and enjoyment with what 
he terms religious return. 
 
i. A Pseudo-Dionysian ‘wise silence’  
The notion that ultimate reality can best be understood as givenness suggests the 
need to begin with ‗that which is done to us.‘ This highlights the ‗in excess‘ nature 
of the gift — the phenomenal world. From the perspective of the perceiving subject 
the emphasis is on the reception of givenness rather than on the response of the 
subject. Because reception ‗precedes and exceeds discourse‘ then, by definition, it is 
marked by a ‗prior or immemorial silence.‘ Our silence, as subjects, reflects and 
respects this more primordial silence. Manolopoulos described silence then as ‗an 
exemplary response‘ on the part of the subject. It honours the aporetic nature of 
givenness and of the perceiving subject that we have been speaking about.
504
 
Ecologically speaking, such silence is exemplary as it clearly indicates a form of 
reception that is not about having all questions answered, or about balancing and 
counting, which are the kinds of reception reflected in a view of nature only as object 
or as resource.
505
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Moreover, silence is central to all the great religious traditions. As the Jewish scholar 
and mystic Franz Rozenzweig points out with regard to the process of creation: ‗God 
spoke. That came third. It was not the first thing.‘ The initial act of creation did not 
involve the spoken word.
506
 In the Buddhist tradition the silence of the Buddha is 
spoken about as having proverbial status.
507
  
 
Eriugena‘s Christianity and Kūkai‘s Buddhism both reflect the importance of 
silence.  For instance Eriugena‘s use of the apophatic in approaching the divine 
principle—ultimate reality— indicates the value he places on silence. Moreover it 
reflects what Dionysius refers to as a ‗wise silence.‘  Because of the infinity of the 
Divine principle, Eriugena explains that the human mind cannot grasp the essence of 
reality. As noted previously it is capable of understanding only quia est and never 
quid est, the essence. Therefore, according to Eriugena one ought to ‗approach 
intellectually the divine principle, with respectful silence.‘508 Approaching the divine 
principle in such a manner would indicate approaching the manifestation of this 
principle as the phenomenal world in an equally respectful manner.  
 
Meditative practices, which are built on silence, while not as central as devotional 
practices in the western Christian psyche, are still to be found. One such practice, 
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which advocates this wise silence and is found sporadically in the West but more 
associated with the Greek East, is that of hesychia.
509
   
 
Just as the idea of silence is understood in the interplay of the apophatic and 
cataphatic in Eriugena, in the Buddhist understanding silence is connected to the 
experience of emptiness or nothingness when one comes face to face with the abyss 
—which is generally understood to be the starting point of salvation or 
enlightenment. When one lets go into this experience one comes to see that no split 
exists between the world and the perceiver —the subject and object. In his essay on 
‗Language and Silence‘ Tetsuaki Kotoh comments that at this point reality, which 
has been ‗rigidified by linguistic segmentation, gradually becomes fluid...and with 
the elimination of distinct boundaries things come mutually to interpenetrate each 
other.‘510 We come face to face with reality as it is—a reality that is totally different, 
however, from everyday reality, since it is perceived without the ‗overlay of 
everyday language.‘ Kūkai points out: ‗With ordinary people the true perception of 
true nature is prevented by ―obscuring fantasies.‖511 
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This primordial reality— often termed spontaneous arising— silently boils up, and 
out of this silence emerges a new language that of the true self. Silence then can be 
understood as an echo of true reality, out of which comes a new language —in 
Kūkai‘s words the esoteric language of Dainichi—that is not the everyday language 
of physicality as such. By returning to silence, the true self—in our case the more 
ecological self—‗joins the flow of spontaneous arising‘s silent segmentation, and for 
the first time encounters the original segmentation which begins to create the worlds 
of individual things.‘ As Kotoh concludes ‗one needs to listen belongingly (gehören) 
to the sound of silence which constantly emanates from the depths of the 
indescribable and continue to let this be the source of one‘s own language.‘ 512 In so 
doing it becomes the source of one‘s own way of being in the world. 
 
Contemplating the world, which involves silence, can engender in us a sense of 
wonder at its givenness, at (what can be perceived at times to be) its ‗sheer alien 
pointless independent existence.‘513 Such contemplation, which is related, as we 
have seen, to the praxis approach of Kūkai and also the contemplatio of Eriugena 
enables us to recognise reality as it is: to recognise the mystery at the heart of reality. 
From this stance attempts to grasp it in any possessive sense are seen to be 
impossible, and instead we allow ourselves to be overcome with wonder. 
 
ii. The knowing and unknowing of reality 
Finally, I focus on what language and silence ultimately mean: an appropriate way of 
knowing reality. Once again approaching reality in terms of givenness and 
recognising the aporetic nature of the gift, Manolopoulos points out, in his 
interpretation of Marion, that this involves an oscillation of knowing and not 
knowing: a partial knowledge. The phenomenon must be grasped in order for it to be 
recognised as gift; yet not grasped completely as this kind of mastery would erase 
the gift and reduce it to an object.
514
 Manolopoulos goes on to make a further 
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important ecological point regarding the notion of knowing always being about a 
gain. Science and technology are primary sources of our knowledge of the 
phenomenal world. They are ‗acts-of-knowing par excellence‘ and yet the ‗gain‘ of 
this knowledge has also resulted in manipulation and destruction of the natural 
world, of the kind that might be better described as loss. Inherent particularly in the 
science and technology episteme one can find reflected the double meaning of the 
German translation of the term gift. Here gift is both ―present‖ and ―poison.‖  
 
What all this points to is that the world as gift —beings in relation—indicates the 
impossibility of anything being completely knowable. The ‗excess‘ that givenness 
highlights means that, in perception, there is both knowing and unknowing. Once 
again we return to the recognition of the mystery that marks all of reality, and that is 
recognised in the philosophical understandings of both Eriugena and Kūkai. The type 
of knowing being considered here is not an intellectual knowing as such. 
Manolopoulos points out: ‗Creation is inundated by the damaging ―noise‖ of 
excessive epistēmē and technē.‘515 It is the knowing of not knowing that is reached 
through a deep unity and oneness with things. It is the knowing reached when we 
have gone through to the level of the Buddhist notion of śūnyatā.516  
 
Another approach is to speak about going beyond knowing to a deep understanding.  
In this regard Kasulis talks about an ‗insightful understanding‘ or verstehen, which is 
to go beyond knowing about, for example, another culture: included in the concept 
are feelings and imagination, and ‗the capacity to project ourselves into the place‘ of 
the other as it were. At the heart of this kind of knowing, according to Kasulis, is the 
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notion of intimacy, since this involves an inseparability, a belonging together, a 
sharing.‘517  
 
iii. Inter-relatedness and violence 
The primary characteristic of any unity means that all within it are in a relational 
mode. However the fact of our being in relationship (as well as the reality of human 
influence on the earth today) means that in dealing with the natural world simply 
letting things be in any total sense is not a viable possibility. This raises a number of 
concepts but one I would like to explore briefly here is the idea of violence and the 
role it plays in our general engagement with nature.  Firstly with regard to violence 
we can say that there is inevitability about interaction that could be characterised as 
an unavoidable violence. The logic of the evolutionary process is that life feeds on 
life. As humans it is obvious that not only are we derived from the whole we also 
depend on it for our continued existence. The food chain is the most obvious 
example of this. The taking of life suggests violence. What it means is that there is a 
necessary kind of violence that characterises the life of the world but also can be 
reflected in our understanding of gift.  
 
I say unavoidable or necessary because there are also forms of violence that must be 
resisted, what Manolopoulos describes as ‗disfigurative violence‘. Such forms can be 
seen in our commodification or instrumentalising of nature resulting in the kind of 
consumerism that characterises capitalist societies today, and that have given rise to 
the ecological crisis. Manolopoulos points out that Heidegger‘s and Marion‘s notions 
concerning a critique of technology are informative in this regard. For instance 
Marion‘s notion of objectification, where the conceptualising of the subject 
determines the given rather than the other way round, is a critique of modern 
technology‘s approach, and can be seen as a form of violence that needs to be 
resisted. Heidegger‘s notion of Bestand (standing reserve) results from the fact that 
modern technology forces nature to provide energy for human use, rather than the 
emphasis being on allowing nature to offer itself as in ‗the blossoming of a rose.‘ 
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Technē itself is perverted. Manolopoulos comments: ‗Modern technology is a form 
of technē that not only prohibits things from letting themselves be in their own 
particularity, but disfigures phenomena as standing-reserve, as products for human 
consumption.‘518 It is important to recognise that Heidegger is not condemning all 
technē, he is pointing out that technē has been disfigured.  
 
iv. The response of praise 
Dainichi Nyorai, according to Kūkai, expresses himself as the phenomenal world for 
his own enjoyment. There is a sense in which the givenness of reality invites a 
response of playfulness and of enjoyment. The invitation is free. We enter into the 
play that is creation if we so wish. Enjoying creation can also result in over 
indulgence and treating entities as commodities for our enjoyment. This gives rise to 
another form of oscillation: we ‗use‘ the world for our enjoyment, but do so with an 
attitude of letting be, giving rise to a ‗gentler recreation.‘519 
 
While we cannot return, in any real sense, the givenness of the phenomenal world, 
there is room for a kind of reciprocity that softens the notion of exchange and also 
recognises the inherent interdependency of reality. Awareness of these aspects of the 
notion of reciprocity means that the possibility of over-indulgence in the enjoyment 
of creation —the problems of over consumption of resources for enjoyment in many 
forms, in a word consumerism— is tempered. By giving thanks, there is both an 
acceptance of the gift and the making of some form of return. In more religious 
terms we are referring to the notion of praise. The philosopher Jean-Louis Chretien, 
in his reflections on praise, recognises its double sidedness: it both accepts what is 
given but also says thanks. There is both identification and celebration.  In a non-
religious sense Manolopoulos points out the value of celebration in this context. In 
celebration ‗freely given creation is (―simply‖) affirmed.‘520  Rather than 
emphasising the return —and yet not forgetting it altogether— the recipient delights 
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in the given, giving rise to what Caputo describes as (in referring to Lévinas) a kind 
of natural atheism where one rejoices in the world for its own sake.
521
   
 
In many ways the kind of ethic being developed here links with the notion of 
ecological humility spoken of earlier. Humans are becoming increasingly aware of 
what is the overwhelming starting point—what has been emphasised throughout this 
text: we are part of a larger whole—a matrix—out of which we have arisen. In the 
much used ecological catchphrase we are one species among many. This awareness 
of our belonging to the larger matrix is increasing in us today through data from the 
various earth sciences. The human person comes to a realisation that he or she 
‗derives from the creation-gift and this realization counterbalances pretensions of 
priority and mastery over itself and others.‘522 Gabriel Marcel‘s remarks are 
insightful here: ‗We realize at once with what care the affirmation ―I am‖ must be 
approached...it [should] be whispered humbly.‘ He goes on to explain: I say humility 
because, after all,... this being is something that can only be granted to us as a gift; it 
is a cruder illusion to believe that it is something which I can offer to myself...‘523  
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Conclusion: 
In this dissertation I have endeavoured to show how a dialogue between two lesser 
known philosophers from the major world religions of Christianity and Buddhism, 
Eriugena and Kūkai respectively, offer insights that are valuable as religious 
philosophical responses to the ecological crisis. I firstly used the framework of 
divine-human-earth relations to explore and connect the insights of Eriugena and 
Kūkai, and secondly, to bolster the core claim, I examined some ecologically 
oriented understandings of contemporary phenomenological approaches, that (I 
argued), reflect notions of reality similar to those of the medieval philosophers.  
 
In relation to their perceptions of the nature of reality I argued that the overwhelming 
emphasis in Eriugena and Kūkai is on the oneness of all reality, though this is 
perhaps more obvious in Kūkai than in Eriugena. Eriugena maintains a creator-
creation focus in dealing with the origin of all things, while Kūkai clearly holds that 
creator and created are the same—both being the six great elements.  Yet, Eriugena‘s 
grappling to find one overall concept—natura or phusis—to express the totality and 
Kūkai‘s central teaching that the phenomenal world is the cosmic Buddha are 
indicative of their primary emphasis on oneness.  Any notion of ‗divinity‘ or some 
ultimate truth in their respective positions is to be found within the one ontological 
realm. An emphasis on one unified whole is at the heart of most ecological stances, 
therefore the religious philosophical perspectives expressed here can be considered 
worthwhile ecologically. Moreover they counter the kinds of dualisms, particularly 
within Christian understandings, that many argue are at least partly response for the 
denigration of material reality.  
 
Through my use of the divine-human-earth framework I showed that both Eriugena 
and Kūkai express understandings of this unified reality that could be described via 
the term ‗immanental transcendence.‘ Kūkai holds that the cosmic Buddha Dainichi, 
considered by other Buddhist schools to be remote and inaccessible, is in fact the 
very cosmos itself in its enlightened state. While this suggests that Dainichi and the 
phenomenal world are identical Kūkai‘s writings also contain some paradoxical 
expressions that retain a sense of distinction so that while one is within many and 
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many are in one there is at the same time no confusion to be found.  Eriugena uses 
the notion of theophany to describe, on the one hand, how the divine expresses itself 
and, on the other, the effects of that expression.  The divine manifests itself as 
created reality—in fact it is the only way by which the divine can be known—and all 
phenomena can be understood as divine self-expression.  
 
I suggested that the concept of personhood, not understood as an agent who acts but 
as the act itself, can be applied to both their understandings of reality. This relational 
understanding of personhood does not separate the action from the one doing the 
action, and in that way the emphasis is on the unity and internal relationship of the 
whole and parts. Moreover, I argued, that both Eriugena and Kūkai speak of an 
emptiness or nothingness at the heart of reality with significant similarities to be 
found in their understandings. This is not the emptiness of privation or nihilism; 
rather with the suggestion of beyond both being and nonbeing there is a kind of 
fullness or excess—an emptiness that is full of potential or possibility—and this is 
made visible as the phenomenal world.  
 
Thus we can say that for both Eriugena and Kūkai all phenomena point to an 
underlying emptiness or ultimate truth and are that truth expressing itself. I further 
pointed out that this understanding suggests that worldly phenomena are accorded a 
more active role vis-à-vis the divine in Eriugena than is the case within more 
Western oriented, Augustinian influenced, Christian thought. Such thought is 
generally considered to be the mainstream of the tradition. The radical dependency, 
passivity and separateness (from the creator) of creation, found in Augustinian 
influenced thought, is not to be found in Eriugena. The fact that Eriugena includes 
the infinite within his totality makes it impossible to fully define reality, and so gives 
to it, from the very beginning, an inherent dynamism. Instead of a passive role 
created reality is cast in the active role of being the expression of the divine nature to 
the point of actually fulfilling the divine nature.  All of this further suggests that 
Eriugena views the whole of the phenomenal world in a very positive light. This 
positivity can also be gleaned in his subversion of the Neoplatonic principle of 
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reduced causal power in favour of a multiplicity of divine expression. Such 
subversion, I argued, can be understood as grounds for appreciating created reality.  
A strongly positive and active sense of the phenomenal world is very much evident 
in Kūkai‘s poetry where, in highlighting its naked wild aspect, he claims that nature 
cultivated his mind rather than, (as was the case in the court at the time) poetic 
writing capturing and transforming natural beauty. This approach to the natural 
world is further enhanced by his rejection of the theory of universal degeneration and 
his clear emphasis on the phenomenal world being the place where enlightenment is 
achieved. For Kūkai it is in, through, and with this very body (this existence) that 
one reaches the enlightened state. 
 
The perspective on reality as revealing and concealing ultimate truth I argued gives 
rise to a sense of a depth dimension to the whole of the phenomenal world. There is a 
numinous quality to all of reality making all phenomena more than mere objects. We 
cannot fully know them or speak of them, and so I highlighted the inability of human 
language to express the kind of ineffability that is being hinted at here. My claim is 
that an ecological humility is required, one that recognises our place within the 
overall scheme of things.  
 
I go on to explore how Eriugena and Kūkai relate the notion of text to the 
phenomenal world. In Kūkai the world is understood as an open-ended text—all 
phenomena are its words—and ultimately we can speak of the text as the world and 
the world as the text, giving rise to a material rather than representational sense of 
text. In Eriugena I referred to his use of the Christian idea of having the book of 
nature alongside the book of scripture—that all created beings (not just the scriptural 
texts) are understood to be the words or speech of God. Moreover, just as the 
meaning of a text is to be found in the text so the divine is to be found in created 
reality. Thus, I argued, Eriugena‘s emphasis is not on God and the world as two 
separate realms, but on the theophanic world. 
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In turning to the role of the human person I argued that both philosophers emphasise 
a focus on reaching enlightenment or salvation—understood as attaining union with 
the whole. It is through choosing to respond to divine condescension (in theophany) 
that one can recognise this in Eriugena.  One is required to choose to activate in 
oneself this inherent capacity to respond, in order to recognise the world as divine 
manifestation or theophany. It requires a cultivation of a way of being in the world. 
And yet, paradoxically, for Eriugena such cultivation is ultimately possible only via 
divine grace. While a similar process can be gleaned from Kūkai‘s notion of kaji, 
there is a greater emphasis on the interpenetrating activity of the practitioner and 
ultimate reality, giving rise to nyugo ganyu—the Buddha enters me and I enter the 
Buddha.  
 
Moreover, for Kūkai to come to the enlightened state involves a different kind of 
knowing— one that is ultimately about praxis. Through engagement in ritual 
practices of cultivation the practitioner aligns his or her activity with that of the 
Buddha. Specifically for Kūkai these practices are the three processes of reciting 
mantras, making the appropriate mudras and engaging in visualizations attached to 
the mandalas. Consequently one truly realises nonduality with the dharma or truth: 
one reaches enlightenment. Kūkai‘s emphasis on praxis is not matched in Eriugena. 
Yet Eriugena‘s notion of theoria, which can be understood as a process of 
experiential mindfulness, is about preparing the practitioner to see reality as divine 
manifestation. Ultimately the view of reality being sought here by both Eriugena and 
Kūkai is akin to Nishitani‘s notion of true religion, where there is a simultaneous 
action of our becoming aware of reality and reality realising itself in our awareness. 
 
I also pointed out that Kūkai gives clear priority to the body—the vehicle of 
cultivation practices—over the mind and yet maintains a bodymind unity or 
nonduality. Eriugena, on the other hand, emphasises the mind over the body, and yet 
his theory of the body—even while associated with Christian notions of sin—
eventually results in an understanding of materiality as the source of possibility as 
well as danger. It is the means by which one comes to see reality as it really is—the 
manifestation of the divine—but it is also the source of temptation. Finally, Eriugena 
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emphasises a mediator role for the human, giving the human a central role in his 
schema. The human is the being through whom all else unfolds and returns to the 
One. Yet the human cannot be understood as a being of independent status, rather he 
or she is part of surrounding reality. In Kūkai the central emphasis is on the human 
as part of the larger reality and the emphasis is on all of reality giving rise to ultimate 
reality in its fullness.  
 
In an effort to give the argument of the thesis a more contemporary focus and to 
bolster the use of these ideas for an ecological context, in chapter four I drew on 
some contemporary ecological interpretations of recent philosophical thinking that 
reflect notions of reality and of the human similar to those expressed in Eriugena and 
Kūkai. I did this firstly, by equating the notions of the numinous found in Eriugena 
and Kūkai with more secular concepts of alterity found in contemporary 
understandings of Merleau-Ponty (as discussed by Ted Toadvine), as well as notions 
of givenness and gift found in Marion. Moreover, I claimed that recognition of such 
alterity or numinosity offers the possibility of cultivating a more respectful attitude 
toward the natural world. Such an attitude has a greater possibility of resulting in 
more ecologically acceptable behaviour and as such I suggest that it could be seen as 
a basis or an ethos for how one ought to live in, and respond to, the current 
ecological reality.  
 
Secondly, I equated notions of the human—understood as part of the whole yet 
having a specific role—that emerged from Eriugena‘s theophany and Kūkai‘s kaji 
with a critical appraisal of subjectivity in Marion‘s phenomenology of givenness, 
largely drawn from the work of Shane Mackinlay and Mark Manolopoulos. I 
claimed that Mackinlay‘s ‗middle-voiced‘ position regarding the subject, which he 
describes via the concepts of ‗active receptor‘ and ‗hermeneutical space‘, allowed for 
a more balanced view, and it reflected Eriugena‘s and Kūkai‘s positions. The 
givenness of all phenomena is to be understood within an interpretative space. This 
allows, on the one hand, for the active involvement of the one interpreting and, on 
the other, for the givenness of the phenomena. Thus the human as perceiving subject 
is actively involved but not in the sense of a modern autonomous subject.  
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This understanding of the human, within a world understood as dynamic and 
mysterious is likely to result in a more ecologically appropriate manner of living. In 
exploring elements of such behaviour I drew on Manolopoulos‘ idea of a kind of 
comportment that reflects an ‗oscillating approach‘ to reality as givenness. On the 
one hand recognition is given to the element of excess in the givenness of 
phenomena and to the passive role of the human subject by such behaviours as 
letting be, remaining silent, and playing gently with creation. On the other hand, the 
exchange element of gift is recognised, as is the active role of the subject. The latter 
(active role of subject) is expressed by engaging in appropriate interventionist 
approaches such as what might be described as unavoidable violence inherent in the 
evolutionary process itself.  
 
The central claim of the dissertation—that lesser known but influential thinkers 
within religious traditions have something to offer the current ecological context and 
that exploration of these perspectives are best done in dialogue particularly dialogue 
between East and West—arises out of a prior claim concerning the discourse on 
religion and ecology. This is the claim that religious philosophical responses offer a 
much needed addition to the scientific and technological ones, which currently 
dominate the discourse on the ecological crisis.  Moreover this reflects the scenario 
found within the humanities generally. 
 
Before exploring the dialogue I looked briefly at this prior claim firstly by noting 
that despite the ambiguous nature of religious traditions—which often inspired 
derogatory attitudes towards nature—the call has not been to abandon them as 
sources of inspiration for ecological responses but to engage them more deeply. In 
this way the different shades of opinion and perspectives to be found within them are 
highlighted. Secondly, the value of religious traditions‘ contribution is implicit in the 
wide-ranging and burgeoning field of study that has come to be known as ecology 
and religion.  Over the course of the past almost half century, not only environmental 
writers but scholars across a range of disciplines, from religious studies and theology 
through philosophy, anthropology, sociology to various branches of science, have 
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contributed to this area. This must surely suggest recognition of the value of 
contributions from religious thought.  
 
My general overview of this field in the final section of Chapter One paid particular 
attention to the significant contribution made by the Harvard ecology and religion 
series in the late 1990s—a series that is reflective of the nature of much of the field. 
The series was underpinned by a belief in the need for broader philosophical and 
religious understandings of the human vis-à-vis the natural world because the 
ecological crisis required moral and spiritual responses as well as political, social 
and economic ones. Thus identifying ecological attitudes, values and practices within 
the various traditions was a key aim of the series. By exploring the work of Eriugena 
and Kūkai —two examples, within the Christian and Buddhist traditions 
respectively, of more positive attitudes towards the phenomenal world— this thesis 
relates to this central aspect of the field.  However in its efforts to contribute insights 
from the traditions the thesis takes a somewhat different approach than is often the 
case in the religion and ecology literature. 
 
While much ecological writing has focused on a notion of the unity or oneness of all 
reality where the emphasis is on humans being very much one with nature—a 
materialist focus—the approach taken here is a more metaphysical one. I showed 
that both Eriugena and Kūkai posit an understanding of the phenomenal world that is 
more than material. While Kūkai does not endorse any kind of dualism (a point that 
is more ambiguous in Eriugena) my highlighting—through the use of the concept of 
‗immanental transcendence‘—of the dynamic, numinous, mysterious nature of 
reality that they posit, as well as the somewhat distinctive role of the human within 
that reality, indicates such a metaphysical approach.  Moreover the human is not just 
presented as being part of nature, though this is clearly emphasised; rather I argued 
for an understanding of the human as actively engaging with the other than human 
world while recognising his or her belonging within it. My use of the concept of 
active receptor and my exploration of the aporetic nature of the givenness of reality 
gave this argument a contemporary expression.  
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I further highlighted that critical appraisals of the literature indicate that the focus 
has tended to be on mainstream positions within the respective traditions. The focus 
of this thesis is more nuanced in that it has been on more neglected, yet recognisable 
streams, within the traditions. While Eriugena and Kūkai express identifiable 
Christian and Buddhist positions, I have pointed out that both offer understandings 
that differ markedly with what were considered mainstream positions of their day. 
Their overwhelming emphasis on an immanental sense of transcendence and on a 
much more dynamic sense of reality marked them out in their particular time.   
 
While Kūkai has featured in some works in the field of religion and ecology 
Eriugena has not been explored in this context to any significant degree in previous 
literature. Moreover my focus on a cross-cultural philosophical religious dialogue 
adds to an underdeveloped aspect of this field. By exploring the insights of two 
lesser known thinkers from vastly different traditions Eriugena and Kūkai this 
dissertation has effected to contribute to the field by a much needed focus on 
comparative work.  
 
The efforts to unearth ecological possibilities in the literature involved recognising 
the ambiguous and nuanced nature of the understandings of the phenomenal world at 
work in many of the great religious traditions. This thesis also recognises that reality 
by noting a certain level of ambiguity towards material reality found in Eriugena‘s 
philosophy. Yet it sees the value of his contribution. In that respects it endeavours to 
maintain a realistic perspective on Christian oriented approaches to the natural 
world.  
 
The assumption, often found in the literature, that religious traditions such as 
Buddhism, (which easily locate humans within the material world and contain 
obvious core teachings which are easily clothed in ecological language), are more 
ecological and will automatically give rise to ecologically sound behaviour, while 
those such as Christianity, (where such teachings are not as easily discernable), will 
not, is also critiqued. Again cognisance of such a criticism is reflected in this thesis‘ 
choice of philosophers. For instance, I have argued that Eriugena, while being 
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recognizably Christian, offers a more ecologically acceptable perspective on the 
natural world than is often the case with Christianity.   
 
A further criticism here concerns the idealistic premise of much of the literature: that 
behaviour is invariably conditioned by worldviews giving rise to a sense of a direct 
one-directional causal link from worldview to behaviour. This thesis takes 
cognisance of such a criticism in exploring the cosmic vision—worldviews—of 
Eriugena and Kūkai. I argued in the thesis for the positive potential impact of such 
views of reality.  Yet my claim is that Eriugena and Kūkai did not just offer a purely 
theoretical understanding of reality that would lead to a change in human behaviour. 
They were not just offering ideas as the means of social change. They claimed, 
particularly Kūkai, through active engagement with the world, which for Kūkai was 
about the ritual practices, one came to the truth—in other words one‘s worldview 
was deepened or altered.  
 
Finally, the practice of using traditional religious thought to create an environmental 
ethic has been strongly criticised by scholars such as Harris, who claim that it is a 
distortion of the culture specific approaches of different traditions. However, I would 
argue that this need not necessarily be the case, as my approach to Eriugena and 
Kūkai shows. I argued that both offer insights that can be used in formulating more 
ecologically appropriate behaviour. Yet, in doing this I have not ignored aspects of 
their thought— such as the ambiguity in Eriugena towards the body—which would 
not contribute positively to such an ethic. In that way I have not distorted their 
particular philosophical positions on reality.  
 
In some respects however, this dissertation is no more than an introductory effort to 
compare two thinkers from vastly different cultures from each other and from today 
in an ecological context. Further possibilities for research suggest themselves. I have 
argued that the recognition of the depth dimension to reality, which marks the 
esoteric and apophatic as indicated by Kūkai and Eriugena, makes the possibility of 
having a more holistic and non possessive attitude towards the phenomenal world 
more feasible. I looked at how this notion is reflected in the work of contemporary 
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phenomenology. However it seems to me that this idea is also reflected (if somewhat 
differently) in recent work in environmental philosophy by Simon James.  
 
Coming from the field of virtue ethics, James wishes to develop a phenomenological 
approach in environmental philosophy. In examining a values-only approach to 
nature (in order to ascertain how nature matters in a morally significant way) James 
presents scenarios that show a values-only approach to be too limited. The reasons 
why things matter to us cannot be framed completely in the idiom of value and to do 
so is to ‗proffer an interpretation that is forced or violent.‘ However, James goes on 
to point out, the problem with using this kind of framework only is not just because 
we might fail to account for all the ‗matterings‘ of phenomena in our lives, but more 
particularly it is because it may result in our dismissal of such phenomena altogether 
claiming that we know all there is to know: 
The real danger, I believe, is that a preoccupation with values-thinking might 
lead one to suppose that it is possible to distil the value from a thing and in 
this way capture all the ways it matters to us. For having distilled the value of 
the thing, one might be led to think that the thing itself merits no further 
attention. Everything that is important, morally, aesthetically and spiritually, 
will seem to be encapsulated in a neat package of values. And this surely 
would be the world of lived experience well lost.
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In this dissertation I have simply scratched the surface of trying to understand how 
we speak of the phenomenal world by exploring neglected ancient religious 
philosophical traditions in conjunction with contemporary phenomenological 
understandings. There is, therefore, room for much further engagement that 
recognises that nature needs to be approached via more than any one framework of 
exploration because ultimately we can never fully exhaust its meanings. 
 
                                                          
524
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I have argued for the role of religion in responding to contemporary reality. Implicit 
in much of what has been explored is retrieval of religious ideas—particularly in 
Christianity—but in the consciousness of a post ‗death of God‘ context. In many 
ways this has freed up notions of religiosity from a more formalised sense found in 
classical mainstream Christianity (and also perhaps from the hostility of 
philosophical enterprises that see no place for religious thinking), allowing them to 
be examined in a more neutral setting. There is ample scope for further research of 
this kind, especially in the light of the ecological crisis. 
 
Moreover, in recognition of the widening understanding of the concept of religion 
itself, there is ample scope for a dialogue between these elements of Christianity and 
Buddhism, on the one hand, and ideas found in indigenous traditions, on the other. In 
particular I am thinking of the work of John Grim whose idea of a holistic matrix 
could provide a link with Eriugena‘s frame of natura and Kūkai‘s hosshin seppō. 
From his exploration of the world of indigenous culture—its lifeways—Grim claims 
that in their grappling with the unknown from a religious sense, ‗the implicate world 
of cosmological relationships‘ are understood to be ‗folded into the rich array of 
lifeway activities.‘ He goes on to say that in indigenous traditions divine power ‗is 
neither simply transcendent nor immanent, but a holistic matrix that generates a 
deeper knowing of the observed world through the interacting spheres of the 
somatic, the social, the ecological and the cosmological.‘525 Making these links with 
indigenous notions would offer different angles on how we might come to an ever 
deeper understanding of the observed world.  
 
Throughout this work I have experienced the underlying tension between a positive 
regard for the world in all its aspects— coming primarily through the emphasis on 
the unity of reality— and, at the same time, a possible denigration, or undervaluing, 
of the very materiality of such a recognition in the face of the ultimate reality.  Such 
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 J.A. Grim, ‗Indigenous Traditions‘ in Gottlieb, (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Religion and Ecology, p. 
297. Interestingly, Grim brings attention to a four-fold interpretive context—the embodied self, the 
native society, the larger earth community of the region, and the powerful cosmological entities that 
are considered to be present in ritual activities and mythic narratives of the group. A dialogue between 
such a frame and the four-fold of Eriugena could reveal interesting results. 
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tensions need to be acknowledged more clearly, but not in a dismissive way. My 
contention is that we are at a new level of integration of vastly different perspectives 
on reality. In a sense this is pointed out by Catherine Keller in an insightful 
observation in an article that discusses literature on embodiment alongside notions of 
the apophatic. She wonders firstly if it is an accident that now that a focus on body is 
finding its voice within theological institutions ‗a mysticism of transcendent silence 
becomes trendy.‘  She goes on to suggest that there is a sense in which these need 
each other. Her claim is that if research on embodiment is to reach its own potential, 
it may require ‗a dose of negative theology laced with deconstruction.‘ Conversely, 
she claims, ‗an earthier embrace of our diversely bodied and often clouded 
creatureliness might help the mystical radiance to come out from under its bushel.‘526 
Perhaps we need not see these different approaches as opposing (and yet not deny 
their differences) so much as finding in them views that bring us closer to the 
purpose of philosophy and religion: coming to an understanding of the true nature of 
reality and our place and role in it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
526
 C. Keller, ‗The Cloud of the Impossible: Feminist Theology, Cosmology and Cusa, for Harvard 
2007 available <users.drew.edu/ckeller/essays/Cloud%20of%20Harvard.doc >  
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